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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on market microstructure by pre-
senting three essays on the market microstructure around ex-dividend days. The
rst essay studies the market microstructure footprints associated with trading
and tax-arbitrage activity around ex-dividend day using a sample of FTSE 100
stocks. Specically, the rst essay asks whether bid-ask spreads, price volatility
and order submission strategies change as stocks transition to the ex-dividend
day. From the results there is evidence of the presence of both tax- arbitrageurs
and liquidity suppliers around ex-dividend day. Furthermore, the ndings sup-
port that increases in spread, volatility, return and execution probability around
ex-dividend day attract liquidity suppliers and tax-arbitrageurs.
The second essay investigates whether the lack of liquidity prevents the pres-
ence of ex-dividend trade activities, and how the behaviour of tax-arbitrage traders,
if there are any, could aect bid-ask spreads, price volatility and order submis-
sion strategies using a sample of FTSE SmallCap stocks. The results show that
illiquidity seems not to prevent tax-arbitrage activities altogether. Although, the
ndings suggest eects associating order submission to spread, volatility and to
return, they do not support any eect associating order submission to execution
probability.
The third and nal essay analyses intraday patterns related to bid-ask spread,
trade volume and price volatility around the ex-dividend day for a sample of FTSE
100 companies. The results show that volume towards the end of the trading day
is .greater .both on ex- and cum-dividend days , .among rms that are the most
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attractive targets for tax-arbitrage. The ndings show that the spread towards
the end of the day is greater both on ex-dividend and cum-dividend days also
though here the eect is conned to the last half hour of the trading day for the
rms that are the most attractive targets for tax-arbitrage. The classication of
whether a rm is an attractive target for tax-arbitrage is based on whether the
price impact less than a specied threshold. Finally, the results and patterns
noted above become masked in the large pool comprising all rms because the
eects that are identied for rms that are the most attractive targets for tax-
arbitrage are oset by the eects that are identied for the rms that are the least
attractive targets for tax arbitrage.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or en-
ergy or money. It's run by ones and zeroes, little
bits of data. It's all just electrons. [. . . ] There's
a war out there, old friend, a world war. And it's
not about who's got the most bullets. It's about
who controls the information: what we see and
hear, how we work, what we think. It's all about
the information.
Cosmo (Ben Kingsley) in Sneakers (1992)
This thesis provides an empirical study on London Stock Exchange market (LSE).
It contributes to the existing literature by addressing three main issues which cover
the elds of market microstructure and corporate nance. The rst essay, pre-
sented in the second chapter, focuses on the market microstructure eects around
ex-dividend day for a sample of FTSE 100 stocks. The second essay, presented
in the third chapter investigates the impact of liquidity on market microstructure
around the ex-dividend day using a sample of FTSE SmallCap stocks. The nal
essay, presented in the fourth chapter, examines the impact of the ex-dividend
day on intraday trading patterns for a sample of FTSE 100 stocks.
For a clearer understanding of the London Stock Exchange market, this chapter
presents a brief introduction to the London Stock Exchange market and the UK
taxation system, explains the motivations behind the thesis and the briey scouts
1
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the data employed in the thesis, outlines the main contributions and presents the
structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Ex-dividend trading activities remain a prevalent feature of equity markets world-
wide.1 Traders, who aim to receive the dividend payments for a specic stock,
should hold this stock on the cum-dividend day. Traders who buy this stock on the
ex-dividend day or any day after the cum-dividend day will not receive that par-
ticular dividend payment. Trading activities around ex-dividend day can become
intenseespecially for stocks that are actively traded and have a great current
dividend yield. Some investors may prefer dividends over capital gains for tax
reasons. For example, individual investors who pay income tax are at a better tax
position if the dividend payments are between ¿9200 and ¿34,600, everything else
being equal. The tax rate for dividend payment that are between ¿9200-¿34,600
is 10% however the tax rate for capital gain that are between ¿9200-¿34,600 is
22%. Such individual investors may buy stocks on cum-dividend day, to get the
upcoming dividend, and then sell them on ex-dividend day, assuming trading vol-
ume justies transaction costs. While dividend-capturing investors buy stocks on
cum-dividend day and sell them on ex-dividend day, some traders may do just the
opposite. With a high dividend yield and above-average trading volume, stock
prices on cum-dividend day may increase because of trading intensity. Consid-
ering that the stock price is to be adjusted lesser on the ex-dividend day and
expecting a potential sell o by dividend-capturing investors on ex-dividend day,
some traders might "short" the stock on cum-dividend day. This is completed
by borrowing stocks and selling them at a greater price on cum-dividend day and
then buying them back at a lesser price on ex-dividend day to capture capital
gains.
1See, for example, Kalay (1982); Eades et al. (1984); Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986);
Michaely (1991); Michaely and Vila (1996); and Rantapuska (2008).
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For investors who have standing holdings, cum-dividend day can be a prot
making opportunity sometimes. Trading activities could become intensive on
cum-dividend day as investors who prefer dividends over capital gains scramble
to buy shares at the last minute, potentially moving the price higher. For existing
stockholders considering selling during days before the ex-dividend day present
the best opportunity.
On the other hand, days around the ex-dividend day might also be an op-
portunity for investors who wish to buy the stock for future holdings. Investors
who do not like to get dividend realise stocks the day before the ex-dividend day.
The selling might possibly prompt a price drop in case of absent of strong buying
behaviour from dividend-capturing investors. Furthermore, days after the cum-
dividend day could oer better opportunities for future investors to buy shares at
even lower prices.
The focus of the existing ex-dividend day literature and the corresponding
empirical results refer, almost exclusively, to abnormal returns and abnormal vol-
ume.2 This thesis contributes to the literature and informs the debate by in-
vestigating empirically the eects of tax-arbitrage trading activities on bid-ask
spreads, price volatility and order submission strategies, by examining the eects
of liquidity on tax-arbitrage activities and by studying the intraday patterns of
bidask spread, price volatility and trading volume around the ex-dividend day
using high frequency data from the London Stock Exchange market (LSE).
It is of interest to investigate whether immediacy concerns have an impact on
order submission around the ex-dividend day in addition to spread and volatility
factors for the following reasons. First, traders around the ex-dividend day could
have a dierent subjective valuation of the stock, which could reect dierences
between tax rates on capital gains and tax rates on dividend payment and the
2Previous studies report a drop in stock price on ex-dividend day by amount less than the
amount of dividend. This drop has explained by tax-eect (e.g. Elton and Gruber, 1970), short-
term trading (e.g. Kalay, 1982), or price discreteness (e.g. Bali and Hite, 1998). In addition,
previous studies also report an increase in trading volume around ex-dividend day Michaely and
Vila (1995, 1996).
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ability to utilize tax credits. For example, dividend-capture traders will buy stock
on the cum-dividend day and/or sell it on the ex-dividend day. Tax-arbitrage
trading activities occur mostly on the cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day and
are more likely to be one-sided (either buying pressure or selling pressure).3 Sec-
ond, trading activities around ex-dividend day could be viewed as dividend related
trading which does not include information since information asymmetry is more
likely to be lower following dividend announcements that predate the ex-dividend
day. Third, Foucault et al. (2005) and Ro³u (2009) nd theoretically that waiting
costs should aect the order submission decision.4 They argue that high competi-
tion among patient traders motivates them to submit aggressive orders increasing
probability of execution.5 If waiting costs are high, traders will seek to reduce
execution time by submitting more aggressive orders. Most ex-dividend trading is
submitted and executed prior to the ex-dividend day, which makes traders sensi-
tive to execution risk (Ainsworth et al., 2011). As the ex-dividend day approaches
and both the waiting costs and the risk of non-execution increase, the proportion of
impatient traders are expected to increase with the approaching deadline and will
be more likely to switch to using relatively more aggressive orders. Fourth, since
tax-arbitrageurs keen to unwind their position on cum-dividend day, liquidity sup-
pliers can take advantage of them and trade strategically around ex-dividend day
Admati and Peiderer (1988). Finally, traders who are indierent between capital
gain and dividend can also take advantages from the tax-arbitrageurs who need
to liquidate their positions around ex-dividend day Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005). The ex-dividend day, therefore, provides a natural experiment to study
the market microstructure when in at low information asymmetry environment
and with a limited and dynamically closing time window for execution.
3By pressure we mean the temporary imbalance in the ow of orders. For example, traders
who prefer dividend payments more than capital gains will buy stocks on the cum-dividend day
and sell stocks on the ex-dividend day and vice versa for investors who prefer capital gain more
than dividend payments.
4Waiting cost : is the total delay between order submission and order execution
5Impatient traders have a higher waiting cost per unit of time and are more likely to submit
aggressive orders than patient traders.
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Hypothesis 1 : we expect to nd evidences of the presence of both tax-arbitrageurs
and liquidity suppliers around ex-dividend day for FTSE100 stocks
The expected execution probability for illiquid stocks is lower than the ex-
pected execution probability for liquid stocks. Further, the expected waiting cost
for illiquid stock is higher than the expected waiting cost for liquid stocks. Traders
in illiquid markets could face a risk of signicant price change in response to there
being available only few orders. Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2012) reports that
dramatic price changes could occur if one order matches up with all orders on
the opposite side of the market, but Seppi (1997) reports that in liquid markets
submitted orders have only a small impact on stock prices. Aggressive orders
and large orders could amplify the signicant eect of illiquidity on stock prices.
Aggressive orders could quickly consume all orders on the opposite side of the
market (Lebedeva, 2012). Large orders could raise an imbalance between the two
sides of the market. The only way to wash out this imbalance between two sides
of the market is by changing the stock prices (Damodaran, 2005). In addition
to bid-ask spreads and commission costs, Treynor (1981) argues that waiting for
the right time to liquidate an investment is valuable. In illiquid markets, this
value is higher than in liquid markets, so traders may wait longer to liquidate
their investments than in liquid markets. Both the non-execution costs and the
value of waiting before submitting orders are expected to be higher for the illiquid
stocks than for the liquid stocks. It is of interest, therefore, to investigate whether
tax-arbitrage traders seek to avoid trading in illiquid stocks and how the activi-
ties of tax-arbitrage traders, if there are any, could aect bid-ask spreads, price
volatility and order submission strategies.
Hypothesis 2 : we think that the lack of liquidity prevents the tax-arbitrageurs
from applying their trading strategy around ex-dividend day on FTSE SmallCap
stocks.
Several studies have found evidence of general intraday patterns in volatility,
spread and trading volume in equity market and other markets. More specically,
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they nd U-shaped patterns in volatility, spread and volume.6 Studies rationalise
U-shaped patterns by information asymmetry eects at the beginning of the day
and by market closure at the end of the day. Information asymmetry leads to
greater spreads and greater volatility because of adverse selection costs and infor-
mation revelation and also greater volumes because more informed trading takes
place. At market closure, the traders who otherwise risking holding their posi-
tion overnight when they have limited access to information and trading liquidity,
will choose to close their positions. Therefore, the liquidity suppliers quote larger
spreads to take advantage of those closing their position and the resulting trad-
ing activity leads to greater price volatility and volumes (Slezak, 1994). Tax
arbitrageurs are averse to adverse selection costs and execution risk and should
consequently prefer to trade in the companies were these are the lowest and at a
time of day when these are the lowest. It is of interest, therefore, to investigate
the impact the trading activity around the ex-dividend day on intraday patterns
of spread, volume and volatility.
Hypothesis 3 : we expect that the tax-arbitrage trading activities aect the
intraday pattern of bid-ask spread, price volatility and trading volume for FTSE
100 stocks.
To date, there is little empirical evidence on this issue. For instance, while
Graham et al. (2003), study spread eects on cum- and ex-dividend days for
NYSE stocks but focus on the eects of the decimalisation of tick size. Ainsworth
et al. (2008) study the spreads around ex-dividend day and nd higher spreads
on ex-dividend day compared to cum-dividend day on the Australian Stock Ex-
change. Eective spread has been found to decrease on cum-dividend days and
increase on ex-dividend days by Ainsworth and Lee (2011) who also report that
for executed orders, traders are more aggressive on cum-dividend days and less
aggressive on ex-dividend days on the Australian Stock Exchange. Evidence of
abnormal volumes around the ex-dividend day is reported by Jun et al. (2008)
6some studies indicate that there is an L-shape or inverted J-shape for the intraday pattern
of spreads, volume and volatility (Chan et al., 1995 and McInish and Van Ness, 2002)
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though they focus on explaining the ex-dividend price drop. Lakonishok and Ver-
maelen (1986) demonstrate that the ex-dividend day is associated with an increase
in trading activity while Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and Jakob and Ma (2004)
nd evidence of order imbalance around ex-dividend day. Finally Ainsworth et al.
(2008) and Jun et al. (2008) nd evidence of abnormal volume and price volatility
around ex-dividend day.
1.2 Contribution
This thesis focuses on investigating market microstructure and intraday trading
patterns around the ex-dividend day. The eects of ex-dividend day trading on
market microstructure are evaluated using a multinomial logit and an ordered pro-
bit analysis and the intraday patterns are examined using a GMM and dierence
in dierence analysis. The main contributions of this thesis are in the following
ways.
Most of the ex-dividend literature focuses on price eects and volume eects of
the ex-dividend day but this thesis focuses on investigating market microstructure
eects.7 Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by investigate the presence of
both tax-arbitrageurs and liquidity suppliers. The results reveal the presence of
footprints of tax-arbitrage trading and of liquidity supply eects around the ex-
dividend day. The aggressive inow of tax-arbitrageurs around the ex-dividend
day is quickly oset by less aggressive inow of liquidity suppliers. Interestingly,
the level of order aggressiveness, for both tax-arbitrageurs and liquidity suppliers,
is aected by the spread, volatility, return and duration. One sided buying or
selling pressure drives prices away from fundamentals and increase returns and
spreads. The large spread and the price deviation from the fundamental value
attract the liquidity suppliers to trade aggressively. Moreover, one sided buying
or selling pressure raises price volatility. That is, the tax-arbitrageurs become
7That is, how ex-dividend trading mechanisms aect bid-ask spreads, price volatility, order
submission strategies and the intraday trading pattern.
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more aggressive and these eects are stronger on cum-dividend days. We see this
in the light of an approaching cum-dividend deadline to trade and the potential
after tax return that would be forgone.
Other main contributions of this thesis are a deeper investigation of whether
tax-arbitrageurs focus only on high liquid stocks such as the FTSE 100. Speci-
cally, Chapter 3 uses stocks from FTSE SmallCap to examine the eect of liquidity
on the activities of tax-arbitrageurs around the ex-dividend day. Chapter 3 nds
that illiquidity does not prevent tax-arbitrage activities altogether. Similar to
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 nds, for illiquid stocks, eects that link order submission
to spreads, volatility and returns but not to order arrival rate.
The nal contribution of this thesis is that Chapter 4 explores the intraday pat-
tern of bid-ask spread, price volatility and trade volume around the ex-dividend
day. Furthremore, Chapter 4 investigates dierences between rms with high price
impact (less attractive target to tax-arbitrage traders) and those with low price
impact (more attractive target to tax-arbitrage traders). Further, on the cum-
dividend day, competition between traders, increases as a result of high wait-
ing cost of not trading, resulting in higher volumes and lower spreads. More-
over, the ndings show ex-dividend day eects in the intraday patterns can be-
come masked in lower frequency investigations. We nd that that tax-arbitrage
traders are more likely to trade in rms with the lowest price impact since this
minimises both adverse selection costs and execution risk. Across all the rms in
the sample of Chapter 4, there is no measurable impact on spreads and volumes
on the ex-dividend day and cum-dividend days but when the sample is split into
low price impact rms and high impact rms, the results show greater spreads
and volumes at the end of the ex-dividend day and cum-dividend day for low price
impact rms and smaller spreads and volumes at the end of the day for the high
price impact rms. The total sample masks, therefore, the two opposing eects.
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1.3 Background
1.3.1 UK Taxation
Income earned in the UK is usually subject to UK taxation regulations regardless
of either citizenship of an individual or the place of registration of a company.
Capital gain is calculated on the basis of the dierence between the current price
and the original purchase price plus allowable related expenditure. From 6th
April 2008, individuals and companies however, have had dierent capital gains
tax rates from previously. Companies apply, moreover, an "indexation relief"
to the original cost, increasing the purchase cost with the Retail Prices Index.
Individuals are taxed at a at rate of 18% (since 22nd June 2010 and at 28% for
higher rate taxpayers) without indexation relief though realised capital losses can
be brought forward.8
Table 1.1shows the tax rates and allowances in the UK for (2007-2008) and
(2008-2009), which are the years relevant to this study.
8Sourced from various locations: see Scopulus Limited (2013); Taxcafe UK Limited (2013);
Government Digital Service (2013).
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Table 1.1  Tax rates, allowances and bands for UK
*The Small companies rate raises from 19% to 20% in April 2007, but then to 21% in April 2008 and 22%
in April 2009
Tax rate , Allowance and Bands for UK 2007-08 (¿) 2008-09 (¿)
INCOME TAX ALLOWANCES:
Personal allowance 5,225 6,035
Personal allowance for people aged 65-74 7,550 9,030
Personal allowance for people aged 75 and over 7,690 9,180
Income limit for age-related allowances 20,900 21,800
Married couple's allowance - aged 75 or more 6,365 6,625
Minimum amount of married couple's allowance 2,440 9,180
Blind person's allowance 1,730 1,800
Dividend income taxable bands
Rate 10% below 34,600 below 34,800
Rate 32.5% Over 34,600 Over 34,800
CAPITAL GAINS TAX ANNUAL EXEMPT AMOUNT
Individuals 9,200 9,600
Other trustees 4,600 4,800
Inheritance tax threshold 300,000 312,000
Taxable bands
Starting rate 10% 0 - 2,230 -
Basic rate 22% (for 2008-09 is 20%) 2,231 - 34,600 0 - 34,800
Higher rate 40% Over 34,600 Over 34,800
Band Corporation tax prots
0 - 300,000 * 20% 21%
300,001 - 1,500,000 Marginal relief Marginal relief
1,500,001 or more 30% 28%
It is dicult to determine whether traders would prefer either capital gains or
dividends since that depends on a trader's needs and obligations. For example,
in the tax year between April 2007 and April 2008, the individual tax allowance
income level is lower than the individual tax allowance for capital gains. Indi-
viduals are indierent between dividends and capital gains if the return is lower
than ¿5225. Capital gains or dividends equal to or less than ¿5225 are tax free.
The capital gains are however, more tax ecient if the return is between ¿5225
and ¿9200, everything else being equal. Capital gains equal to or less than ¿9200
are tax free but dividends that are between ¿5225-¿34,600 are taxed at 10% rate.
Dividends are more tax ecient if the return is more than ¿9,200, everything else
being equal since capital gains that are between ¿9200 and ¿34,600 are taxed at
22% rate. The UK system of taxation will, therefore, generate a variation in tax
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status across investors motivating tax arbitrage
1.3.2 London Stock Exchange (LSE)
The Stock Exchange Electronic Trading System (SETS) was introduced on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) on 20th October 1997 for FTSE 100 stocks but
now also covers the FTSE 250, FTSE SmallCap Index.9 SETS is also indirectly
accessible from many platforms through Direct Market Access (DMA) and the
Exchange's Member Authorised Connectivity (MAC) (London Stock Exchange,
2013).10 London Stock Exchange (LSE), by the use of SETS, has moved from
quote driven market structures to order driven market structures. In order driven
market structures, the market makers are not obligated to quote the stocks and
the public are allowed to compete directly.
1.3.3 Market participants
Issuers
An issuer of a security is a legal entity that develops, registers and sells securities
to investors, who in turn exchange these stocks with other investors to balance
their holdings and intermediaries facilitate. Issuers are legally responsible for
the obligations of the issue and for providing all relevant information (i.e. -
nancial conditions, material developments and any other operational activities)
to all investors on a timely basis as required by the regulations of their jurisdic-
tions. Publishing of news and of periodic nancial reports is often required and
is assumed to be of help investors to help evaluate the value of the company.
9It also acts as a platform for various other securities also such as ETFs, ETCs, ETNs, liquid
AIM, liquid Irish stocks and liquid international equity stocks.
10SETS is considered one of the most liquid electronic order books in Europe and more than
230 companies trade directly on SETS through market makers, agency brokers and private client
brokers (London Stock Exchange, 2013).
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Investors
Investors are initially the source of market activities. An investor is an indi-
vidual or an institution who allocates capital with the expectation of a nancial
return using a wide range of trading strategies. This denition makes no dis-
tinction between those in the primary markets and secondary markets. That is,
someone who provides a business with capital and someone who buys stock are
both investors. Fundamental analysis and technical analysis are thought to be
used by investors to determine the true value of the stock prices. Recent studies
suggest a link between market microstructure and technical analysis. Price trends
may be the result of dynamic adjustment of prices to the incoming information
(Schwartz and Francioni, 2004). The price level may reect also excess liquidity
available at a certain price.
Intermediaries
An intermediary is a third party that oers intermediation services between two
trading parties. Financial intermediaries could be classied into market makers
and brokers. A market maker is a person or a rm in the business of buying and
selling securities for their own account, whether through a broker or otherwise.
Market makers are the designated counterparties for the rest of the market par-
ticipants - when a trader wants to transact, he/she can trade immediately with a
market maker at price that latter quotes. The key concept to understand about
the market maker's role is that by committing to trading at all times, the market
maker participates in the market as a principal. A market maker is distinct from
a trader in that buying and selling securities is part of its regular business, while
a trader buys and sells securities for his or her own account but not on a business
basis. Market makers are the central player in many organised markets though the
LSE SETS are a notable exception. Here, there is no designated market makers
and all trading occurs by directly matching each orders with other orders. This
does not mean that the market makers' services are not needed.
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The main feature that dierentiates brokers from market makers is that a
market maker acts as a principal while trading on its own account, as opposed to
a broker who is paid gets by commission for arranging transactions on behalf of
their clients. Brokers do not take on risk. In the most cases, brokers help nd the
best execution venue for those actors who do not have direct access to the market
- individual investors often transact through brokers.
1.3.4 Market organisation
Order types
An order is an instruction to either a broker or directly to the market (if trader
has access) to either buy or sell a specied number of securities. When submitting
a limit order, a trader species a reservation price at which the trader is willing to
transact. For example, when a trader submits a buy (sell) limit order, he/she is
willing to buy (sell) a specied quantity of stock at a limit price or lower (higher).
Incoming limit orders that cannot execute immediately at their specied prices
join one queue of orders set at dierent price levels and organized according to
their order time arrival and they transact against incoming market orders. New
limit buy (sell) orders of size (x) increases the size of the bid (ask) queue by (x).
Market orders directs the broker to transact immediately at the best price that
can be found or executes immediately against the best price quoted in the market
in the case of direct access. Market order with size (x) decreases the queue size by
(x). Limit orders submitted at the best available price are executed against market
orders (Cont and De Larrard, 2012). Limit orders are subject to dierent types
of risk which can be summarized by the following: being in front-run; execution
uncertainty; revealation of intentions to the market; being subject to picking o;
and trade with informed traders (D'Hondt et al., 2003).11'12 Market order is
11Front running is when a trader submits an order in front of another order in the same
direction. For example, when a broker-dealer trades ahead of large investors' orders either on
behalf of other customers or for themselves, this is `front running'.
12A limit order may take time to ll and that order may be lled following a sudden change
in the stock price. The notion of being `picked o' refers to a situation where investors react to
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subject to risk of execution price uncertainty.
Market mechanisms
Market mechanisms are generally classied into two categories: quote-driven and
order-driven. A quote-driven market is an electronic stock exchange system in
which prices are determined from bid and ask quotations made by market makers
or specialists  investors cannot transact directly with one another, all trade ow
goes through market makers. It is essential to understand that even though all
traders go through the market maker the market maker does not set prices in
the market. Quotedriven markets can feature multiple specialists in the same
securities, competing for the order ow among themselves - public investors will
only transact with the specialist who has the highest bid or the lowest ask in the
market.
A pure order-driven (or auction) market is a market where all buyers and sell-
ers display the prices at which they wish to buy or sell a particular security, as
well as the amounts of the security desired to be bought or sold. Traders transact
directly with one another by submitting limit and market orders since there are
no designated market makers. Major exchanges (e.g. the NYSE, NASDAQ, the
Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange (LSE)) have switched to
electronic order driven platforms either completely or partially through hybrid
systems.13'14 In order-driven markets, limit orders provide liquidity to the mar-
ket (essentially performing the function of the market maker in the quote-driven
market) and market orders consume liquidity.
the arrival of relevant information before the limit order investors are able to amend their own
now `mispositioned' limit orders so that newly arriving market order will execute with them.
13The trading process in nancial markets, can be summarized as a pure order-driven market
such as Euronext, Helsinki, Hong Kong, Swiss, Tokyo, Toronto, and many electronic communi-
cation networks, hybrid markets such as NYSE, NASDAQ and London Stock Exchange (LSE)
and quote driven markets such as London SEAQ. In hybrid markets, while market makers do
exist, they are involved only in a small number of transactions and have to compete with other
traders (Hasbrouck and Soanos, 1993).
14Examples of Electronic Communications Networks include Archipelago, Instinet, Brut and
Tradebook.
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Rule, regulation and frictions
Important aspects of nancial markets, useful for the understanding of models
and applications, are the rules of precedence and tick size. These rules dier
(slightly) for each market. The rules of precedence, while complex in reality, for
the purpose of this thesis can be summarized as follows: buy (sell) orders with
highest (lowest) price executes rst. The rules of precedence are closely tied to
tick size - the smallest increment (tick) by which the price can move.
The eects of tick size are not clear-cut. The backers of tick reduction state
that smaller tick size raises the competitiveness (or aggressive) of limit orders,
which leads to narrower spreads and decreases the cost of trading. The opponents
of tick reduction claim smaller tick size makes it easier to jump into the front of
a queue of limit orders. If jumping to the front of limit orders costs practically
nothing, which makes the time priority rule basically useless and leaves limit
orders move vulnerable, this will discourage the submission of limit orders. While
the spreads are narrower, the pre-committed liquidity or depth at those quotes
is much lesser than with larger tick sizes when spreads were wider, which makes
trading more expensive. Whether the eect of tighter spreads dominates the
eect of reduced liquidity has been studied by several researches, but no clear
consensus has emerged thus far (see Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000 and Chordia
and Subrahmanyam, 1995).
1.4 Data
Rather unusually the dataset is described here merely to avoid repetition since it
has been employed throughout all chapters for this thesis. The main part of the
data set contains tick by tick data from the London MIDAS15 order book, which
contains three les: an ORDERS le, with information about order submissions, a
HISTORY le, with information about executed trades and a TRADE REPORT
15MIDAS holds day by day historical trading information for the London Stock Exchange and
is housed within a SQL server and on large terabyte databases.
Chapter 1: Introduction 16
le, with price data for the executed trades. The TRADE REPORT le is merged
with the HISTORY le to link prices for each executed trade. ORDERS contains
information about each submitted limit order but there is no information about
market orders and no information about withdrawn orders (i.e. those that are
never executed). A market order will appear in the HISTORY le. The trade
executions are classied into four groups: a limit buy trade, a limit sell trade,
a market buy trade, and a market sell trade. A limit buy (sell) trade is the
transaction that takes place following the submission of a limit buy (sell) order.
Such an order will appear in all three les, ORDERS, HISTORY, and TRADE
REPORT. A market buy (sell) trade is the transaction that takes place following
the submission of a market buy (sell) order. This order will appear only in the
HISTORY and TRADE REPORT les. If an incoming limit order is partially
executed, the whole order will appear in the ORDERS le, the executed part will
appear as a separate limit order in the HISTORY and TRADE REPORT les and
the non-executed part will eventually appear as a separate order in the two latter
les if and when execution takes place. Typically the time interval between the
two is very short and the initial order is labelled p and the nal order is labelled
m. Deleted orders appear in the HISTORY le and a modied order is shown
as a deleted order in the HISTORY le followed by a new order submission in the
ORDERS le. The data do not include orders routed via oor brokers and only
those linked to the electronic submission of orders. The data include transactions
carried out between 7:50 a.m. till 4:35 p.m.
The data sets for Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are constructed based
on the following criteria:
1. The stock must be included in the FTSE 100 index for Chapter 2 and
Chapter 4 (or in the FTSE SmallCap index for Chapter 3) during the sample
period, from June 2007 to June 2008.
2. The stock paid a cash dividend during the sample period with the ex-
dividend day on a Wednesday,to avoid trading activity related to weekend
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eects documented in the literature, and where there is no bank holiday in
the ex-dividend week or in the week before (which we classify as the control
week).16
The stocks in the FTSE SmallCap index contains execution data in the HISTORY
le but the data for a number of liquidity measures were poor compared to the
FTSE 100 index stocks. The resulting sample contained 47 FTSE 100 stocks and
43 FTSE SmallCap stocks. For each stock, all trade data from the ORDERS,
the HISTORY, and the TRADE REPORT les were collected from Monday to
Friday in the week containing the ex-dividend day (the ex-dividend week), and
the corresponding data for Monday to Friday in the week prior (the control week).
17
Further, the data sets for robustness test in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter
4 are constructed based on the following criteria:
1. The stock must be included in the FTSE 100 index for Chapter 2 and
Chapter 4 (or in the FTSE SmallCap index for Chapter 3) during the sample
period, from June 2007 to June 2008.
2. The stock paid a cash dividend during the sample period.
For rms that paid a cash dividend several times during the sample period, we
include all events, each event is counted as a separated stock. The resulting sample
contained 167 FTSE 100 stocks and 77 FTSE SmallCap stocks. For each stock,
all trade data from the ORDERS, the HISTORY, and the TRADE REPORT
les were collected for cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day and 10 days after ex-
dividend day, as a controlling period. By considering 10 days after ex-dividend day
16Weekend eects have been documented by French (1980). Where these rms are not ex-
cluded, potential confounding issues are run, since it will be unable to distinguish the docu-
mented weekend eect from any tax-arbitrage evidence it may found. A small number of cases
where there is a bank holiday in the two-week period are also excluded, to exclude potential
contemporaneous eects that might be associated with bank holiday related trading activity but
not associated with tax-arbitrage.
17The time distance between the announcement date and the ex-dividend date varies with
dierent stocks. The minimum time dierence between ex-dividend date and announcement
date is one month which ensures that our control week is free from dividend related trading
activity.
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as a control period, we avoid the period that might be contaminated by dividend
related activity.
Finally, daily data is used from DataStream covering the period from June
2007 to June 2008 as the basis for computing liquidity measures and estimating
the preliminary regressions. For each rm the closing price, the ask price, the bid
price, the daily volume, the number of daily transactions and dividend payments
are collected. Information about the ex-dividend day for each stock was taken
from the various companies' web-sites.
1.5 Overview and structure of the thesis
The reminder of the thesis is set up as follows. Chapter 2 studies market mi-
crostructure eects around the ex-dividend day and investigates what eects tax-
arbitrage activities may have on spreads, price volatility and order submission
strategies using data from the FTSE 100 index. The spread and the volatility are
compared between the ex-dividend week and the control week and between the
cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day. The changes in the marginal aggres-
siveness level of buy orders and sell orders are also examined on cum-dividend
day and ex-dividend days as compared to the control week and to the rest of
the ex-dividend week. Whereas Chapter 2 looks at FTSE 100 stocks, Chapter 3
studies market microstructure eects around the ex-dividend day using data from
FTSE SmallCap stocks. Stocks that are listed in the FTSE SmallCap index are
classied as illiquid stocks. This dierence in liquidity is conrmed empirically
in Chapter 3, employing a range of liquidity measures. Chapter 4 studies the
intraday patterns of bidask spreads, price volatility and trading volume around
the ex-dividend day for a sample of FTSE 100 companies. We also investigate
the dierences between the intraday trading patterns change of those rms that
are the most attractive targets for tax-arbitrage traders compared with the pat-
terns for the least attractive targets for tax-arbitrage traders. Chapter 5 briey
summarises the key ndings of the thesis and concludes.
Chapter 2
Market Microstructure Eects
around Ex-Dividend Day
2.1 Introduction
Among the several longstanding questions in market microstructure are what the
optimal trading strategies are around specic events and what can be inferred,
from high frequency trading data, concerning the informational environment that
rms face. This chapter studies market microstructure eects of trading asso-
ciated with ex-dividend day price changes. The ex-dividend day is known to
attract trading activity associated with tax-arbitrage (Elton and Gruber, 1970;
Kalay, 1982). Specically, this study investigates tax-arbitrage eects on spreads,
price volatility and order submission strategies, using data from the London Stock
Exchange (LSE). In particular, there is an expectation that such tax-arbitrage ac-
tivity around the ex-dividend day can be one-sided due either to buying pressure
or to selling pressure. Investors who prefer dividend are more likely to buy stocks
on cum-dividend day and sell it on ex-dividend day, however investors who prefer
capital gain are more likely to sell stocks on cum-dividend day and buy it back on
ex-dividend day. Therefore, the spread and volatility may increase because limit
orders are eroded faster on one side of the market than on the other. However,
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since this tax-arbitrage trading is a known exogenous event, it is likely to attract
liquidity suppliers who seek to prot by catering to that need. More specically,
though trading activity can itself be seen as a source of price volatility, this study
argues that since inows of uninformed trade could make informed speculation
less likely, the latter eect may reduce price volatility around the ex-dividend day.
The net eect on spread and volatility is, therefore, unclear and in any case, there
is little empirical evidence on this issue. For instance, while Graham et al. (2003),
study spread eects on cum- and ex-dividend days for NYSE stocks, they focus
on the eects of the decimalisation of tick size. Evidence of abnormal volumes
around the ex-dividend day is reported by Jun et al. (2008) though they focus
on explaining the ex-dividend price drop. Eective spread has been found to de-
crease on cum-dividend days and increase on ex-dividend days by Ainsworth and
Lee (2011) who also report that for executed orders, traders are more aggressive
on cum-dividend days and less aggressive on ex-dividend days.
While this study investigates also whether spread and volatility dier between
cum- and ex-dividend days, the focus is on order submission strategies on cum-
and ex-dividend days. Furthermore, since spread, volatility, return, and duration
between submitted orders aect the order submission strategy, in this chapter
we investigate also how their eects vary between cum- and ex-dividend days.
The optimal submission trading strategy is a trade-o between the cost of delay
in execution, which is the execution risk of submitting limit orders on the one
hand and on the other, the cost of immediacy, which is the price concession of
submitting market orders. Since tax-arbitrage driven trading activity around the
ex-dividend day has a limited time-window for execution, because tax-arbitrage
trades need to be executed prior to the close of trade on the cum-dividend day, tax-
arbitrage is likely concentrated on one side of the market with aggressive orders, it
can transpire that liquidity-supplying traders on the other side of the market will
employ relatively passive orders. The aggregate net eect on order submission
is, therefore, unclear and it could be that both passive and aggressive orders are
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used more frequently. More specically, Foucault et al. (2005) and Ro³u (2009)
investigate, theoretically, how waiting costs aect the choice of order type and
predict that an increase in the cost of waiting will lead to more aggressive order
submission. It would be then reasonable to observe either a switch to market
orders from limit orders or a switch to more aggressive pricing within limit orders
and this study, therefore, investigates whether immediacy concerns have an impact
on order submission around ex-dividend days, in addition to spread, volatility,
return, and duration factors.
We empirically investigate these issues, employing data on order submissions
and executions in the ex-dividend week, and in a control week, and for shares
constituting the FTSE 100 going ex-dividend between June 2007 and June 2008.
This study is restricted to only those rms that go ex-dividend on a Wednesday, to
avoid trading activity related to weekend eects documented in the literature, and
where there is no bank holiday in the two weeks concerned. What ndings could be
reasonably expected? This is conditional on whether tax-arbitrage traders place
their orders and even if orders were placed, the answer can further be conditioned
on how sensitive the equilibrium in the limit order book is to external changes.
For instance, if an inow of tax-arbitrageurs is quickly oset by a similar inow of
liquidity suppliers, it is not obvious that there are strong market microstructure
eects. In this event, this chapter seeks footprints of tax-arbitrage trading and of
liquidity supply eects. When traders face high waiting costs, they become more
likely to submit aggressive orders to reduce the cost of delayed execution. The
aggressiveness level is aected by the proportion of patient and impatient traders.
On cum-dividend days, as the deadline for the close of trading approaches, both
waiting costs and the risk of non-execution are likely to increase. We argue that
when the cost of delayed execution increases beyond a latent threshold level, a
subset of the patient traders will become impatient and submit more aggressive
orders whereas, the remaining patient traders are not necessarily independent of
other traders. Therefore, traders may turn out to be less patient and submit more
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aggressive orders. We argue that order aggressiveness can be detected from the
limit order book by observing specic patterns of trading and these patterns we
label as footprints.
Evidence of footprints, this study argues, is the best overall description of
the ndings, which are outlined next. First, we nd that spread and volatility are
higher in the ex-dividend week compared to the control week and on the cum-
dividend day compared to the ex-dividend days, within the ex-dividend week.
Seen in isolation, this eect appears hard to explain, without also studying order
submission strategies.
Second, we report results for both sides of the market: arbitrageurs and liquid-
ity providers. There is evidence that behind the quote buy orders and marketable
sell orders are less likely on the cum-dividend day and behind the quote buy orders
and at the quote and inside the quote sell orders are more likely on the ex-dividend
day, consistent with tax arbitrage, which involves a round-trip of buying on the
cum-dividend day and selling on the ex-dividend day. There is also evidence that
behind the quote sell orders are more likely on the cum-dividend day and be-
hind the quote buy orders are more likely on the ex-dividend day, consistent with
liquidity suppliers taking advantage of tax-arbitrage activity.
Third, we nd eects linking order submission to spread, volatility, return
and duration. One pattern that may be expected is that one-sided trading of
tax-arbitrageurs may drive prices away from fundamentals and in that process
increase return and spread. They are likely to attract liquidity suppliers, who may
trade aggressively either to take advantage of the dierence between transaction
prices and fundamental prices, or to prot from the larger spread. In addition,
one-sided buying or selling pressure increases price volatility, which motivates the
tax-arbitrager to submit aggressive orders.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 presents the prior
literature, whereas Section 2.3 specically presents the extant theory. The data
and methodology are in Sections 2.4 and Section 2.5 respectively, while section
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2.6 reports and interprets the results, section 2.7 displays a robustness tests and
a nal section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There are several strands of literature related to this chapter. First, there is a
literature on ex-dividend eects but not related to market microstructure. Second,
there is a literature specically on market microstructure eects. Third, there is a
strand that looks at market microstructure eects linked specically to the period
around the ex-dividend day.
In an economy with perfect capital markets with no tax and transaction
costs, Miller and Modigliani (1961) showed that shareholders are indierent as
to whether they receive income in the form of either dividends or capital gains.
This implies that the stock price should decline on the ex-dividend day by an
amount equal to the dividend payment. However, early empirical studies (e.g.,
Campbell and Beranek, 1955; Durand and May, 1960) have shown that prices on
the ex-dividend day fall by an amount less than the amount of the dividend. Elton
and Gruber (1970) introduce what can be called a longterm trading hypothesis
or tax-eect hypothesis. They argue that dierences in tax status motivate trad-
ing around the ex-dividend day. If the cum-dividend stock price is(Pc), the tax
rate on capital gain is (tg) , the purchase price of the stock is (P0) , the dividend
amount is(D), the ex-dividend stock price is (Pe) , and the tax rate on divided
is(tg).1
(Pc)− (Pc − P0)× tg = (Pe)− (Pe − P0)× tg +D × (1− td) (2.1)
(Pc − Pe)
D
=
(1− td)
(1− tg)
(2.2)
1(tg):the tax rate on capital gain when the price, ex-dividend, exceeds the purchase price.
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Tax-driven trading around the ex-dividend day has been evidenced and hy-
pothesised also by a number of other studies.2 Kalay (1982) introduces what
can be called a short-term trading hypothesis. He argues that the ex-dividend
day price drop attracts tax arbitrage. Investors who are indierent between the
tax rate on dividend and the tax rate on capital gain, can generate prots by
trading around the ex-dividend day. Though the short-term trading hypothesis
is supported by several studies, since several others nd no support (Lakonishok
and Vermaelen, 1983; Poterba and Summers, 1984; Kaplanis, 1986; Booth and
Johnston, 1984 and Menyah, 1993), we argue that this tax-arbitrage rationale is
contentious.3 This chapter is, therefore, partly motivated by the notion that tax-
driven trading is likely to take place around the ex-dividend day and that such
evidence is more likely to be discernible in high frequency trading data than those
based on daily data alone.
While the trade-o between the use of limit orders and market orders in a
static model has been studied the extension into a dynamic framework has also
been investigated while linking depth and spread to order type.4'5 Although the
empirical literature on this link is quite extensive, more recent studies have argued
that the link is conditional on various features observable in the market, such as
the degree of informed trading (Beber and Caglio, 2005), while others have studied
the eects on the choice of order type conditional on the presence of impatient
traders (Foucault et al., 2005; Ro³u, 2009).6 This chapter contributes to this
literature, relying on it as the basis for hypotheses development.
2For example, see Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983); Eades et al. (1984); Poterba and
Summers (1984); Kaplanis (1986); Barclay (1987); Fedenia and Grammatikos (1993); Lasfer
(1995); Michaely and Vila (1995, 1996); Bell and Jenkinson (2002); Callaghan and Barry (2003);
Graham et al. (2003); Elton et al. (2005); Zhang et al. (2008).
3Examples of studies that support short-term trading hypothesis include Eades et al. (1984);
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Michaely (1991).
4Several studies such as Cohen et al. (1981); Copeland and Galai (1983); and Handa and
Schwartz (1996) examine the static case.
5See Parlour (1998); Foucault (1999); Handa et al. (2003); Foucault et al. (2005); Goettler
et al. (2005); and Rosu (2009) for the extension to the dynamic case.
6A typical array of the empirical literature would include Biais et al. (1995); Harris and Has-
brouck (1996); Parlour (1998); Foucault (1999); Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000); Griths
et al. (2000); Sandas (2001); Ranaldo (2004); Beber and Caglio (2005); Goettler et al. (2005,
2009); Foucault et al. (2005); Ellul et al. (2007); Rosu (2009) and Menkho et al. (2010).
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Discreteness in prices as compared to the continuity of dividends is the reason,
claim Bali and Hite (1998), for the ratio of dividend to the ex-dividend price
drop not being equal to one. They argue that investors would never be willing
to pay more than the value of the dividend, pushing the price to drop to the
tick above the cum-dividend price minus the dividend. However, when quotes
were decimalised in the U.S., evidence against Bali and Hite (1998) was found by
Graham et al. (2003) and by Jakob and Ma (2004). Specic exchange trading
rules have been suggested as a possible rationale by Dubofsky (1992) who suggests
that NYSE Rule 118, AMEX Rule 132 and price discreteness are the reasons for
ex-dividend abnormal returns. These rules state that buy limit orders on the ex-
dividend day should be adjusted downwards by the cash amount of the dividend.
In those cases where the cum-dividend price less the dividend is not equal to a tick
multiple, the buy limit order price is further adjusted downwards to the nearest
tick multiple. These results, relating to these rules, were supported by Jakob and
Ma (2005). However, given that a smaller drop-o ratio is documented in Canada
relative to the U.S., which it is argued is related to outstanding limit orders, on
the Toronto Stock Exchange, not being adjusted as noted above, the results for
Canada do not support the price discreteness explanation proposed by Bali and
Hite (1998).7 Frank and Jagannathan (1998) provide a market microstructure
argument to explain that transactions on the cum-dividend day occur relatively
more often at the bid price and on the ex-dividend day relatively more often at
the ask price. Their claim is that, since for some individuals there is a collection
cost burden if they were to be paid the dividend (i.e. to have to go through the
procedure of collecting it), the majority of investors will prefer not to receive the
dividend. They then further argue that since collection cost is not a burden for
market makers, market makers will buy stocks on the cum-dividend day. As a
result, most trades will occur on the bid side on the cum-dividend day while most
trades should occur on the sell side on the ex-dividend day. There is empirical
7The drop-o ratio is a standard statistic used to compare drop-os across companies. It
denes as the ex-dividend price drop divided by the dividend.
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evidence which shows that there is an increase in trade size around the ex-dividend
day which could be explained by an increase in the cost of delay in execution in
this period (see Michaely and Vila, 1995; McDonald, 2001 and Rantapuska, 2008).
While these studies focus on price eects associated with executed orders, we focus
on market microstructure eects associated with submitted orders (which may or
may not be nally executed). We next turn to a more detailed discussion of bid-
ask spreads, volatility and to the details associated with limit order submission.
2.3 Theory
Spread
It is unclear, what eects on spread should be observed on the ex-dividend day.
While no dierence in quoted and eective spreads between ex-dividend day and
cum-dividend day was found by Graham et al. (2003), wider spreads around ex-
dividend periods have been reported by Koski and Michaely (2000) in the US and,
on the Australian Stock Exchange Ainsworth et al. (2008) nd that the eective
bid-ask spread increases on the ex-dividend day. Ainsworth et al., (2008) attribute
this nding to a decrease in the cost of delaying execution on the ex-dividend day,
and uncertainty about the ex-dividend price drop. These eects result in less
aggressive limit orders and thus higher spreads on the ex-dividend day
Meanwhile, Foucault (1999) studies the costs associated with submitting limit
orders, with the argument that while on the one hand, there may be price uncer-
tainty and the trader risks execution at adverse prices, there is also, on the other
hand, the risk of non-execution. On cum-dividend days, the cost of price uncer-
tainty is low but the cost of non-execution is high while on ex-dividend days, the
cost of price uncertainty is greater but the cost of non-execution is small. Foucault
(1999) shows that in markets with traders who have varying tax status and given
that these traders will, therefore, have varying valuations of the stock, trading us-
ing limit orders should increase execution risk. Hence, the bid-ask spread should
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also increase. The increase in spread has a dierent impact in a market with
relatively more impatient traders than in a market with relatively more patient
traders (see Foucault et al., 2005). Foucault et al. (2005) claim that for a given
spread, patient traders are more likely to submit limit orders and impatient ones
more likely to submit market orders, this suggests the spread on the cum-dividend
day should narrow because of this switch to markets orders, but will widen on
ex-dividend days because of the switch back to limit orders. There are, therefore,
two eects: variation in valuation because of tax-status on the cum-dividend day,
which will widen the spread on the cum-dividend day relative to the ex-dividend
day together with an increase in the number of impatient traders on the the cum-
dividend, which will narrow the spread on the cum-dividend day relative to the
ex-dividend day.
Hypothesis 1 : we expect that the bid-ask spread will increase on cum-dividend
day because of the presence of liquidity suppliers and the dierences in stock
valuation by tax-arbitrageurs.
Hypothesis 2 : Because of the increases in price uncertainty on ex-dividend
day, we expect the bid-ask spread will increase as well.
Volatility
Copeland and Galai (1983) show that submitting limit orders is equivalent to of-
fering an option for other traders to trade at the limit price. Since the value of this
option increases if price uncertainty increases, uninformed traders submitting limit
orders are more likely to incur adverse selection costs of trading with informed
traders, unless they adjust their limit order prices. Accordingly, the spreads are
likely to widen when prices are more volatile. Foucault (1999) and Foucault et al.
(2005) show that large dierences in investor valuation of a stock, (arising from
dierent tax status, for instance), can give rise to such price uncertainty and that
the net eect is an increase in spreads as well as a switch to relatively increased
use of limit orders. We should, therefore, expect an increase in price volatility
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on cum-dividend days. Furthermore, order imbalances are also a source of price
volatility and evidence of order imbalances around the ex-dividend day is reported
by Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and Jakob and Ma (2004) while Ainsworth et
al. (2008) and Jun et al. (2008) nd evidence of abnormal volume and price
volatility around the ex-dividend day. This study argues that tax arbitrage can
lead to order imbalances on both the cum- and ex-dividend days, increasing the
volatility on both days.
Hypothesis 3 : we expect an increase in price volatility on both cum- and
ex-dividend days.
Order Submission
An important characteristic of order submission is order aggressiveness which
indicates the degree to which the order oers a price concession  with the most
aggressive orders oering a higher price concession (for instance, a market order)
and the least aggressive orders oering little or no concession (such as for a limit
order). How various factors inuence order aggressiveness has been investigated
by several studies.8 More specically, how volatility, spread, and depth inuence
aggressiveness has been studied.9 Anand et al. (2005) nd that informed traders
are more likely to submit limit orders in the rst half of the day whereas they are
more likely to submit market orders in the second half of the day. Furthermore,
informed traders appear to be more likely than liquidity traders, to submit limit
orders and for informed traders to submit more market orders earlier in the day
and to switch to limit orders over time whereas liquidity traders do the reverse
(Bloomeld et al., 2005).While Chakravarty and Holden (1995) as well as Cao
et al. (2004) report evidence that informed traders do submit limit orders, order
submission is aected by changes in the waiting cost for execution (Foucault et al.,
2005 and Ro³u, 2009). More specically, high competition among patient traders
8Among others see Griths et al. (2000); Ranaldo (2004); Ellul et al. (2007) and the study
by Cao et al. (2009).
9Studies include Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000); Ahn et al. (2001); Hall and Hautsch
(2006, 2007) and Foucault et al. (2007).
Chapter 2: Market Microstructure Eects around Ex-Dividend Day 29
motivates them to submit aggressive orders to reduce execution time (Foucault et
al., 2005). If waiting costs are high, traders will seek to reduce execution time by
submitting more aggressive orders.
Particularly, as the ex-dividend day approaches and both waiting costs and
the risk of non-execution increase, it is expected that the proportion of impatient
traders will increase with the approaching deadline and they will be increasingly
more likely to switch to using relatively more aggressive orders. Harris and Has-
brouck (1996) nd, however, that even in the presence of non-execution costs and
market order price improvement, limit orders play a dominant role for trading.
Guéant et al. (2012) nd that approximately 60% of orders are non-aggressive.
Hypothesis 4a : we expect an increase in order aggressiveness around ex-
dividend day.
Hypothesis 4b : we expect an increase in the submission of passive order around
ex-dividend day.
Order Submission and Spread
Market frictions include two types of costs: explicit trading cost (commission and
taxes) and implicit trading costs (bid-ask spread, thin markets, trade size, price
impact). The bid-ask spread represents a signicant cost of immediate trading,
which should have implications for the choice of order type. Foucault (1999) and
Foucault et al. (2005) argue, for instance, that spread is the cost of submitting a
market order over a limit order. Empirical studies conrm that spread is a deter-
minant of the choice of order type.10 Foucault (1999) demonstrates, theoretically,
that increases in spread around the end of a trading day, will decrease competition
between limit order traders, leading to less aggressive limit orders. Furthermore,
Foucault et al. (2005) claim, in one of the rst dynamic models of the limit order
book, that the trade decision is determined by the bidask spread.
For specic spread levels, patient traders are more likely to submit limit or-
10See for example, Biais et al. (1995); Harris and Hasbrouck (1996); Ranaldo (2004); Anand
et al. (2005); Hall and Hautsch (2006) as well as Pascual and Veredas (2009).
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ders, whereas impatient traders are more likely to submit market orders. As the
spread increases, traders tend to submit more limit orders. Furthermore, liquidity
providers are enthusiastic to supply larger spread improvements when the spread
is large. Biais et al. (1995); Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000); Beber and
Caglio (2005); and Ellul et al. (2007), among others, argue that traders are more
likely to submit aggressive orders as spread decreases, though, Ranaldo (2004)
and Hall and Hautsch (2006) argue that order aggressiveness and trading inten-
sity both decrease as the bid ask spread decreases.
Order Submission and Volatility
Handa and Schwartz (1996) argue that the switch to limit orders as the volatility
increases applies when there is a transitory increase in volatility but not when there
is a permanent increase in volatility. An opposite view was proposed by Cohen
et al. (1981) who shows that when price uncertainty increases, risk-averse traders
will be willing to pay a premium for the certainty that comes with immediate
execution (such as a ,market order). As a result, an increase in price volatility
should lead to relatively increased use of market orders (more aggressive orders).
Order Submission and Return
Chordia et al. (2001) report empirically eects of returns and volatilities on
trading activities. They document a signicant negative relation between expected
returns and the variability of trading activity while Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(2004) predict these eects theoretically. Chan (2005) reports that returns from
previous orders inuence upcoming order decisions, i.e. after positive returns,
traders are more willing to submit aggressive buy orders, whereas they become
less willing to submit sell orders and, conversely, a decline in prices motivates
sellers to submit aggressively.
Lasfer and Zenonos (2003); Armitage et al. (2006), and Isaksson and Islam
(2013) report a drop in stock price and an abnormal return around the ex-dividend
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day on the London Stock Exchange. Lasfer's research (1995) was on the UK
market and presented the eect of the changes before and after the Income and
Corporation Taxes Act 1988. His model concluded a signicant positive return
on stock prices before 1988 due to the dierentiation in taxation (both on capital
gain and dividend). Moreover, the model presented a negative insignicant return
after 1988, when there is no signicant dierence in taxation laws regarding both
dividend and capital gain. Finally, he claimed that dividend yield and the duration
of the settlement period generate a positive return on the ex-dividend day, not the
bid-ask-spread, transaction costs, short-term trading, or other means of dividend
distribution strategies. In the opposite direction, Frank and Jagannathan (1998)
theoretically and Jakob and Ma (2003) empirically argue that the price drop-o
ratio is aected directly by the order imbalances which may exist around the
ex-dividend day.
Order Submission and Duration
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O'Hara (1992) stress the impor-
tance of the time distance between two consecutive orders. They argue that the
importance of time distance between orders comes from its power to reveal impor-
tant information about the future value of the asset. How important time distance
between orders is, has been studied empirically.11 The theoretical arguments in
Rosu (2008) propose that a high arrival rate of trade should decrease the expected
time for the submitted order to execute. Therefore, the traders are incentives to
be submitting more aggressive orders. Tkatch and Kandel (2006) and Linnain-
maa and Rosu (2008) conrm these results empirically. Foucault et al. (2005)
illustrates that high competition between patient traders and high waiting costs
motivate traders to submit more aggressive orders to decrease both the execution
time and the execution cost of delays.
11Among others see Engle and Russell (1998) and Cho and Nelling (2000).
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2.4 Data
The sample of data for this chapter is constructed based on criteria that are
specied on data section in the rst chapter. The resulting sample contained 47
FTSE 100 stocks. Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for order submission and
order execution for these stocks. 12
Table 2.1  Summary statistics (numbers in million)
This table reports the aggregate number of buy (sell) submitted and executed order and the aggregate
volume of buy (sell) submitted and executed order for 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday
in their ex-dividend week or in control week. These aggregate numbers are calculated for control week,
ex-dividend week, corresponding to cum-dividend day in control week (Tuesday) (day2), cum-dividend day,
corresponding to ex-dividend day in control week (Wednesday) (day3) and ex-dividend day.
Variable Num.
of buy
Num.
of
sell
Volume of
buy
Volume of
sell
Num.
of
buy
Num.
of
sell
Volume of
buy
Volume of
sell
All week Ex.w Cont.w
Submission 2.227 2.171 10,407.220 10,795.964 2.162 2.217 9,670.909 9,808.216
Execution 0.563 0.539 1,396.679 1,386.406 0.563 0.539 1,409.586 1,389.144
Tuesday Cum.day C-Cum
Submission 0.460 0.414 1,910.945 1,858.809 0.432 0.438 1,928.550 1,864.651
Execution 0.114 0.108 285.146 274.450 0.115 0.108 284.386 286.434
Wednesday Ex.day C-Ex
Submission 0.485 0.435 1,963.781 1,871.669 0.421 0.467 1,869.073 2,082.989
Execution 0.119 0.115 308.532 308.962 0.111 0.109 268.596 281.201
The main message is that the aggregate data do not indicate that there are
large dierences between the ex-dividend week and the control week and there are
also no large dierences between the cum- and ex-dividend days.
The likelihood of choosing a given submission decision (i.e. limit versus market
order, buy versus sell order) is analysed by dening a representative trader within
each group. The representative trader is the weighted average of the volume of
each type of submission. Since traders can choose not to trade, the no activity
12Ex.w: is ex-dividend week. Cont.w: is control week. C-Cum: is corresponding to cum-
dividend day in control week. C-Ex: corresponding to ex-dividend day in control week.
Cum.day: is cum-dividend day. Ex.day: is ex-dividend day.
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event is also dened by ve minutes passing without activity.13 Table 2.2 shows
the representative trader for submitted and executed orders on each trading day
in control week and ex-dividend week.
Table 2.2  Representative trader
This table reports the Representative trader for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday
in their ex-dividend week or control week. The Representative trader is calculated for submitted and
executed orders for each trading day in both control week and ex-dividend week.
Week Limit Buy Market Buy Limit Sell Market Sell
Day 1
Ex.w Execute 0.458 0.034 0.477 0.030
Submit 0.493 0.000 0.507 0.000
Cont.w Execute 0.464 0.033 0.458 0.045
Submit 0.495 0.000 0.505 0.000
Day 2
Ex.w Execute 0.475 0.027 0.472 0.027
Submit 0.498 0.000 0.502 0.000
Cont.w Execute 0.464 0.035 0.484 0.018
Submit 0.519 0.000 0.481 0.000
Day 3
Ex.w Execute 0.475 0.022 0.474 0.030
Submit 0.482 0.000 0.518 0.000
Cont.w Execute 0.475 0.024 0.478 0.023
Submit 0.529 0.000 0.471 0.000
Day 4
Ex.w Execute 0.480 0.025 0.468 0.026
Submit 0.478 0.000 0.522 0.000
Cont.w Execute 0.486 0.022 0.469 0.023
Submit 0.464 0.000 0.536 0.000
Day 5
Ex.w Execute 0.485 0.030 0.448 0.037
Submit 0.514 0.000 0.486 0.000
Cont.w Execute 0.479 0.036 0.449 0.036
Submit 0.499 0.000 0.501 0.000
FTSE 100 traders trade intensively, so no activity event records zero for all
trading days in both control week and ex-dividend week. Generally, there are no
large dierences between the ex-dividend week and the control week and there are
also no large dierences between the cum- and ex-dividend days.
13We do so following other studies in this vein such, Easley et al. (1997), and Ellul et al.
(2007).
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Preliminary regression
Tax-arbitrage traders either buy on the cum-dividend day and sell on ex-dividend
day the long-short or sell on the cum-dividend day and buy on the ex-dividend
day the short-long. The following logit model for each stock i and day t is
estimated to examine whether one of these trading strategy dominates the other:
Tradeactivityi,t = αi + βixi,t + εi,t (2.3)
where:
xi,t: is dividend yield of the stock i and day t.
Tradeactivityi,t: is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if the condition
is met and 0 otherwise, for each stock i and day t.
For the rst (second) case, of buying (selling) on the cum-dividend day and
selling (buying) on the ex-dividend day, three dierent dependent variables are
constructed.
1. BS(L) (SB(L)), is an indicator variable, equals one if the conditions below
are both satised, and zero otherwise:

buy trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)− sell trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day) > 0
And
buy trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)- sell trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day) < 0
(2.4)
2. BS(M) (SB(M)), is an indicator variable, equals one if the conditions
below are both satised , and zero otherwise:

buy trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)-sell trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)
buy trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)+sell trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)
> 0.02
And
buy trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)- sell trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)
buy trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)+ sell trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)
< −0.02
(2.5)
Chapter 2: Market Microstructure Eects around Ex-Dividend Day 35
3. BS(H) (SB(H)), is an indicator variable, equals one if the conditions below
are both satised, and zero otherwise:

buy trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)-sell trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)
buy trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)+sell trade size on Cum.day (Ex.day)
> 0.05
And
buy trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)- sell trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)
buy trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)+ sell trade size on Ex.day (Cum.day)
< −0.05
(2.6)
Assume P̂i is the probability that an event can occur. Then, the logit model
specication is:
log
P̂i
1− P̂i
=β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 + · · ·+ βpxip (2.7)
The non-linearity of binary outcome logit models makes the straightforward
interpretation of their coecients quite dicult. It is, therefore, common to relate
logit model equations back to the odds rather than to the log-odds by exponenti-
ating both sides. The critical point of odds ratios is 1 rather than 0. If the odds
ratio is equal to 1, the related variable leaves the odds unchanged. If the odds
ratio is larger (smaller) than 1, the related variable increases (decreases) the odds
or the related variable eects positively (negatively) the probability that the event
will occur, holding other covariates constant (see Harrell, 2001).14 Exponentiated
coecients or so called odds ratios are calculated for model (2.3) and Table 2.3
reports the odds ratios for all logit models.
14More explanations are detailed in Appendix A.
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Table 2.3  Estimation of logit regression
This table reports the odds ratio of estimate Eq. (2.3) for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and
June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday
in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variables are indicators variables. (BS) is an
indicator variable refers to long-short trading strategy. (SB) is an indicator variable refers to short-long
trading strategy. For each type of trading strategy, we generate three dierent indicator variables. The
low degree indicators BS(L) and SB(L) are dened as following : if buy trade size on Cum.day  sell trade
size on Cum.day > 0 and buy trade size on Ex.day  sell trade size on Ex.day < 0 then BS(L) equal one ,
otherwise zero; if buy trade size on Cum.day  sell trade size on Cum.day < 0 and buy trade size on Ex.day
 sell trade size on Ex.day > 0 then SB(L) equal one , otherwise zero. The medium degree indicators BS(M)
and SB(M) are dened as: if (buy trade size on Cum.day -sell trade size on Cum.day )/(buy trade size on
Cum.day +sell trade size on Cum.day )>0.02 and (buy trade size on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day )/(buy
trade size on Ex.day +sell trade size on Ex.day )<-0.02 then BS(M) equal one, otherwise zero; (buy trade
size on Cum.day -sell trade size on Cum.day )/(buy trade size on Cum.day +sell trade size on Cum.day
)<-0.02 and (buy trade size on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day )/(buy trade size on Ex.day +sell trade
size on Ex.day )>0.02 then SB(M) equal one, otherwise zero. Finally, the high degree indicators BS(H)
and SB(H) are dened as : if (buy trade size on Cum.day-sell trade size on Cum.day)/(buy trade size on
Cum.day+sell trade size on Cum.day)>0.05 and (buy trade size on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day )/(buy
trade size on Ex.day +sell trade size on Ex.day )<-0.05 then BS(H) equal one, otherwise zero; (buy trade
size on Cum.day -sell trade size on Cum.day )/(buy trade size on Cum.day +sell trade size on Cum.day
)<-0.05and (buy trade size on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day )/(buy trade size on Ex.day +sell trade
size on Ex.day )>0.05 then SB(H) equal one, otherwise zero. The signicant levels are dened as follows:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
BS(L) BS(M) BS(H)
Buy-Sell
Dividend Yield 1.548* 1.453 0.916
(1.92) (1.62) (-0.18)
SB(L) SB(M) SB(H)
Sell-Buy
Dividend Yield 0.924 1.865* 1.463
(-0.27) (1.75) (0.71)
The results refer to patterns in the trading activity around the ex-dividend day.
There is weak evidence of the presence of both types of trading strategies.
2.5 Methodology
Spread
In limit order book, trades take place at best prices posted by the traders. Poten-
tial traders pay the spread between the bid and the ask. The quoted spread, which
is the dierence between the bid and ask prices, measures the cost of completing
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a round trip (buy and sell), if trades are executed at the quoted prices. However,
trades are sometimes executed either inside or outside the quoted bid-ask spread.
In this chapter, we, therefore, measure the spread in two dierent ways: we
calculate, for each point of time, the dierence between the best live submitted ask
price and best live submitted bid price. A full detail will be present in Robustness
test section (2.7).
The quoted spread may overstate trading costs since trades can occur at prices
within this spread, and this motivates us to calculate the eective spread using
Roll measure. Roll (1984) proposes an estimator of implied eective spread based
on measuring the negative autocorrelation produced by bounces between the bid
and ask. Roll measure assumes that orders are executed at the best bid price or at
the best ask price, the probabilities of buying and selling are equal and probability
of continuation is same as reversal. Roll's measure is dene as following:
Roll =
√
max(0,−cov(∆pi,j∆pi,j−1))
This measure is computed on a rolling 5-minute interval for each day and for
each stock. For each day, transactions are ordered according to their time arrival
and price changes, ∆pi,j calculated.15 The covariance between adjacent-interval
price changes is computed to nd the Roll spread for that interval. The spread for
stock i, in a 5-minute time interval n, is Sni (w), where w = 1 for the ex-dividend
week and w = 0 for the control week. To investigate more about the spread in ex-
dividend week, cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day, several regressions are run.
The rst regression examines the overall picture of spread in ex-dividend week in
compere to control week. A regression model specied as follows is estimated:
Sni (1) =α + βS
n
i (0) + δ1DCi + δ2DEi + δ3C.DCi + δ4C.DEi + ε
n
i (2.8)
15For some transactions which arrive at the same time, they are sorted according to their
Message Sequence Number (a sequence number used to assist in sorting orders received in the
same second)
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where:
Sni (w): is the spread for stock i, in the 5-minute time interval n, and w = 1
for the ex-dividend week and zero for the control week.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
wise.
C.DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to cum-
dividend day the in control week (day2) and 0 otherwise.
C.DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to ex-
dividend day the in control week (day3) and 0 otherwise.
The previous regression is run over both control week and ex-dividend week.
Then, the following model is estimated for cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day,
second day of control week and third day of control week:
Sni (1) =α + βS
n
i (0) + δ1DCi + δ2C.DCi + ε
n
i (2.9)
Finally, the model is also estimated for the cum-dividend day and the ex-
dividend day alone.
Sni (0)cum = α + βS
n
i (0)ex + ε
n
i (2.10)
where:
Sni (0)cum: is the spread for stock i, in 5-minute time interval n, for the cum-
dividend day.
Sni (0)ex: is the spread for stock i, in 5-minute time interval n, for the ex-
dividend day.
To avoid the problem of measurement error in the right hand side variables, the
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following model is estimated using the dierence in spreads between a 5-minute
interval in the ex-dividend week and the corresponding interval in the control
week:
∆Sni = α+ β1∆V o
n
i + β2∆V u
n
i + β3∆Re
n
i + β4∆Bs
n
i + β5∆Ss
n
i + δ1DCi + δ2DEi (2.11)
+ β6∆V o
n
i ∗DCi + β7∆V uni ∗DCi + β8∆Reni ∗DCi + β9∆Bsni ∗DCi + β10∆Ssni ∗DCi
+ β11∆V o
n
i ∗DEi + β12∆V uni ∗DEi + β13∆Reni ∗DEi + β14∆Bsni ∗DEi + β15∆Ssni ∗DEi
+ εni
where:
∆V oni : is volatility dierence between control week and ex-dividend week in
every ve minutes. The volatility is the tick-by-tick standard deviation of returns
over a ve minute interval.
∆V uni : is volume dierence between control week and ex-dividend week in
every ve minutes. The volume is the natural logarithm of the average number of
shares per transaction in a ve minute interval divided by the average number of
shares per transaction on the day.
∆Reni : is return dierence between control week and ex-dividend week in
every ve minutes. The return denes as the average tick-by-tick return over a
ve minute interval.
∆Bsni : is buy trade size dierence between control week and ex-dividend week
in every ve minutes. Buy trade size is the accumulated volume of buy transac-
tions over a ve minutes interval before the event.
∆Ssni : is sell trade size dierence between control week and ex-dividend week
in every ve minutes. Sell trade size is the accumulated volume of sell transactions
over a ve minutes interval before the event.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
DEi :is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
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wise.
The model is also estimated for the ex-dividend week alone.
To investigate more about the spread dierences between ex-dividend week,
cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, second day of control week, third day of con-
trol week and control week, we run the following regression:
SP ni =α + δ1DCi + δ2DEi + δ3C.DCi + δ4C.DEi + δ5DCWi + ε
n
i (2.12)
where:
SP ni : is the spread for stock i, in the 5-minute time interval n.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
wise.
C.DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to cum-
dividend day the in control week (day2) and 0 otherwise.
C.DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to ex-
dividend day the in control week (day3) and 0 otherwise.
DCWi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 in control week and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we run the following spread determinants regression, to examine whether
these determinants aect dierently on spread on cum- and ex-dividend days:
SPni = α+ β1X
n
i + β2DCi + β3DEi + β4DCWi +B5C.DCi +B6C.DEi
+ β7X
n
i ∗DCi + β8Xni ∗DEi + β9Xni ∗DWi + β10Xni ∗ C.DCi + β11Xni ∗ C.DEi
+ εni (2.13)
where:
SP ni : is the spread for stock i, in the 5-minute time interval n.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
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otherwise.
DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
wise.
C.DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to cum-
dividend day the in control week (day2) and 0 otherwise.
C.DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to ex-
dividend day the in control week (day3) and 0 otherwise.
DCWi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 in control week and 0 otherwise.
Xni : are the spread determinants which are: volatility (the tick-by-tick stan-
dard deviation of returns over a ve minute interval), volume (the natural loga-
rithm of the average number of shares per transaction in a ve minute interval
divided by the average number of shares per transaction on the day), return (the
return denes as the average tick-by-tick return over a ve minute interval), buy
trade size (the accumulated volume of buy transactions over a ve minutes inter-
val before the event), sell trade size (sell trade size is the accumulated volume of
sell transactions over a ve minutes interval before the event).
Volatility
To investigate volatility in the ex-dividend week as compared to that in the control
week, the following regression model is estimated
V olni (1) = α + βV ol
n
i (0) + δ1DCi + δ2DEi + δ3C.DCi + δ4C.DEi + ε
n
i (2.14)
where:
V olni (w): is the volatility of the tick-by-tick return of stock i in the 5-minute
interval n for the ex-dividend week (w = 1) and for the control week (w = 0).
Similarly to spread, the following model is estimated for cum-dividend day,
ex-dividend day, second day of control week and third day of control week:
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V olni (1) = α + βV ol
n
i (0) + +δ1DCi + δ2C.DCi + ε
n
i (2.15)
The model is also estimated for the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day
alone.
V olni (0)cum = α + βV ol
n
i (0)ex + ε
n
i (2.16)
where:
V olni (0)cum: is the volatility for stock i, in 5-minute time interval n, on the
cum-dividend day.
V olni (0)ex: is the volatility for stock i, in 5-minute time interval n, on the
ex-dividend day.
To investigate more about the volatility dierences between ex-dividend week,
cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, second day of control week, third day of con-
trol week and control week, we run the following regression:
V Oni =α + δ1DCi + δ2DEi + δ3C.DCi + δ4C.DEi + δ5DCWi + ε
n
i (2.17)
where:
V Oni : is the volatility for stock i, in the 5-minute time interval n.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
wise.
C.DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to cum-
dividend day the in control week (day2) and 0 otherwise.
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C.DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on the corresponding to ex-
dividend day the in control week (day3) and 0 otherwise.
DCWi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 in control week and 0 otherwise.
Order Submission
While there is, in the market microstructure literature, an emphasis on the choice
between market orders and limit orders.16 Orders are, however, categorized ac-
cording to their price aggressiveness.17 Aggressiveness is essentially a measure of
the price concession the trader makes when submitting the order. For example,
if a buy limit order is submitted with a limit price higher than the prevailing
bid price it will be considered as aggressive, and similarly for a sell order with a
limit price lower than the prevailing ask price. Limit orders are categorized into
four groups with varying aggressiveness: behind-the-quote, at-the-quote, inside-
the-quote and marketable. Specically, for each order, limit price of the order is
compared with the price of the buy (sell) transaction in the previous ve minute
interval which was executed at the highest (lowest) price. Denoting the price of
the buy transaction in the previous ve minute interval with the highest price as
Max-5min, and the price of the sell transaction in the previous ve minute interval
with the lowest price as Min-5min, then
1. Behind-the-quote (B-T-Q) buy (sell) orders is dened by the criterion that
it has a limit price less (more) than Max-5min (Min-5min);
2. At-the-quote (A-T-Q) buy (sell) orders is dened by the criterion that it has
a limit price equal to Max-5min (Min-5min);
3. Inside-the-quote (I-T-Q) order is dened by the criterion that it has a limit
price between Max-5min and Min-5min;
16See Handa and Schwartz (1996); Parlour (1998); Bae et al. (2003); Bloomeld et al. (2005).
17Doing so following several other studies in this vein such as Biais et al. (1995); Griths et
al. (2000); Goettler et al. (2005); Ellul et al. (2007); and Tkatch and Kandel (2006).
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4. Marketable (M-A) limit buy (sell) order is dened by the criterion that it
has a limit price greater (less) than or equal to Min-5min (Max-5min).
Behind-the-quote limit orders are deemed the least aggressive and marketable
orders the most aggressive orders. Since there is no data about the actual bid-ask
spread or the higher tiers of the limit order book in real time, this procedure has
applied to approximate the level of aggressiveness of submitted orders.
A multinomial logit regression is estimated to investigate factors that may be
determining the aggressiveness with which orders are submitted.18Factors reported
in the literature are: spread, which is Roll's measure of spread over a ve-minute
interval, volatility, which is the tick-by-tick standard deviation of returns over a
ve-minute interval, buy (sell) trade size, which is the accumulated volume of buy
(sell) transactions over a ve-minute interval before the event, relative volume,
which is the natural logarithm of the average number of shares per transaction
in a ve-minute interval divided by the average number of shares per transaction
on the day, buy (sell) trade duration, which is the time in seconds of a buy (sell)
transaction since the last buy (sell) trade, the expected return, on the stock which is
the average tick-by-tick return over a ve-minute interval, time from noon squared,
which is the log of one plus the time distance (measured in number of ve-minute
interval) from noon, number of buy (sell) transactions, which is the number of
buy (sell) trades in a ve-minute interval. The multinomial logit model specied
18Following previous studies such Griths et al. (2000); Ellul et al. (2007) as well as Has-
brouck and Saar (2009) in this regard.
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below is estimated: 19'20'21'22'23'24'25'26'27'28'29
Eventtype(i,t) = α + β1,iXi,t + δ1,iZi,t
+ β2,iDW i + β3,iDWi ∗Xi,t + δ2,iDWi ∗ Zi,t
+ β4,iDCi + β5,iDCi ∗Xi,t + δ3,iDCi ∗ Zi,t
+ β6,iDEi + β7,iDEi ∗Xi,t + δ4,iDEi ∗ Zi,t
+
n∑
i=1
β8,iD(i) + εi,t (2.18)
where:
i and t : indices for rms and time respectively,
Xi,t: are the model variables,
Zi,t: are the control variables,
DWi :is the indicator variable and takes value of 1 on ex-dividend week and 0
otherwise,
19Examples of studies that report the spread include Cohen et al. (1981); Harris (1998);
Foucault (1999); Wald and Horrigan (2005); Jones and Lipson (2004); Foucault et al. (2005);
Bloomeld et al. (2005) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2009).
20Examples of studies that report the volatility include Foucault (1999); Handa and Schwartz
(1996); Easley et al. (2002); Wald and Horrigan (2005) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2009).
21Examples of studies that report the buy (sell) trade size include Hasbrouck and Saar (2009)
as well as Menkho et al. (2010).
22Examples of studies that report the relative volume include Ellul et al. (2007).
23Examples of studies that report the trade duration include Madhavan et al. (1997); Foucault
et al. (2005); Tkatch and Kandel (2006) as well as Rosu (2009).
24Examples of studies that report the return include Wald and Horrigan (2005) as well as by
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009).
25Examples of studies that report the time from noon include Ellul et al. (2007).
26Number of buy (sell) transactions is a measure of momentum is employed in Menkho et
al. (2010).
27Unordered multinomial logit models are typically employed when there are multiple cate-
gories but the order among the categories is not of concern. A multinomial logit model compares
each category of the unordered response variable to one category, designated a-priori, for this
purpose, as the benchmark.
28Probit and logit models are essentially the same; the dierence is in the distribution: Logit:
cumulative standard logistic distribution (F), probit: cumulative standard normal distribution
(Φ). Both probit and logit models present similar results (Institute for Digital Research and
Education, 2015).
29Use multinomial logit model is similar to use ordered logit regression, except that it is
assumed that there is no order to the categories of the dependent variable (i.e., the categories
are nominal)(Institute for Digital Research and Education, 2015).
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DEi: is the indicator variable and takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0
otherwise,
DCi: is the indicator variable that takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and
0 otherwise,
D(i): is the indicator variable takes value of 1 on rm i and 0 otherwise.
The multinomial logit regression is a model that is used to predict the proba-
bilities of the dierent possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent
variable, given a set of independent variables (which may be continuous variable
, binary variable, categorical variable, etc.). Therefore, we use multinomial logit
estimation to predict the probabilities of choose a specic aggressive buy order in
compare to sell order generally. More specically, we predict the probabilities of
each type of four aggressive buy order (behind the quote - at the quote - inside the
quote and marketable) using all sell order (without any classication) as baseline
and vice versa for sell order. A full explanation of multinomial logit regression is
provided in Appendix A.
Several versions of equation (2.18) are estimated separately for buy and sell
orders as well as a number of alternative specications of the variables in the
regressions. A list of the models is detailed in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4  List of Model Variations
This table reports the specication for ve dierent multinomial models where DW is the indicator variable
takes value of 1 on ex-dividend week and 0 otherwise, DE is the indicator variable takes value of 1on ex-
dividend day and 0 otherwise and DC is the indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
Model Model Variables (X) Control Variables (Z) Dummies
M1 Spread, Volatility,
Return, Duration
Controls -
M2 As M1 Controls DW
M3 As M1 plus Controls As M3
Spread*DW,
Volatility*DW,
Controls*DW
Return*DW,
Duration*DW
M4 As M3 Controls As M3 plus DC, DE
Controls*DW
M5 As M4 plus Controls As M4
Spread*DC, Controls*DW
Spread*DE, Controls*DC
Volatility*DC, Controls*DE
Volatility*DE
Return*DC,
Return*DE,
Duration*DC,
Duration*DE
2.6 Results
Spread and Volatility
The results from estimating models presented in the methodology section are as
follows. Table 2.5 shows the results of model (2.8) and (2.14), using the data for
both the ex-dividend week and the control weeks, whereas Table 2.6 shows the
results of models (2.9) and (2.15) using the data for only days 2 and 3 of the two
weeks (Days 2 and 3 in the ex-dividend week are the cum- and ex-dividend days,
respectively). Table 2.7 shows the results of models (2.10) and (2.16) using the
data only for the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day.
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Table 2.5  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.8) and Eq (2.14) for sample of 47 stocks
from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in
a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample
period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The regression is robust
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables Spread.Ex........................ Variables Volatility.Ex
Spread 0.316*** Volatility 0.462***
(7.06) (9.68)
Cum.day -0.000 Cum.day 0.000
(-0.09) (0.08)
Ex.day -0.000 Ex.day 0.000
(-0.17) (1.57)
Spread#C-Cum 0.021 Volatility#C-Cum 0.010
(0.27) (0.16)
Spread#C-Ex 0.010 Volatility#C-Ex -0.090
(0.18) (-1.31)
constant 0.000*** constant 0.000***
(11.11) (9.83)
Table 2.6  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.9) and Eq (2.15) for sample of 47 stocks
from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in
a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample
period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week.The regression is robust for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables Spread. Ex........................ Variables Volatility. Ex
Spread 0.326*** Volatility 0.371***
(5.25) (6.72)
Cum.day 0.000 Cum.day -0.000
(0.01) (-1.22)
Spread#C-Cum 0.010 Volatility#C-Cum 0.100
(0.12) (1.25)
constant 0.000*** constant 0.000***
(12.43) (8.47)
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Table 2.7  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.10) and Eq (2.16) for sample of 47 stocks
from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in
a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample
period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week.The regression is robust for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Spread.Cum.day................. Volatility.Cum.day
Spread.Ex.day 0.386*** Volatility.Ex.day 0.531***
(6.23) (6.84)
constant 0.000*** constant 0.000***
(6.71) (6.55)
The results show several signicant eects. First, the constant term is signi-
cantly positive in all regressions. This indicates that, in general, the spread and
the volatility are higher in the ex-dividend week than in the control week and
are higher on the cum-dividend day than on the ex-dividend day within the ex-
dividend week. Second, the coecients on the corresponding spread observations
and the volatility observations in the two weeks are positive in all tables, which
indicate that there are intra-day patterns in both the spread and the volatility
variables. The general picture is therefore, that there are spread and volatility
eects in the ex-dividend week.
We estimate two versions of model (2.11). First, we regress the dierence
in the spread between the ex-dividend week and the spread in the control week
for corresponding 5-minute intervals, on a set of determining variables, which
are themselves also dierences between corresponding 5-minute interval in the
dividend and control weeks. Second, we regress the level of the spread in the ex-
dividend week on the same right hand side variables which are volatility, volume,
return, buy-size, sell-size, and dummies for the cum-dividend day and the ex-
dividend day and the results are reported in Table 2.8
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Table 2.8  Estimation of OLS regression over spread determinants
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.11) for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is
no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The second columns estimate the determinants
of the dierence in spread between control week and ex-dividend week for corresponding 5-minute intervals.
The third columns estimate the determinants of the spread over ex-dividend week. The regression is robust
for heteroskedasticity and and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Control week + Ex-dividend week Ex-dividend week
Volatility
All Week 0.558*** 0.578***
(20.32) (16.73)
Cum-dividend day -0.008 -0.023
(-0.18) (-0.55)
Ex-dividend day 0.011 -0.030
(0.23) (-1.07)
Volume
All Week -0.000*** -0.000***
(-2.92) (-3.08)
Cum-dividend day -0.000** 0.000
(-2.00) (0.07)
Ex-dividend day 0.000 -0.000
(0.10) (-0.20)
Return
All Week 0.002 0.032
(0.03) (0.38)
Cum-dividend day -0.074 -0.019
(-0.61) (-0.22)
Ex-dividend day 0.027 0.123
(0.26) (1.26)
Buy Size
All Week -0.000 0.000
(-0.74) (1.30)
Cum-dividend day 0.000 0.000
(0.96) (0.22)
Ex-dividend day 0.000 0.000
(0.94) (0.19)
Sell Size
All Week 0.000 0.000
(0.13) (0.42)
Cum-dividend day 0.000* 0.000
(1.68) (0.00)
Ex-dividend day -0.000 -0.000
(-0.08) (-0.04)
Dummies
Cum-dividend day 0.000 0.000
(0.93) (0.43)
Ex-dividend day 0.000 0.000
(1.04) (0.94)
constant -0.000*** -0.000***
(-2.93) (-5.39)
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Columns two in Table 2.8 show the determinants of the dierence in spread.
We nd that the spread overall is greater in the ex-dividend week than in the
control week. Furthermore, we nd that the dierence in spread is explained, in
general, by the dierence in volatility by a positive association but there are no
specic cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day eects. There is also a negative
association with the dierence in volume and this eect is amplied on the cum-
dividend day. An increase in the dierence in the trading volume from the control
week to the ex-dividend week, therefore, leads to a decrease in the dierence in
the spread over the same period, which is amplied on the cum-dividend day. We
nd similar results when using levels. In general, when the volatility is higher or
when the trading volume is lower, the spread levels are higher.
Table 2.9shows the results of model (2.12) and (2.17) , using the data for both
the ex-dividend week and the control weeks.
Table 2.9  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.12) and Eq (2.17) for sample of 47
stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100
index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the
sample period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The regression is
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Dummies Spread Volatility
Cum.day -0.006 -0.004
Ex.day 0.002 -0.002
Cont.w 0.003 -0.003
C-Cum -0.002 -0.013
C-Ex -0.004 -0.026**
constant 0.169*** 0.462***
The results of these regression conrm the previous results that volatility is
higher on ex-dividend week in compere to control week. Further, the constants
in two regressions are also positive conrming the potential intra-day patterns in
both the spread and the volatility variables.
Table 2.10shows the results of models (2.13) using the data for both the ex-
dividend week and the control weeks.
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Table 2.10  Estimation of OLS regression over spread determinants
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.13) for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is
no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The regression is robust for heteroskedasticity
and and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Variables Ex.w Cum.day Ex.day Cont.w C-Cum C-Ex
Volatility 0.503*** -0.058* -0.027 0.030 -0.000 0.000
Volume -1.042* -1.017 -0.069 0.001 -191.664 -22.151
Return 0.041 0.058 0.178 -0.061 0.000 -0.000
Buy Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.005
Sell Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.004
Dummies -0.065*** 0.018 0.013 -0.009 -0.002 -0.015
The signicant positive eect of volatility and negative eect of volume have
been conrmed in this regression. However, the positive eect of the volatility on
spread has been reduced on cum-dividend day.
Order Submission
The results of the order submission analysis are presented here. All models pre-
sented in the methodology section were estimated for both the buy side and the
sell side. Only the results of M5, however, are discussed here and presented in
Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 for buy side and sell side respectively. 30 Table 2.11 and
Table 2.12 report the relative risk ration RRR for multinomial logit estimation of
model (2.18). The coecients that multinomial logit estimation usually report
is not easy to interpret. Therefore, we calculate the relative risk ration which is
much easier to interpret, a full explanation is provided in the Appendix A.
30The results of the remainder of models are reported in Appendix B
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Table 2.11  Relative risk ratiosM5buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq. (2.18) for -M5-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in
their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.614*** 0.186*** 0.096*** 0.334***
DW 0.919*** 0.917*** 1.109** 1.092***
DC 1.069*** 0.852*** 0.825** 0.894***
DE 1.197*** 1.301*** 1.692*** 1.005
Baseline * DW 0.564 0.171 0.106 0.365
Baseline * DW * DC 0.603 0.145 0.088 0.326
Baseline * DW * DE 0.675 0.222 0.180 0.367
Spread variables
Spread 1.217*** 1.143*** 0.965** 0.853***
Spread # DW 0.828*** 0.838*** 0.958* 1.021
Spread # DC 1.136*** 1.250*** 1.116*** 0.745***
Spread # DE 1.108*** 0.969 0.814*** 0.800***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.008 0.958 0.924 0.871
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DC 1.145 1.197 1.032 0.649
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DE 1.117 0.928 0.753 0.697
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.793*** 0.979 1.214*** 1.066***
Volatility # DW 1.187*** 1.099*** 1.068*** 0.99
Volatility # DC 0.949*** 1.013 1.181*** 1.254***
Volatility # DE 0.903*** 0.867*** 1.161*** 0.950***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.941 1.076 1.297 1.055
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC 0.893 1.090 1.531 1.323
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE 0.850 0.933 1.505 1.003
Return variables
Return 0.745*** 1.015 1.238*** 1.779***
Return # DW 1.066*** 1.005 0.765*** 0.917***
Return # DC 1.051* 1.001 1.376*** 1.734***
Return # DE 0.794*** 0.870** 1.231*** 1.323***
Return * Return # DW 0.794 1.020 0.947 1.631
Return * Return # DW * Return # DC 0.835 1.021 1.303 2.829
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE 0.631 0.887 1.166 2.158
Duration variables
Duration 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.996***
Duration # DW 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001* 0.997***
Duration # DC 1.001 1.003*** 1.000 1.002***
Duration # DE 1.001*** 1.003*** 0.999 1.003***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.002 1.005 1.003 0.993
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DC 1.003 1.008 1.003 0.995
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE 1.003 1.008 1.002 0.996
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Table 2.12  Relative risk ratiosM5sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq. (2.18) for -M5-sell side on a stock-
by-stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and
June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday
in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order
(5) buy order. Buy order set as reference category for sell regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.578*** 0.168*** 0.076*** 0.427***
DW 1.038*** 1.207*** 1.252*** 0.966***
DC 1.060*** 0.760*** 0.797*** 0.950***
DE 0.913*** 1.249*** 0.951 0.877***
Baseline * DW 0.600 0.203 0.095 0.412
Baseline * DW * DC 0.636 0.154 0.076 0.392
Baseline * DW * DE 0.548 0.253 0.090 0.362
Spread variables
Spread 0.994 0.917*** 0.908*** 0.793***
Spread # DW 1.250*** 0.980 1.085*** 1.032**
Spread # DC 0.786*** 1.141** 1.160*** 1.067***
Spread # DE 0.787*** 1.099* 0.545*** 1.252***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.243 0.899 0.985 0.818
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DC 0.977 1.025 1.143 0.873
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DE 0.978 0.988 0.537 1.025
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.981*** 1.133*** 1.424*** 1.149***
Volatility # DW 0.840*** 0.944** 0.930*** 0.990
Volatility # DC 1.081*** 1.067* 0.853*** 0.828***
Volatility # DE 1.219*** 1.023 1.801*** 0.897***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.824 1.070 1.324 1.138
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC 0.891 1.141 1.130 0.942
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE 1.005 1.094 2.385 1.020
Return variables
Return 1.309*** 0.877*** 0.824*** 0.530***
Return # DW 1.003 1.149*** 1.206*** 1.347***
Return # DC 1.017 0.945 0.721*** 0.560***
Return # DE 1.099*** 1.046 1.196*** 0.691***
Return * Return # DW 1.313 1.008 0.994 0.714
Return * Return # DW * Return # DC 1.335 0.952 0.716 0.400
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE 1.443 1.054 1.189 0.493
Duration variables
Duration 1.002*** 1.005*** 1.000 0.994***
Duration # DW 0.999*** 0.999 1.001 1.001***
Duration # DC 0.999*** 1.003*** 1.004*** 0.998***
Duration # DE 0.999*** 1.000 0.992*** 0.998***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.001 1.004 1.001 0.995
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DC 1.000 1.007 1.005 0.993
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE 1.000 1.004 0.993 0.993
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Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 are divided into the following sections: dummy vari-
able, spread variable, volatility variable, return variable and duration variables.
In the dummy variables section, the baseline refers to the control week, DW refers
to ex-dividend week, DC refers to cum-dividend day and DE refers to ex-dividend
day. To calculate the overall eect of ex-dividend week, we need to multiply the
RRR of the baseline by RRR of the ex-dividend week DW. Similarly, in order
to observe the overall eect of cum-dividend day (ex-dividend day), we need to
multiply the RRR of baseline by the RRR of ex-dividend week and RRR of cum-
dividend day (ex-dividend day). For the other parts of the table, spread variable,
volatility variable, return variable and duration variable refer to the RRR of these
variables in control week, whereas (one variable) # DW refers to the RRR of that
variable in ex-dividend week (e.g., Spread # DW refers to the RRR of spread
variable in ex-dividend week). Further, (one variable) # DC (DE) refers to the
RRR of that variable in cum-dividend day (ex-dividend day) (e.g., Spread # DC
refers to RRR of spread variable on cum-dividend day). In same way as dummy
variables part, in order to observe the overall eect of one variable in ex-dividend
week, we should multiply the RRR of this variable in control week by RRR of
that variable in ex-dividend week (e.g., the overall eect of spread variable in ex-
dividend week can be calculated by multiply the RRR of spread variable in control
week by RRR of spread variable in ex-dividend week). Finally, in order to see the
overall eect of one variable on cum-dividend day (ex-dividend day), we should
multiply the RRR of this variable in control week by RRR of same variable in ex-
dividend week and RRR of samet variable on cum-dividend day (ex-dividend day)
(e.g., the overall eect of spread variable on cum-dividend (ex-dividend) day can
be calculated by multiply the RRR of spread variable in control week by RRR of
spread variable in ex-dividend week and RRR of spread variable on cum-dividend
(ex-dividend) day). The full explanation why we do that is presented in Appendix
(A).
While these are a rather complex set of results, the general picture, is as
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follows. First, there are clear eects linked to the likelihood of the submission
of orders on the cum dividend day, the ex-dividend day and the rest of the ex-
dividend week, compared to the control week. On the cum-dividend day there
is a reduction in the base-line likelihood of the submission of a buy order of any
kind and on the ex-dividend day there is an increase in the base-line likelihood of
the submission of a buy order of any kind, compared to the base-line likelihood
for the control week. This can be inferred from Table 2.11, by comparing the
Baseline relative risk ratio (RRR) with the interaction terms on the Baseline
variables such as the relative risk ratios on Baseline* DW * DC and on Baseline
* DW * DE.31 This comparison takes into account the eect on the baseline from
inclusion in the dividend week (by the Indicator variable DW) and the inclusion
in the cum-dividend day (by the Indicator variable DC) and the ex-dividend day
(by the Indicator variable DE), respectively. Meanwhile the picture is dierent
for sell orders.
On the cum-dividend day there is an increase in the likelihood of the submission
of the least aggressive sell orders and a decrease (or constant) in the likelihood of
the submission of any other kind of sell order, compared to the control week. On
the ex-dividend day there is a reduction in the likelihood of the submission of the
least aggressive sell order and the most aggressive sell order and an increase in
the likelihood of the submission of any other kind of sell order, compared to the
control week. At one level there is a symmetry that can be seen between buy and
sell orders, however: the change in likelihood is going in opposite directions on the
cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day, compared to the control week, for both
buy and sell orders of any kind. The likelihood of the least aggressive buy orders
and the three most aggressive sell orders is reduced on the cum-dividend day, while
the likelihood of the least aggressive buy order and the second and third most
aggressive sell orders is increased on the ex-dividend day, consistent with more
aggressive buying behaviour on the cum-dividend day and more aggressive selling
31A full explanation of relative risk ratios and why it is used is detailed and provided in
Appendix A.
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behaviour on the ex-dividend day. Traders submit a premium for their buy orders
on the cum-dividend day. On the ex-dividend day, though there is no guillotine
type deadline pressure, traders still act aggressively, but not as aggressively as
they do on cum-dividend days, so they avoid most aggressive sell orders. This is
evidence of the presence of tax-arbitrage traders.
There is, however, an increase in the likelihood of the least aggressive sell
orders on the cum-dividend day and an increase in the likelihood of the least
aggressive buy orders on the ex-dividend day, consistent with liquidity suppliers
seeking to benet from the activity of the relatively more aggressive behaviours
of the tax-arbitrageurs.
Second, there are patterns in the way that order submission is associated
with changes in spread occurring in the ex-dividend week relative to the control
week. While, most sell orders, respond more positively to spread increases on
the cum-dividend day than the control week, only the second and third least
aggressive buy orders respond more positively to increases in spread on the cum-
dividend day than the control week. The second least aggressive sell orders and
the most aggressive sell orders respond more positively to spread increases on
the ex-dividend day than the control week. All buy order types respond more
negatively to an increase in spread on the ex-dividend day than the control week -
a conclusion that can be inferred from Table 2.11 and Table 2.12, from the relative
risk ratios on the Spread variables.32
It is more likely that we see more aggressive sell orders submitted following
an increase in the spread on the cum-dividend day but less likely that we will
see more aggressive buy orders submitted following an increase in spread on the
ex-dividend day. This can be consistent with liquidity provision by sellers on the
cum-dividend day. If there is buying pressure on the cum-dividend day and selling
pressure on the ex-dividend day from arbitrageurs, there should be temporary
increases in spread that is subsequently lled by more aggressive orders from the
32For example, compare the Spread relative risk ratio (RRR) with the Spread * Spread
#DW * Spread #DC and Spread * Spread #DW * Spread #DE relative risk ratios.
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opposite side of the market, on both the cum- and ex-dividend days. This eect
is observed on the cum-dividend day but not on the ex-dividend day, which could
be explained by there being a cum-dividend day deadline for placing tax-arbitrage
transactions and the absence of such a deadline on the ex-dividend day. The fact
the liquidity supplying orders are aggressive does not mean the liquidity provision
is not protable, since the trading pressure may push the bid and ask prices away
from the fundamentals. For example, if a liquidity provider is submitting an
aggressive order relative to the current spread, the order may not be aggressive
relative to the fundamental price.
Third, there is evidence of patterns in the dierences seen in the way that
order submission is associated with return changes in the ex-dividend week as
compared to the control week. All types of buy orders respond more positively
to return increases on the cum-dividend day than the control week. The three
least aggressive sell orders respond more positively to return increases on the ex-
dividend day than the control week. Consistent with the literature, in the control
week, there is a positive association between return and the likelihood of the
submission the three most aggressive buy order types, and of the submission of
the least aggressive sell order. It is expected that this eect is particularly strong
on the cum-dividend day for buy orders and the opposite eect is expected for
sell orders on ex-dividend day, since it is aggressive buying (selling) pressure that
is more likely to be driven on the cum-dividend (ex-dividend) day by arbitrageurs
who need to place their orders before the end of the cum-dividend day. This
assertion is supported by the data, since the positive association between the
submission of buy orders and returns is amplied on the cum-dividend day and
the positive association between the submission of least aggressive sell orders and
returns is excited on the ex-dividend day. This can be inferred from comparing the
relative risk ratios (RRR) for Return variable in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 with
those for the interaction terms with Return. This is evidence of the presence of
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tax-arbitrage traders.33
It is more likely to see two least aggressive sell orders submitted following an
increase in the return on cum-dividend day and more likely to see aggressive buy
orders submitted following an increase in the return on ex-dividend day. This
can be consistent with liquidity provision by sellers on the cum-dividend day and
buyer on the ex-dividend day. If there is buying pressure on the cum-dividend day
and selling pressure on the ex-dividend day from arbitrageurs temporary increases
in the return may be seen that is subsequently taken by more orders on the other
side on both the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day.
Fourth, there are patterns also in the way order submission is associated with
volatility changes occurring in the ex-dividend week relative to the control week.
All buy order types respond more positively to volatility increases on the cum-
dividend day than in the control week. In the control week, there is a positive
association between and volatility and the likelihoods of the submission of the
three most aggressive sell order types and of the submission of the two most ag-
gressive buy orders types. This is evidence that trading activity is associated with
and perhaps even drives price volatility. It is expected that this eect is particu-
larly strong on the cum-dividend day for buy orders, since more aggressive buying
pressure (which is more likely to move prices) is more likely on cum-dividend days
from the activity of arbitrageurs who need to place their orders before the end
of the cum-dividend day (i.e. an approaching guillotine type deadline). There is
evidence for this assertion in the data , since the positive association between the
submission of the two most aggressive buy orders and price volatility is amplied
on the cum-dividend day. This conclusion can be inferred from the relative risk
ratios in Table 2.11 and Table 2.12, by comparing the relative risk ratio (RRR) for
Volatility with the interactions terms on Volatility.34 This is evidence of the
33More specically, this can be seen by comparing the Return relative risk ratio (RRR) with
the Return * Return # DW * Return # DC and Return * Return # DW * Return # DE
relative risk ratios.
34For example, see Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC and Volatility * Volatility
# DW * Volatility # DE relative risk ratios.
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presence of tax-arbitrage traders.
Fifth, there are some links between duration changes taking place in ex-
dividend week relative to control week and order submission. The likelihood of
the most aggressive buy order increases when duration decreases in control week.
This eect amplies on cum-dividend day for buy side. The most three aggressive
sell orders respond more positively to duration decreases on ex-dividend day com-
paring to control week. This can be inferred from Table 2.11 and Table 2.12, by
comparing the relative risk ratios.35 When the duration increases on cum-dividend
(ex-dividend) day, the traders submit less aggressive buy (sell) order. Duration
variable was intended to capture the inuence of expected time to execution, an
increase in which should discourage limit orders according to existing theory (Fou-
cault et al., 2005; Rosu 2008, 2009). Evidence for this hypothesis is provided in
Tkatch and Kandel (2008). We oer the following potential explanation of this
otherwise puzzling result. In some markets, like the LSE, trading tends to occur
most frequently at the market open, when information asymmetries are strongest
because trading has been suspended during an extended overnight period (Mad-
havan et al., 1997). If so, the trade duration variable might capture these shifts in
the information environment. Higher trade duration would reect a dearth of new
information arrivals and would therefore be associated with the relatively heavy
use of less aggressive orders consistent with our results.
Overall, the results point to traces of foot-prints associated with tax arbitrage
and liquidity supply around the ex-dividend event. One picture that emerges
is that increases in the price volatility on the cum-dividend (ex-dividend) day
motivate tax-arbitrageurs to buy (sell) aggressively. Furthermore, aggressive tax
arbitrage buying on the cum-dividend day leads to high returns (as prices are
pushed away from fundamentals) and higher spreads are associated with buying
and selling pressure on the cum- and ex-dividend days . The increases in return
35For example, by comparing the Duration relative risk ratio (RRR) with the Duration *
Duration # DW * Duration # DC and Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE relative
risk ratios.
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and spread attract liquidity suppliers, particularly on the cum-dividend day, where
it is more likely they can exploit the immediacy needs of tax-arbitrageurs. Conse-
quently, there is also, therefore, an increase in the likelihood of order submission
strategies and that is as expected from liquidity suppliers.
2.7 Robustness Test
This section provides additional tests to examine the robustness of the results
presented above. The results point to traces of foot-prints associated with tax ar-
bitrage and liquidity supply around the ex-dividend day. They also show patterns
in the way that order submission is associated with changes in spread, volatility
and return occurring on the cum- and ex- dividend days. To perform the robust-
ness test - rstly, instead of restricting our sample to rms that are listed on the
FTSE100 which have paid a cash dividend on Wednesday, we are including all
rms that have paid a cash dividend, regardless of the trading day. Furthermore,
if a rm pays a cash dividend several times during the sample period, we will in-
clude them all as ex-dividend events with each taken as a separate stock. Our nal
sample has 167 ex-dividend events. Secondly, in the previous section the sample
period included the week with the ex-dividend day as well as the week prior, as
a control week. However, for robustness test, we collected data for cum- and ex-
dividend days as well as ten days after the ex-dividend day as the control period
as to avoid any dividend related trade activities that otherwise might contaminate
the control week. Thirdly, we calculated the actual bid-ask spread as follows:
1. For each day, all submitted orders from the start of the day were collected.
2. For a given order submitted at a given time on that day, we took all orders
from step 1 still live up to that point (i.e. not executed or deleted).
3. The most competitive buy and sell orders still live are the bid-ask spread at
the submission of the order in point 2.
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4. Some live orders were deleted. These were orders where (i) data on volume
is missing or (ii) the best bid price exceeds the best ask price.
5. The steps 2  4 were repeated for all orders submitted during each trading
day.
The error correction procedure in step 4 leads to the elimination of 2% of the
orders.
Fourth, to investigate further the spread (volatility) eects on cum and ex-
dividend days, we have run two OLS regressions. The rst regression examines the
overall picture of the spread during the study period by estimating the following
model:
Spreadni = α + δ1DCi + δ2DEi + ε
n
i (2.19)
where:
Spreadni : is the average spread for stock i during the ve minutes n.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
DEi :is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
wise.
We then add the following spread determinants: volatility, volume, return,
buy size, sell size and their interaction with cum-dividend day and ex-dividend
day dummies. The second regression examines whether these determinants aect
spread on cum- and ex-dividend days dierently in comparison to the control
period by estimating the following model: 36
36The control period is the ten days after ex-dividend day.
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Spreadni = α+ β1V o
n
i + β2V u
n
i + β3Re
n
i + β4Bs
n
i + β5Ss
n
i + δ1DCi + δ2DEi (2.20)
+ β6V o
n
i ∗DCi + β7V uni ∗DCi + β8Reni ∗DCi + β9Bsni ∗DCi + β10Ssni ∗DCi
+ β11V o
n
i ∗DEi + β12V uni ∗DEi + β13Reni ∗DEi + β14Bsni ∗DEi + β15Ssni ∗DEi
+ εni
where:
Spreadni : is the average spread for stock i during the ve minutes n.
V oni : is volatility for stock i during the ve minutes n. The volatility is the
tick-by-tick standard deviation of returns over a ve minute interval.
V uni : is volume for stock i during the ve minutes n. Volume is the natural
logarithm of the average number of shares per transaction in a ve minute interval
divided by the average number of shares per transaction on the day.
Reni : is return for stock i during the ve minutes n. The return denes as the
average tick-by-tick return over a ve minute interval.
Bsni : is buy trade size for stock i during the ve minutes n. Buy trade size
is the accumulated volume of buy transactions over a ve minutes interval before
the event.
Ssni : is sell trade size for stock i during the ve minutes n. Sell trade size is
the accumulated volume of sell transactions over a ve minutes interval before the
event.
Also, to investigate more regarding the volatility on cum- and ex- dividend
days, we estimated the following model:
V oni = α + δ1DCi + δ2DEi + ε
n
i (2.21)
Finally, we performed an ordered probit test of model 2.18 as follows: The
results presented so far consider four types of dierent aggressive buy orders
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(Behind-the-quote, At-the-quote, Inside-the-quote and Marketable) in comparison
with all sell orders as one block and four types of dierent aggressive sell orders
(Behind-the-quote, At-the-quote, Inside-the-quote and Marketable) in comparison
with all buy orders as one block. In this section, we classify the submitted orders
according to their price aggressiveness, in a similar way described in section 2.5
(2.5 order submission), and categorise orders from the least aggressive orders (i.e.
behind the quote) to the most aggressive orders (i.e. marketable). More specif-
ically, behind the quote orders are denoted as the lowest rank while marketable
orders are denoted as the highest rank. We then run an ordered probit regression
for the buy and sell sides separately.
Table 2.13 shows the results of models (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21). The rst row
shows the results of model (2.19), the second row shows the results of model (2.21)
and the rest of the table shows the results of model (2.20).
Table 2.13  Estimation of OLS regression over spread and volatility
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.19,2.20,2.21) for sample of 167 stocks
from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in
a period between June 2007 and June 2008 and they paid a cash dividend during the sample period. The
regression is robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables Cum.day Ex.day After.Ex.day
Spread -0.069* -0.109** 1.762***
Volatility -0.001 -0.020** 0.467***
Spread Determinants
Volatility -0.242 0.006 0.980***
Volume 0.103 -0.068 0.170***
Return 0.009 -0.011 0.003
Buy Size -0.005 -0.004 0.005*
Sell Size 0.004 0.005 0.004
Dummies 0.087 -0.082 1.247***
The results show several signicant eects conrming the previous results.
Firstly, the constant term is signicantly positive in spread and volatility dummies
regressions. This indicates that, in general, the spread and the volatility are
signicantly positive in the control period which is the ten days after ex-dividend
day. Secondly, the coecients on the corresponding spread observations and the
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volatility observations are positive in the control period and signicantly decrease
on ex-dividend day, which indicate that there are intra-day patterns in both the
spread and the volatility variables.
Furthermore, we nd that the spread is explained, in general, by volume,
volatility and buy size by a positive association but there are no specic cum-
dividend day and ex-dividend day eects.
Table 2.14 presents the predicted probabilities of submitting orders with vary-
ing levels of aggressiveness, on the cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day and 10
days after ex-dividend day, for both the buy side as well as the sell side. Table
2.15 reports the coecient of ordered probit regression for the buy and sell sides
separately.
Table 2.14  The predicted probabilities to submit dierent level of aggressive buy order and sell order
This table reports the predicted probabilities of each level of aggressiveness over buy and sell side separately.
The predicted probabilities are reported for sample of 167 ex-dividend events from FTSE 100 index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and
June 2008 and they paid a cash dividend during the sample period.
Buy Side Sell Side
Aggressiveness After.Ex Cum.day Ex.day After.Ex Cum.day Ex.day
B-T-Q 0.5107 0.5105 0.5148 0.5025 0.5055 0.5015
A-T-Q 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 0.0129 0.0129 0.0129
I-T-Q 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
M-A 0.4761 0.4763 0.4720 0.4826 0.4795 0.4836
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Table 2.15  Ordered probit regression
This table reports the ordered probit regression coecients over buy and sell side separately. The coecients
are reported for sample of 167 ex-dividend events from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following
criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008 and they paid a
cash dividend during the sample period. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variables Buy Side Variables Sell Side
Spread-After-Ex.Day 0.091*** Spread-After-Ex.Day 0.062***
Spread-Cum.Day -0.002 Spread-Cum.Day -0.021***
Spread-Ex.Day 0.018* Spread-Ex.Day -0.031***
Return-After-Ex.Day 0.001*** Return-After-Ex.Day -0.002***
Return-Cum.Day 0.006*** Return-Cum.Day 0.001***
Return-Ex.Day 0.002*** Return-Ex.Day -0.002***
Volatility-After-Ex.Day -2.872*** Volatility-After-Ex.Day -0.896***
Volatility-Cum.Day 5.483*** Volatility-Cum.Day -0.604*
Volatility-Ex.Day 0.988** Volatility-Ex.Day 0.130
Duration-After-Ex.Day -0.006*** Duration-After-Ex.Day -0.006***
Duration-Cum.Day 0.001*** Duration-Cum.Day 0.000
Duration-Ex.Day 0.000 Duration-Ex.Day 0.000*
Cum-dividend day 0.000 Cum-dividend day -0.008**
Ex-dividend day -0.010** Ex-dividend day -0.003***
Figures 2.1 and 2.3 present the variation in the predicted probabilities for
each level of aggressiveness against the spread variable, holding other variables
constant over the ex-dividend day, for sell and buy orders respectively. Similarly,
Figures 2.2 and 2.4 apply for cum-dividend day. Figures 2.5 and 2.7 present the
variation in the predicted probabilities for each level of aggressiveness against the
return variable, holding other variables constant over the ex-dividend day, for buy
and sell orders respectively. Similarly, Figure 2.6 and 2.8apply for cum-dividend
day. Figures 2.9 and 2.11 present the variation in the predicted probabilities for
each level of aggressiveness against the volatility variable, holding other variables
constant over the ex-dividend day, for sell and buy orders respectively. Similarly,
Figure 2.10 and 2.12 apply for cum-dividend day. Figures 2.13 and 2.15 present
the variation in the predicted probabilities for each level of aggressiveness against
the duration variable, holding other variables constant over the ex-dividend day,
for sell and buy orders respectively. Similarly, Figures 2.14 and 2.16applies for
cum-dividend day.
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Figure 2.1  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Sell order - Ex.Day
Figure 2.2  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Sell order - Cum.Day
Figure 2.3  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Buy order - Ex.Day
Figure 2.4  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread -Buy order - Cum.Day
.
Figure 2.5  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Buy order - Ex.Day.
Figure 2.6  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Buy order - Cum.Day.
Figure 2.7  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Sell order - Ex.Day.
Figure 2.8  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Sell order - Cum.Day.
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Figure 2.9  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Sell order - Ex.Day
Figure 2.10  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Sell order - Cum.Day
Figure 2.11  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Buy order - Ex.Day
Figure 2.12  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Buy order - Cum.Day
Figure 2.13  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Sell order - Ex.Day.
Figure 2.14  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Sell order - Cum.Day.
Figure 2.15  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Buy order - Ex.Day.
Figure 2.16  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Buy order - Cum.Day.
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We observe that by considering the new sample of data, calculating the ac-
tual live spread and analysing buy orders and sell orders separately, the ordered
probit specication does not overrule the previous results. Interestingly, we nd
that the highest predicted probability for marketable buy orders is on the cum-
dividend day (0.4763) and the highest predicted probability for marketable sell
order is on ex-dividend day (0.4836), conrming aggressive buy behaviour on the
cum-dividend day and aggressive sell behaviour on the ex-dividend day. Second,
there are patterns in the way that order submission is associated with changes in
spread occurring on the cum- and ex-dividend days relative to the control period.37
Table 2.15 shows that the aggressiveness level of buy orders responds positively
to spread increases on ex-dividend day. Meanwhile, the negative signs associated
with spread variables in Table 2.15 show that the aggressiveness level of sell orders
respond negatively to spread increases on both cum- and ex- dividend days, on the
cum-dividend day the aggressiveness level of sell orders responds less negatively
than the aggressiveness level of sell orders on ex-dividend day. This conclusion is
inferred from Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
It is more likely that we see more aggressive sell orders submitted following an
increase in the spread on the cum-dividend day and more aggressive buy orders
submitted following an increase in the spread on the ex-dividend day. This can
be consistent with liquidity provision by sellers on the cum-dividend day and by
buyers on the ex-dividend day. If there is buying pressure on the cum-dividend
day and selling pressure on the ex-dividend day from arbitrageurs, there should be
temporary increases in spread that is subsequently lled by more aggressive orders
from the opposite side of the market, on both the cum- and ex-dividend days.
This eect is observed on cum- and ex- dividend days. The fact that liquidity
supplying orders are aggressive does not mean liquidity provision is not protable,
since trading pressure may push bid and ask prices away from fundamentals. For
example, if a liquidity provider is submitting an aggressive order relative to current
37The control period is the ten days after ex-dividend day.
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spread, that order may not be aggressive relative to fundamental price.
Third, there is evidence of patterns in the changes seen in the way that order
submission is associated with return changes on cum- and ex- dividend days com-
pared to the control period. The positive return coecients over buy side in Table
2.15 can be interpreted, consistently with the previous results and with the prior
literature, as a positive association between return increases and the likelihood of
the submission of more aggressive buy order types. It is expected that this eect
is particularly strong on the cum-dividend day, since it is aggressive buying pres-
sure that is more likely to be driven on the cum-dividend day by arbitrageurs who
need to place their orders before the end of the cum-dividend day. This assertion
is supported by the results, since the positive association between the submission
of buy orders and returns is amplied on the cum-dividend day and is inferred
from Figures 2.6 .
Fourth, there are also patterns in the way order submission is associated with
volatility changes occurring on cum- and ex- dividend days compared to the con-
trol period. Table 2.15 shows that the aggressiveness level of buy (sell) orders
responds more positively to volatility increases on the cum-dividend (ex-dividend)
day than on ex-dividend (cum-dividend) day. This is evidence that trading ac-
tivity is associated with and perhaps even drives price volatility on the cum- and
ex-dividend days. This conclusion can be inferred from Figure 2.12
Finally, there are some links between duration changes on cum- and ex- divi-
dend days relative to the control period. The duration variable was intended to
capture the inuence of expected time to execution and as noted by existing the-
ory (see Foucault et al., 2005; Rosu 2008, 2009), an increase in duration should
discourage limit orders. The positive signs of the most duration coecients in
Table 2.15, conrm this. This eect is stronger on cum-dividend day.
Overall, the robustness results conrm the traces of foot-prints associated with
tax arbitrage and liquidity supply around the ex-dividend event. On one hand,
increases in the price volatility and order return motivate tax-arbitrageurs to buy
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on cum-dividend day and sell on ex-dividend day aggressively. On the other
hand, aggressive tax arbitrage buying on the cum-dividend day and selling on
ex-dividend day leads to higher spreads which attract liquidity suppliers to trade
aggressively.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies market microstructure eects associated with ex-dividend
price drops and investigates tax-arbitrage driven trading around ex-dividend days
and searching for their tell-tale footprints. First, there are no strong eects
in the aggregate trading data but spread and volatility are higher in the ex-
dividend week compared to the control week and spreads in the ex-dividend week
is aected by price volatility as well as trading volume. These eects are not
directly interpretable without simultaneously studying the order submission book.
Second, the order submission analysis report an increased in the likelihood of
relatively more aggressive buying on the cum-dividend day and relatively more
aggressive selling on the ex-dividend day, supporting the presence of tax-arbitrage
trading footprints. Also, the results present an increase in the likelihood of
relatively less aggressive selling on the cum-dividend day and of relatively less
aggressive buying on the ex-dividend day. These ndings are consistent with
tax-arbitrage and liquidity supply occurring simultaneously.
Third, there are clearly eects associating order submission to spread, volatil-
ity, return and duration. On the cum-dividend (ex-dividend) day, increases in
the price volatility motivate tax-arbitrageurs to buy (sell) aggressively. More, the
aggressive behaviour of tax arbitrager on the cum- and ex- dividend days leads
to high returns and higher spreads. The increases in return and spread attract
liquidity suppliers, particularly on the cum-dividend day, to trade aggressively.
The interpretation of the overall eect is that, one-sided trading pressure either
buying or selling drive prices away from fundamentals and increase returns as well
as spreads. These departures attract liquidity suppliers who trade aggressively ei-
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ther when prices are driven away from fundamentals or when spreads become large
enough to prot from. In addition, one-sided pressure either buying or selling in-
creases price volatility which motivates tax-arbitrageurs to submit their orders
aggressively. The conclusion is that these conjectured behaviours are stronger on
cum-dividend days because of an approaching cum-dividend day guillotine-type
horizon for placing tax-arbitrage transactions.
Finally, after we expand our sample period, calculate the actual spread and
analyse buy order and sell order separately, the regression specication conrms
most of the results.
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2.9 Appendix A
2.9.1 Multinomial Logit Regression
Denitions
Odds: odds are ratio
Odds =
p
1− p
(2.22)
Log odds: natural log of odds, also known as logit.
Logodds = logit =log(
p
1− p
) (2.23)
Odds ratio: odds ratio is ratio of odds.
Odd− ratio = Odd1
Odd2
=
p1
1−p1
p2
1−p2
(2.24)
Computing odds ratio from logistic regression coecient:
Odd− ratio = exp(b) (2.25)
Computing probability from logistic regression coecient:
probability =
exp(Xb)
1 + exp(Xb)
(2.26)
whereXb is the linear predictor.
Introduction
Multinomial logit models are used to model the relationship between categorical
response variable and set of regressor variables. Multinomial logit models are
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applied in case of discrete dependent variable
yn ∈ 1, 2, · · · J (2.27)
where the values of yn have no natural order.
Econometric model
The Choice of one of J alternatives is driven by a polytomous variable often
interpreted as indirect utility:
Unj = αj +X
′
nβj + εnj (2.28)
whereαj is a constant and βj is a vector of regression coecients, for j = 1, 2, · · · J−
1. Only J − 1 equations are needed to explain a dependent variable with J re-
sponse categories. The exogenous variables Xn explain only the individual and
are identical across alternative. However, the parameter βj diers among alterna-
tive. An individual n chooses alternative j if it oers the highest value of indirect
utility. The observed choice yn of an individual n is:
yn =

1 if Un1≥Unt for all i
2 if Un2≥Unt for all i
...
j if Unj≥Unt for all i
(2.29)
For further details, see Verbeek (2008).
Identication
The parameter vectors βj, j = 1, 2, · · · , J − 1, are not uniquely dened: any
vector c added to all vectors β∗j = βj + c cancels in the choice probabilitiesP nj.
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Pnj =
exp(x′n(βj + c))∑j
i=1 exp(x
′
n(βi + c))
=
exp(c)exp(x′nβj)
exp(c)
∑j
i=1 exp(x
′
nβi)
=
exp(x′nβj)∑j
i=1 exp(x
′
nβi)
(2.30)
One equation sets β to zero, so that the problem is identiable. The associated
outcome is the base reference group (see Hardin et al., 2007).
Model probabilities
Unj = ln
Pnj
PnJ
= αj +X
′
nβj (2.31)
Adopting the convention that UnJ = 0
Pnj =
exp(Unj)∑j
i=1 exp(Uni)
(2.32)
For j = 1, 2, · · · J − 1. By exponentiate the rst equation,
Pnj = PnJexp(Unj) (2.33)
The convention UnJ = 0 makes this formula valid for all j. Sum over j and
use the fact that
∑
j Pij = 1 lead to
PnJ =
1∑
jexp(Unj)
(2.34)
As in Verbeek (2008).
Maximum likelihood
Estimation of the parameters of this model by maximum likelihood (ML) proceeds
by maximization of the multinomial likelihood with the probabilities Pnj viewed
as function of αj and βj parameters. The log likelihood function:
LogL =
N∑
n=1
J∑
j=1
dnjlog(pnj) (2.35)
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dnj

1 if the observation i has outcome j (if yi = j)
0 Otherwise
The maximum likelihood estimatorβ̂ is consistent, asymptotically ecient and
normally distributed (see Hardin et al., 2007).
Interpretation
The parameters of the multinomial logit model are hard to explain. Neither the
sign nor the magnitude of the parameter has direct intuitive meaning because
of the nonlinearity of the link function and the incorporate of the base reference
group.
Relative risk aversion
For easier interpretation, an alternative metric that admits a transformation of
the coecients could be motivated. Since the model is tted using one of the
outcome as a base reference group, the probabilities that are calculated relative
to that reference group. Relative risk ratio (RRR) for an observation i can be
dened as the risk of outcome falling in the comparison group compared to the
risk of the outcome falling in the base group. RRR dene by exponentiating the
multinomial logit coecient.
Relative risk for out come j = exp(Unj) (2.36)
This ratio can be calculates for each outcome and each covariate.
For example, let's assume a model with two covariates x1 and x2 along with a
constant. The RRR for x1 and outcome j is calculated as:
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RRR =
Odds(if the correspoding variable is incremented by 1)
Odds(if the varaible not incrmented)
RRR for x1 =
exp(α0 + (x1jn + 1)β1 + x2jnβ2)
exp(α0 + x1jnβ1 + x2jnβ2)
(2.37)
=exp(β1) (2.38)
An important property of RRR is that there is no dependent on a particular
observation. The RRR is constant, it is independent of the particular value of
covariate. A RRR>1 means as the variable increases, there is an increase in the
risk of the outcome to fall in the comparison group relative to the risk of outcome
falling on the base group. A RRR<1 means as the variable increases, there is a
decrease in the risk of the outcome to fall in the comparison group relative to the
risk of outcome falling on the base group (as in Hardin et al., 2007).
Interaction in non- linear model
The exponentiated coecients introduce for one unite change in the explanatory
variable, the ratio by which the dependent variable changes, that is, the eect is
presented in a multiplicative scale Long and Freese (2006). To illustrate this, let's
assume a model with two variables and their interaction like the following:
yjn = α0 + x1jnβ1 + x2jnβ2 + x12jnβ3 (2.39)
where:
x1: is a dummy variable
x2: is a dummy (continuous) variable.
Generally, adding an interaction term to a model drastically changes the in-
terpretation of the entire coecient if there is no interaction eect term. If there
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is no interaction eect β2 would be interpreted as the unique eect of x2 but af-
ter include the interaction term the eect of x2 depend on both β2 and β3. So,
β1 presents the eect of x1 when x2 = 0 , if x2 is dummy variable otherwise β1
presents the eect of x1 when x2 is at its mean, if x2 is continues variable. β2
presents the eect of x2 when x1 = 0. if x2 is dummy variable,β3 presents the
eect of x1 when x2 = 1 dividend by the eect of x1 when x2 = 0, otherwise if
x2 is continuous variable β3 presents the eect of x1 dividend by the eect of x1
when x2 is at its mean and vice versa. The overall eect of x2 is represented by
β2 ∗ β3 (for further details, see Buis, 2010).
2.9.2 Probit Regression
The Ordered Probit model is an extension of the binary probit model that can be
used in cases where there are multiple and ranked discrete dependent variables.
The central idea is that there is a latent continuous metric underlying the ordinal
responses observed by the analyst. Thresholds partition the real line into a series
of regions corresponding to the various ordinal categories. The latent continuous
variable, y * is a linear combination of some predictors, x, plus a disturbance term
that has a standard Normal distribution.
Lets consider the simple case, where the dependent variable Y takes the values
0, 1, or 2. An unobserved index function Y* is dened as:
Y ∗i =
K∑
k=1
βkXki + εi εi:N(0, 1), ∀ i = 1, · · · , N (2.40)
and assume:
Y =

0 if Y ∗i < k1,
1 if k1 ≤ Y ∗i < k2,
2 if k2 ≤ Y ∗i
(2.41)
where k1 and k2 are "cut points" and k1 < k2.
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The concerned is on how changes in the predictors translate into the probability
of observing a particular ordinal outcome. Consider the probabilities of each
ordinal outcome:
Pr(Y = 0|X) =Pr(
K∑
k=1
βkXki + εi < k1)
=Pr(εi < −
K∑
k=1
βkXki + k1) = Φ(−
K∑
k=1
βkXki + k1),
P r(Y = 2|X) =Pr(
K∑
k=1
βkXki + εi > k2) (2.42)
=Pr(εi > −
K∑
k=1
βkXki + k2) = 1− Φ(−
K∑
k=1
βkXki + k2)
Pr(Y = 1|X) =1− Pr(Y = 0)− Pr(Y = 2)
=Φ(−
K∑
k=1
βkXki + k2)− Φ(−
K∑
k=1
βkXki + k1)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of residual εi .
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2.10 Appendix B
Table 2.16  Relative risk ratiosM1
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for -M1-buy side and sell side
on a stock-by-stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there
is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy regression
is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q
buy order (4) M-A buy order (5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression. The
dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order
(2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5) buy order. Buy order set as reference
category for sell regression.The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Buy side
Baseline 0.601*** 0.179*** 0.103*** 0.347***
Spread 1.131*** 1.068*** 0.946*** 0.825***
Volatility 0.850*** 1.010 1.294*** 1.080***
Return 0.760*** 1.008 1.111*** 1.813***
Duration 1.001*** 1.005*** 1.002*** 0.995***
Sell side
Baseline 0.586*** 0.182*** 0.083*** 0.412***
Spread 1.068*** 0.946*** 0.927*** 0.832***
Volatility 0.919*** 1.096*** 1.389*** 1.106***
Return 1.325*** 0.949*** 0.894*** 0.589***
Duration 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.0000 0.994***
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Table 2.17  Relative risk ratiosM2
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for -M2-buy side and sell side
on a stock-by-stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there
is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy regression
is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q
buy order (4) M-A buy order (5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression. The
dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order
(2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5) buy order. Buy order set as reference
category for sell regression. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Buy side
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.620*** 0.172*** 0.102*** 0.353***
DW 0.944*** 1.075*** 1.021 0.967***
Baseline * DW 0.585 0.185 0.104 0.341
Spread 1.132*** 1.065*** 0.946*** 0.825***
Volatility 0.850*** 1.012 1.294*** 1.080***
Return 0.759*** 1.01 1.113*** 1.812***
Duration 1.001*** 1.005*** 1.002*** 0.995***
Sell side
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.565*** 0.165*** 0.072*** 0.408***
DW 1.070*** 1.205*** 1.278*** 1.018***
Baseline * DW 0.605 0.199 0.092 0.415
Spread 1.067*** 0.941*** 0.925*** 0.832***
Volatility 0.919*** 1.099*** 1.387*** 1.106***
Return 1.326*** 0.953*** 0.900*** 0.589***
Duration 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.000 0.994***
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Table 2.18  Relative risk ratiosM3-buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for -M3-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in
their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Buy side
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.615*** 0.187*** 0.096*** 0.333***
DW 0.961*** 0.919*** 1.164*** 1.076***
Baseline * DW 0.591 0.172 0.112 0.358
Spread variables
Spread 1.218*** 1.145*** 0.965** 0.853***
Spread # DW 0.864*** 0.863*** 0.949** 0.934***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.052 0.988 0.916 0.797
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.791*** 0.973 1.214*** 1.065***
Volatility # DW 1.155*** 1.087*** 1.130*** 1.028***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.914 1.058 1.372 1.095
Return variables
Return 0.744*** 1.015 1.241*** 1.776***
Return # DW 1.042*** 0.981 0.829*** 1.048**
Return * Return # DW 0.775 0.996 1.029 1.861
Duration variables
Duration 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.996***
Duration # DW 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.001 0.998***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.003 1.006 1.003 0.994
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Table 2.19  Relative risk ratiosM3-sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for -M3-sell side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in
their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order
(5) buy order. Buy order set as reference category for sell regression.The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.579*** 0.170*** 0.077*** 0.426***
DW 1.030*** 1.171*** 1.153*** 0.934***
Baseline * DW 0.596 0.199 0.089 0.398
Spread variables
Spread 0.994 0.917*** 0.910*** 0.793***
Spread # DW 1.148*** 1.042 1.038* 1.092***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.141 0.956 0.945 0.866
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.983*** 1.125*** 1.418*** 1.149***
Volatility # DW 0.881*** 0.962* 0.965** 0.934***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.866 1.082 1.368 1.073
Return variables
Return 1.308*** 0.877*** 0.823*** 0.530***
Return # DW 1.021 1.168*** 1.165*** 1.211***
Return * Return # DW 1.335 1.024 0.959 0.642
Duration variables
Duration 1.002*** 1.005*** 0.999 0.994***
Duration # DW 0.998*** 1.000 1.001 1.001*
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.005 1.000 0.995
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Table 2.20  Relative risk ratiosM4-buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for -M4-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in
their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.616*** 0.185*** 0.096*** 0.334***
DW 0.982*** 0.948** 1.028 1.094***
DC 0.994** 0.838*** 1.294*** 0.970***
DE 0.889*** 1.064*** 1.403*** 0.946***
Baseline * DW 0.605 0.175 0.099 0.365
Baseline * DW * DC 0.601 0.147 0.128 0.354
Baseline * DW * DE 0.538 0.187 0.138 0.346
Spread variables
Spread 1.218*** 1.144*** 0.964** 0.853***
Spread # DW 0.865*** 0.861*** 0.946*** 0.935***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.054 0.985 0.912 0.798
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.791*** 0.977 1.216*** 1.065***
Volatility # DW 1.153*** 1.080*** 1.134*** 1.026***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.912 1.055 1.379 1.093
Return variables
Return 0.745*** 1.015 1.241*** 1.776***
Return # DW 1.044*** 0.983 0.824*** 1.048**
Return * Return # DW 0.778 0.998 1.023 1.861
Duration variables
Duration 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.996***
Duration # DW 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.001 0.998***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.003 1.006 1.003 0.994
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Table 2.21  Relative risk ratiosM4-sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for -M4-sell side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in
their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order
(5) buy order. Buy order set as reference category for sell regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.578*** 0.168*** 0.077*** 0.425***
DW 1.001 1.195*** 1.104** 0.923***
DC 1.037*** 0.837*** 0.980 1.003
DE 1.123*** 1.139*** 1.258*** 1.068***
Baseline * DW 0.579 0.201 0.085 0.392
Baseline * DW * DC 0.600 0.168 0.083 0.393
Baseline * DW * DE 0.650 0.229 0.107 0.419
Spread variables
Spread 0.994 0.917*** 0.910*** 0.793***
Spread # DW 1.146*** 1.039 1.035 1.090***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.139 0.953 0.942 0.864
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.983*** 1.128*** 1.419*** 1.148***
Volatility # DW 0.883*** 0.956** 0.968** 0.935***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.868 1.078 1.374 1.073
Return variables
Return 1.308*** 0.877*** 0.823*** 0.530***
Return # DW 1.021 1.170*** 1.163*** 1.211***
Return * Return # DW 1.335 1.026 0.957 0.642
Duration variables
Duration 1.002*** 1.005*** 0.999 0.994***
Duration # DW 0.998*** 1.000 1.001 1.001*
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.005 1.000 0.995
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Table 2.22  Relative risk ratiosM5buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq. (2.18) for -M5-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and June
2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in
their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.614*** 0.186*** 0.096*** 0.334***
DW 0.919*** 0.917*** 1.109** 1.092***
DC 1.069*** 0.852*** 0.825** 0.894***
DE 1.197*** 1.301*** 1.692*** 1.005
Baseline * DW 0.564 0.171 0.106 0.365
Baseline * DW * DC 0.603 0.145 0.088 0.326
Baseline * DW * DE 0.675 0.222 0.180 0.367
Spread variables
Spread 1.217*** 1.143*** 0.965** 0.853***
Spread # DW 0.828*** 0.838*** 0.958* 1.021
Spread # DC 1.136*** 1.250*** 1.116*** 0.745***
Spread # DE 1.108*** 0.969 0.814*** 0.800***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.008 0.958 0.924 0.871
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DC 1.145 1.197 1.032 0.649
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DE 1.117 0.928 0.753 0.697
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.793*** 0.979 1.214*** 1.066***
Volatility # DW 1.187*** 1.099*** 1.068*** 0.99
Volatility # DC 0.949*** 1.013 1.181*** 1.254***
Volatility # DE 0.903*** 0.867*** 1.161*** 0.950***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.941 1.076 1.297 1.055
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC 0.893 1.090 1.531 1.323
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE 0.850 0.933 1.505 1.003
Return variables
Return 0.745*** 1.015 1.238*** 1.779***
Return # DW 1.066*** 1.005 0.765*** 0.917***
Return # DC 1.051* 1.001 1.376*** 1.734***
Return # DE 0.794*** 0.870** 1.231*** 1.323***
Return * Return # DW 0.794 1.020 0.947 1.631
Return * Return # DW * Return # DC 0.835 1.021 1.303 2.829
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE 0.631 0.887 1.166 2.158
Duration variables
Duration 1.001*** 1.004*** 1.002*** 0.996***
Duration # DW 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001* 0.997***
Duration # DC 1.001 1.003*** 1.000 1.002***
Duration # DE 1.001*** 1.003*** 0.999 1.003***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.002 1.005 1.003 0.993
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DC 1.003 1.008 1.003 0.995
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE 1.003 1.008 1.002 0.996
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Table 2.23  Relative risk ratiosM5sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq. (2.18) for -M5-sell side on a stock-
by-stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between June 2007 and
June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday
in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which
is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order
(5) buy order. Buy order set as reference category for sell regression. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.578*** 0.168*** 0.076*** 0.427***
DW 1.038*** 1.207*** 1.252*** 0.966***
DC 1.060*** 0.760*** 0.797*** 0.950***
DE 0.913*** 1.249*** 0.951 0.877***
Baseline * DW 0.600 0.203 0.095 0.412
Baseline * DW * DC 0.636 0.154 0.076 0.392
Baseline * DW * DE 0.548 0.253 0.090 0.362
Spread variables
Spread 0.994 0.917*** 0.908*** 0.793***
Spread # DW 1.250*** 0.980 1.085*** 1.032**
Spread # DC 0.786*** 1.141** 1.160*** 1.067***
Spread # DE 0.787*** 1.099* 0.545*** 1.252***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.243 0.899 0.985 0.818
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DC 0.977 1.025 1.143 0.873
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DE 0.978 0.988 0.537 1.025
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.981*** 1.133*** 1.424*** 1.149***
Volatility # DW 0.840*** 0.944** 0.930*** 0.990
Volatility # DC 1.081*** 1.067* 0.853*** 0.828***
Volatility # DE 1.219*** 1.023 1.801*** 0.897***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.824 1.070 1.324 1.138
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC 0.891 1.141 1.130 0.942
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE 1.005 1.094 2.385 1.020
Return variables
Return 1.309*** 0.877*** 0.824*** 0.530***
Return # DW 1.003 1.149*** 1.206*** 1.347***
Return # DC 1.017 0.945 0.721*** 0.560***
Return # DE 1.099*** 1.046 1.196*** 0.691***
Return * Return # DW 1.313 1.008 0.994 0.714
Return * Return # DW * Return # DC 1.335 0.952 0.716 0.400
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE 1.443 1.054 1.189 0.493
Duration variables
Duration 1.002*** 1.005*** 1.000 0.994***
Duration # DW 0.999*** 0.999 1.001 1.001***
Duration # DC 0.999*** 1.003*** 1.004*** 0.998***
Duration # DE 0.999*** 1.000 0.992*** 0.998***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.001 1.004 1.001 0.995
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DC 1.000 1.007 1.005 0.993
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE 1.000 1.004 0.993 0.993
Chapter 3
Impact of Liquidity on Market
Microstructure around Ex-Dividend
Day
3.1 Introduction
Whereas the previous chapter investigated FTSE 100 rms, this chapter studies
market microstructure eects around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap
rms. Stocks that are listed on FTSE SmallCap Index are classied as illiquid
stocks and this notion is empirically documented using a range of liquidity mea-
sures.
The expected execution probability for illiquid stocks is lower than the ex-
pected execution probability for liquid stocks. The expected waiting cost for
illiquid stock is higher than the expected waiting cost for liquid stocks. On the
other hand, the ex-dividend day is known to attract trading activity (Elton and
Gruber, 1970 and Kalay, 1982). This trading activity is a unique window of op-
portunity to prot from tax arbitrage trading for some investors the non-execution
cost of trading, especially on the cum-dividend day may, therefore, be higher than
on other normal trading days. If traders fail to execute their submitted order
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on the cum-dividend day, they could face the risk of potential losses or negative
returns. Further, the existence of the protability of short term trading around
the ex-dividend day is determined by the liquidity and transaction cost (see for
example, Kalay, 1982; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994; Michaely and Vila, 1996; and
McDonald, 2001). Therefore, it is an interesting to examine the critical role the
liquidity could have in tax-arbitrager decision. This chapter investigates whether
the lack of liquidity prevents the presence of tax-arbitrage trading around the
ex-dividend day and how the activities of tax-arbitrage traders, if there are any,
could aect bid-ask spreads, price volatility and order submission strategies. The
previous chapter found evidence that tax-arbitrage trading was present among
FTSE 100 stocks and in this chapter we investigate whether similar evidence of
tax arbitrage can also be found among the illiquid FTSE SmallCap stocks.
Market liquidity has been dened in various ways. Keynes (1930) and Hicks
(1962) dene liquidity by phrases like future volatility of market prices or the
possibility of immediate execution of a transaction. To decide whether the mar-
ket is liquid or not Bagehot (1971) focused on factors like adverse selection, price
impact and spreads. In the context of market microstructure theory, a liquid mar-
ket is described by phrases like tightness (cost of rebalancing portfolios), depth
(trading volume required to move prices) and resiliency (time required to reach a
new equilibrium after price changes). Black (1971) denes a liquid market as one
where the bid-ask price is always quoted, its spread is small enough, and small
trades can be immediately executed with minimal eect on price. Grossman and
Miller (1988) argue that liquidity can be measured as the ability to execute trades
quickly under the current quoted prices. Muranaga et al. (1999) similarly dene a
liquid market as one where a large volume of orders can be executed immediately
at minimum impact on price.
While market makers provide liquidity in a quote driven market by setting
bid and ask quotes, in a limit order market, public orders, provide the liquidity.
In limit order markets, there is no specied market maker and counterparties are
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matched impersonally and usually electronically. The liquidity in limit order book
depends on the decision of liquidity supplier (traders who submit sell orders at a
price above the pre-trend prices of stocks or submit buy orders at prices below the
pre-trend prices of stocks) and liquidity demanders (traders who submit orders at
a premium or a discount to ensure a faster execution). The limit order book may,
therefore, face the problem of lack of liquidity if there is an imbalance between
liquidity suppliers and liquidity demanders.
Traders in illiquid markets could also face the risk of a potential shortage in
counterparties and the risk of a signicant price change in response to only few
orders being carried on the limit order book. Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2012)
reports that dramatic price changes could occur if one order matches up with
many or all orders on the opposite side of the market but Seppi (1997) reports
that in liquid markets, submitted orders have only a small impact on stock prices.
Aggressive orders and large orders could amplify the eect of illiquidity on stock
prices since aggressive orders will fast consume all orders on the opposite side of the
market (Lebedeva, 2012). Large orders could also increase the imbalance between
two sides of the market. The only way to reduce this imbalance between two sides
of the market is by changes in price (Damodaran, 2005). In addition to bid-ask
spreads and commission costs, Treynor (1981) argues that being able to wait for
the right time to liquidate an investment is also valuable. In illiquid markets, this
option to wait value is higher than in liquid markets, so traders may wait longer to
liquidate their investments than in liquid markets. Both non-execution costs and
the value of waiting before submitting orders are expected to be higher for illiquid
than for liquid stocks. This chapter investigates, whether tax-arbitrage traders
may, therefore, seek to avoid trading in illiquid stocks. Moreover, since increases
in non-execution costs lead to increases in the aggressiveness of submitted orders,
as predicted by the theoretical models in Foucault et al., (2005) and Ro³u (2009),
the expectation is that these costs are likely to be higher on cum-dividend days.
Hence, if tax-arbitrageurs exist around the ex-dividend day on illiquid markets,
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the aggressiveness of submitted orders is expected to increase on cum-dividend
days.
On the matter of bid-ask spreads, Foucault (1999) and Foucault et al. (2005)
argue that bid-ask spreads should aect the order submission decisions of traders.
Several empirical studies conrm this eect (for example, Biais et al., 1995; Harris
and Hasbrouck, 1996; Ranaldo, 2004; Anand et al., 2005; Hall and Hautsch, 2006
and Pascual and Veredas, O2009). Many factors could aect the bid-ask spread
around the ex-dividend day. Foucault et al., (2005) claim that while patient
traders are more likely to submit limit orders, for a given level of spread, impatient
traders are more likely to submit market orders. They also argue as the spread
increases, in addition to liquidity suppliers, traders are more likely to submit limit
orders, widening the spread even more. On cum-dividend days, the bid-ask spread
could be narrow, since the high non-execution cost on cum-dividend day motivates
traders to submit more aggressive orders. On the ex-dividend day, when there is
not such a high non-execution cost, traders are less likely to submit aggressive
orders and the spread may be wider. Furthermore, tax-arbitrage trades around
the ex-dividend day are expected to be more on one side of the market, creating
either buying pressure or selling pressure, leading to wider spreads. Moreover,
Foucault (1999) argues that bid-ask spreads include a reservation element related
to adverse selection and an execution risk element related to non-competitive
behaviour. Around the ex-dividend day, price uncertainties are more likely to be
high, increasing the risk of being picked o and hence, spread could also increase.
Foucault (1999) shows that in markets with traders who have varying tax status
and given that these traders will, therefore, have varying valuations of the same
stock, trading using limit orders should increase execution risk. The bid-ask
spread will therefore be expected to increase too. Wyss (2004) states that there
is a negative relation between market liquidity and bid-ask spreads. To sum up,
the aggregate net eect of ex-dividend day tax driven trading on bid-ask spread
is theoretically unclear and remains an empirical issue.
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Several previous studies report a negative relation between market liquidity
and price volatility (e.g., Ahn et al., 2001; Bae et al., 2003; Ranaldo, 2004; Fou-
cault, 1999 and Foucault et al., 2007). While Foucault et al. (2007) argue that
liquidity suppliers will submit less aggressive orders as volatility increases, thereby
also decreasing liquidity, Cohen et al. (1981) claim traders place a premium on cer-
tainty in the execution of their trades by submitting aggressive order as the price
uncertainty increases. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and Jakob and Ma (2003)
report evidence of order imbalances around the ex-dividend day. Ainsworth et al.
(2008) and Jun et al. (2008) nd evidence of abnormal volume and price volatility
around the ex-dividend day. We therefore expect that tax-arbitrage trades will
lead to order imbalances on both the cum- and ex- dividend days, increasing price
volatility. Furthermore, in the presence of high non-execution costs on the cum-
dividend day, consistent with Cohen et al. (1981) we expect that traders will be
willing to oer a premium to increase the execution probability of their orders by
submitting aggressive orders as the volatility increases.
The theoretical arguments of Foucault et al. (2005) and Rosu (2008) suggest
a high arrival rate of trade should increase waiting costs, motivating traders to
submit aggressive orders and Tkatch and Kandel (2006) and Linnainmaa and Rosu
(2008) conrm these results empirically. Less liquid markets are characterised by
low order arrival rates. We expect that the arrival time between two orders will not
aect order submission decisions around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap
stocks.
We employ data on orders submissions and executions in the ex-dividend week
(Monday to Friday in the week containing the ex-dividend day), and the control
week (the corresponding data for Monday to Friday in the week prior) for FTSE
SmallCap rms, which went ex-dividend between June 2007 and June 2008. We
restrict our study to the rms that had stocks going ex-dividend on a Wednesday
and where there is no bank holiday in the two weeks concerned.
The results of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, similarly to the
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FTSE 100, we nd that the spread and volatility are higher in the ex-dividend
week compared to the control week and on the cum-dividend day compare to
and ex-dividend days within the ex-dividend week. To gain further insight, we
investigate these results together with their associated order submission strategies.
Second, there is evidence of the existence of both tax-arbitrage traders and
liquidity suppliers footprints around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap
rms. Illiquidity seems not, therefore, to prevent tax-arbitrage activity altogether.
There is evidence that tax-arbitrage traders buy on cum-dividend day and sell on
ex-dividend day. The results show that behind the quote buy orders and the at
the quote and inside the quote sell orders are less likely on the cum-dividend day
and behind the quote buy orders and the inside the quote and marketable sell
orders are more likely on ex-dividend day. There is also evidence that liquidity
suppliers take advantage of tax-arbitrage activity around ex-dividend day. The
results show that behind the quote sell orders are more likely on the cum-dividend
day and behind the quote buy orders are more likely on the ex-dividend day.
Third, this research nds inuences connecting order submission to spreads,
volatility and returns. One pattern that can be expected is that one-sided trading
of tax-arbitrageurs may drive prices away from fundamentals and in that process
increases spread as well as return. They are likely to attract liquidity suppli-
ers, who may trade aggressively either to take advantage of dierences between
transaction prices and fundamental prices or to prot from the larger spread. In
addition, one-sided buying or selling pressure increases price volatility and return
which motivates tax-arbitrageurs to submit their orders aggressively. This study
nds no evidence of a relation between order arrival rates and order submission
decisions around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap rms.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces dif-
ferent liquidity measures. Section 3.3 describes the data and Section 3.4 presents
the results of dierent liquidity measures. Section 3.5 outlines the main method-
ology employed in the chapter. Section 3.6 presents results. Section 3.7 displays
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a robustness tests and a nal section concludes.
3.2 Liquidity Measures
Several uni-dimensional and multidimensional liquidity measures are used to cap-
ture dierent aspects of liquidity (Wyss, 2004; Goyenko et al., 2009; and Lo and
Wang, 2000).
3.2.1 One-Dimensional Liquidity Measures
One-dimensional liquidity measures can be divided into four groups: liquidity
measures related to the size of the rm, liquidity measures related to the volume of
trades, liquidity measures related to the time between adjacent trades and liquidity
measures related to the bid-ask spread.1 One-dimensional liquidity measures that
we employ are:
Volume-related Liquidity Measures
 Trading volume (number of shares traded in a given time interval)2;
 Turnover (money value of the trades in a given time interval) (e.g. Amihud
and Mendelson, 1986);
 Relative turnover (turnover divided by the free oat, where free oat is
calculated as the dierence between the total number of shares outstanding
and the total number of shares owned by the rm) (e.g. Brunner, 1996)
Time-related Liquidity Measures
 Number of transactions in a given time interval (e.g. Walsh, 1998)
1The liquidity measures that are related to the size of the rm are not applied anymore.
These kinds of liquidity measures present no enough variation in term of the intraday context
Wyss (2004).
2E.g. (Chordia et al., 2001; Elyasiani et al., 2000; George and Hwang, 1998; Gervais et
al., 2001; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2001; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Kamara and Koski, 2001;
Karagozoglu, 2000; Lee et al., 1993; Lee et al., 2001; Lin et al., 1995; Van Ness et al., 2000 and
Yang and Liu, 2002)
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Spread-related Liquidity Measures
 Roll's (1984) spread measure, which is dened as:
√
max(0,−cov(∆Pt∆P(t−1))) (3.1)
where:
∆Pt: is the price change over a 5-minute time-interval and ,
∆P(t−1): is the price change over the prior 5-minute interval.
3.2.2 Multi-Dimensional Liquidity Measures
Amivest's liquidity measure
Amivest's liquidity measure is dened as the ratio of turnover to absolute price
change in a given time interval using non-zero returns.3 The greater the volume,
the more that price movements can be absorbed. A high value on Amivest's liq-
uidity measure is interpreted as a highly liquid market (e.g. Baker, 1996; Elyasiani
et al., 2000; Kluger and Stephan, 1997; and Ranaldo, 2000).
Amivest measure =
Vt
|rt|
(3.2)
where:
rt :is the return over a given time interval.
Vt :is the turnover over a given time interval.
Elyasiani et al. (2000) suggest that the Amivest liquidity measure is a useful
measure for daily data.
Amihud's (2002) liquidity measureO
Amihud liquidity measure is dened as the ratio of absolute price changes to
trading volume during a given time interval. Amihud's liquidity measure is a
price impact measure (a high price impact indicates an illiquid market). Though
3For zero returns, Amivest liquidity measure is set to zero.
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Amihud's liquidity measure is a common measure it could be aected by extreme
values.
Amihud measure =
|rt|
Qt
(3.3)
Where:
rt: is the return over a given time interval.
Qt: is the volume over a given time interval.
Lo and Wang's (2000) liquidity measure
Lo and Wang (2000) estimate liquidity in the spirit of the Amihud liquidity mea-
sure but Hwang and Lu (2007) report two shortcomings of the Amihud mea-
sure. First, the Amihud measure uses the monetary trading volume, so it will
have a higher value when the stock prices increase, even if liquidity remains con-
stant. Moreover, the Amihud measure can be correlated with market capitaliza-
tion (Nagel, 2005; Lo and Wang, 2000) which, in turn, is also known to aect
liquidity (e.g. Chordia et al., 2000). Hwang and Lu (2007) following the proposal
of Lo and Wang (2000) use the natural logarithm of the ratio between absolute
return to monetary turnover to minimize the eect of outliers commonly observed
during periods of low trading activity and the monetary turnover measure is an
attempt to be free of market capitalization. A high value on the Lo and Wang
measure indicates an illiquid market.
Lo and Wang measure = ln
(
|rt|
Vt
)
(3.4)
where:
rt :is the return over a given time interval.
Vt :is the turnover over a given time interval.
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Ranaldo's (2000) liquidity measure
Ranaldo's liquidity measure is dened as the ratio of the Amivest liquidity measure
to the free oat. A high value on the Ranaldo measure indicates a liquid market.
Ranaldo measure =
Amivest liquidity ratio
free oat
(3.5)
Brunner's (1996) liquidity measure
Brunner's (1996) measure is dened as the average price change per transaction
over a given time interval and a high value of the Brunner measure indicates an
illiquid market.4
Brunner measure =
∑Nt
i=1 ri
Nt
(3.6)
where:
ri: is the return for transaction i
Nt: is the number of trades over a given time interval
Zeroes liquidity measure
The Lesmond et al. (1999) measure of liquidity looks at the proportion of days
with zero returns since illiquid stocks are more likely to have zero volume days
and zero return days.
Zeroes measure =
Number of days with zero returns
M
(3.7)
where:
M : is the number trading days in a given month.
Bekaert et al. (2007) use an alternative version of the zero measure and their
version also looks at those days with zero return but only those days that also
have positive trading volume:
4For zero returns, Brunner liquidity measure is set to zero.
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Zero.positive measure =
positive volume days with zero returns
M
(3.8)
3.3 Data
The sample of data for this chapter is constructed based on criteria that are speci-
ed on data section in the rst chapter. The resulting sample contained 43 FTSE
SmallCap stocks. Table 3.1 shows the aggregate number and volume of submit-
ted transactions and the aggregate number and volume of executed transactions
over the all control and ex-dividend weeks, cum-and ex- dividend days, and day 2
and day 3 (corresponding to cum- and ex-dividend days in ex-dividend week) in
control week.
Table 3.1  Summary statistics (numbers in million)
This table reports the aggregate number of buy (sell) submitted and executed order and the aggregate
volume of buy (sell) submitted and executed order for 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks
achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June 2007 and
June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank holiday
in their ex-dividend week or in control week. These aggregate numbers are calculated for control week,
ex-dividend week, corresponding to cum-dividend day in control week (Tuesday) (day2), cum-dividend day,
the corresponding to ex-dividend day in control week (Wednesday) (day3) and ex-dividend day
.
Variable Num.
of buy
Num.
of
sell
Volume of
buy
Volume of
sell
Num.
of
buy
Num.
of
sell
Volume of
buy
Volume of
sell
All week Ex.w Cont.w
Submission 0.201 0.206 640.908 689.478 0.210 0.210 644.967 643.137
Execution 0.033 0.031 50.415 48.711 0.034 0.032 58.564 59.896
Tuesday Cum.day C-Cum
Submission 0.041 0.041 127.890 139.375 0.037 0.042 113.810 130.302
Execution 0.007 0.007 12.204 11.330 0.008 0.007 12.336 11.863
Wednesday Ex.day C-Ex
Submission 0.038 0.040 132.551 144.128 0.042 0.044 127.293 131.451
Execution 0.007 0.007 8.923 10.168 0.006 0.007 11.314 12.512
The volume of submitted buy and sell orders on cum- and ex- dividend days
is higher than the volume of submitted buy and sell orders on day 2 and day 3
in the control week. Further, the volume of submitted buy and sell orders on the
ex-dividend day is higher than the volume of submitted buy and sell orders on the
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cum-dividend day. There is a general eect of the ex-dividend day on the trading
activity on both the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day.
Similarly to Chapter 2, the representative trader is dened for FTSE Small-
Cap stocks and Table 3.2 reports the representative trader for all submitted
orders, executed orders and the no activity event for each trading day in the
control and ex-dividend weeks.
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Table 3.2  Representative trader
This table reports the Representative trader for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no bank
holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The Representative trader is calculated for submitted
and executed orders for each trading day in both control week and ex-dividend week.
Order Type Ex- dividend week Control week
Execute Submit Execute Submit
Day 1
All order 0.836 0.962 0.783 0.951
Limit buy 0.445 0.495 0.391 0.455
Limit sell 0.437 0.467 0.380 0.496
Market buy 0.006 - 0.006 -
Market sell 0.007 - 0.006 -
No activity 0.164 0.038 0.217 0.049
Day 2
All order 0.821 0.947 0.795 0.956
Limit buy 0.418 0.450 0.413 0.479
Limit sell 0.391 0.497 0.373 0.477
Market buy 0.005 - 0.005 -
Market sell 0.007 - 0.004 -
No activity 0.179 0.053 0.205 0.044
Day 3
All order 0.824 0.965 0.743 0.956
Limit buy 0.403 0.470 0.349 0.480
Limit sell 0.412 0.495 0.385 0.476
Market buy 0.006 - 0.006 -
Market sell 0.004 - 0.004 -
No activity 0.176 0.035 0.257 0.044
Day 4
All order 0.869 0.969 0.811 0.966
Limit buy 0.446 0.484 0.423 0.465
Limit sell 0.414 0.485 0.375 0.501
Market buy 0.005 - 0.007 -
Market sell 0.005 - 0.006 -
No activity 0.131 0.031 0.190 0.035
Day 5
All order 0.873 0.962 0.794 0.953
Limit buy 0.452 0.480 0.398 0.465
Limit sell 0.409 0.483 0.378 0.487
Market buy 0.006 - 0.009 -
Market sell 0.005 - 0.009 -
No activity 0.127 0.038 0.206 0.048
In general, all trading days in the control week have a higher percentage of
no-activity events than the ex-dividend week for both order submissions and
Chapter 3: Impact of Liquidity on Market Microstructure around Ex-Dividend Day 101
order executions.5 For example, ex-dividend day records 18% for the no-activity
event, whereas the no-activity event records 26% on day 3 in the control week.
It is suggested that the ex-dividend day aects trading activity around the ex-
dividend day. In addition, the cum-dividend day has a higher execution of buy
orders than executions of sell orders. The ex-dividend day has a higher execution
of sell orders than executions of buy orders. However, similar results are also
observed for day 2 and day 3 in the control week. These results cannot be prop-
erly interpreted without investigating the limit order books and associated order
submission strategies.
3.4 Liquidity Measures Results
Although stocks that are listed on the FTSE SmallCap Index are considered as
illiquid stocks, a number of liquidity measures are used, to conrm that illiquidity
prevails on among FTSE SmallCap rms. The results of these measures are
compared between FTSE SmallCap sample and FTSE 100 sample from Chapter
2 and Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for the liquidity measures.6
5Except order submission on cum-dividend day
6Vol. is a volume liquidity measure. Rel. Turnover is a relative turnover liquidity measure.
Num. of .Tran. is a number of transaction liquidity measure.
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Table 3.3  Descriptive statistics for liquidity measures
This table reports descriptive statistics for 12 liquidity measures for 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap and
47 stocks from FTSE 100 index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: they paid a cash dividend on
Wednesday during sample period (June 2007  June 2008) and there is no bank holiday in the ex-dividend
week or in control week. The samples of 11 liquidity measures calculate using daily data over one year from
1-June 2007 to 1-June -2008. The Roll measure calculate using tick data over ex-dividend week and control
week.
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Vol.
FTSE 100 14587.099 32835.056 322.309 243376.297
FTSE SmallCap 726.033 1434.841 29.418 7568.800
Turnover
FTSE 100 4016709.642 6690664.012 1942.593 37389269.600
FTSE SmallCap 180362.554 346057.300 4256.228 1891757.625
Rel. Turnover
FTSE 100 48819.782 84060.047 41.510 457356.563
FTSE SmallCap 2480.332 5289.312 0.000 26895.268
Num. of Tran.
FTSE 100 3664.946 2386.765 181.861 12257.044
FTSE SmallCap 235.194 491.024 6.600 2759.281
Roll
FTSE 100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014
FTSE SmallCap 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.029
Amivest
FTSE 100 16216.623 21782.681 440.067 127622.188
FTSE SmallCap 921.510 1435.131 64.928 7344.690
Amihud
FTSE 100 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.008
FTSE SmallCap 0.051 0.081 0.000 0.354
Lo and Wang
FTSE 100 -13.286 2.488 -16.919 -6.786
FTSE SmallCap -10.313 1.505 -13.784 -6.704
Ranaldo
FTSE 100 75613.560 121043.833 108.072 610933.250
FTSE SmallCap 3327.080 6866.670 0.000 33413.242
Brunner
FTSE 100 0.603 4.740 0.000 37.325
FTSE SmallCap 0.062 0.067 0.001 0.311
Zeroes
FTSE 100 0.045 0.024 0.011 0.138
FTSE SmallCap 0.084 0.041 0.028 0.243
Zeroes positive
FTSE 100 0.046 0.024 0.011 0.135
FTSE SmallCap 0.081 0.038 0.028 0.222
The mean values of the Roll measure, Amihud measure, Lo and Wang measure,
Zeroes measure and Zero.Positive measure are all lower for FTSE 100 than FTSE
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SmallCap. The volume measure, turnover measure, relative turnover measure,
number of transaction measure, Amivest measure, Ranaldo measure and Brunner
measure are all higher for FTSE 100 than FTSE SmallCap. For all measures, the
average FTSE 100 stock is more liquid than the average FTSE SmallCap stock,
although, the most liquid FTSE SmallCap stock tends to be more liquid than the
least liquid FTSE 100 stock.
3.5 Methodology
Rather than repeat here the methodology for this chapter, we note that the same
methodology is applied here for illiquid stock as employed for the liquid stocks on
the FTSE 100 rms. Table 3.4 reports the odds ratios for all logit models that are
listed in the preliminary regression section in Chapter 2.
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Table 3.4  Estimation of logit regression
This table reports the odds ratio of estimate Eq. (2.3) for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index.
These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variables are indicators variables.
(BS) is an indicator variable refers to long-short trading strategy. (SB) is an indicator variable refers
to short-long trading strategy. For each type of trading strategy, we generate three dierent indicator
variables. The low degree indicators BS(L) and SB(L) are dened as following : if buy trade size on
Cum.day  sell trade size on Cum.day > 0 and buy trade size on Ex.day  sell trade size on Ex.day <
0 then BS(L) equal one , otherwise zero; if buy trade size on Cum.day  sell trade size on Cum.day <
0 and buy trade size on Ex.day  sell trade size on Ex.day > 0 then SB(L) equal one , otherwise zero.
The medium degree indicators BS(M) and SB(M) are dened as: if (buy trade size on Cum.day -sell trade
size on Cum.day )/(buy trade size on Cum.day +sell trade size on Cum.day )>0.02 and (buy trade size
on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day )/(buy trade size on Ex.day +sell trade size on Ex.day )<-0.02 then
BS(M) equal one, otherwise zero; (buy trade size on Cum.day -sell trade size on Cum.day )/(buy trade
size on Cum.day +sell trade size on Cum.day )<-0.02 and (buy trade size on Ex.day -sell trade size on
Ex.day )/(buy trade size on Ex.day +sell trade size on Ex.day )>0.02 then SB(M) equal one, otherwise zero.
Finally, the high degree indicators BS(H) and SB(H) are dened as : if (buy trade size on Cum.day-sell
trade size on Cum.day)/(buy trade size on Cum.day+sell trade size on Cum.day)>0.05 and (buy trade size
on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day )/(buy trade size on Ex.day +sell trade size on Ex.day )<-0.05 then
BS(H) equal one, otherwise zero; (buy trade size on Cum.day -sell trade size on Cum.day )/(buy trade size
on Cum.day +sell trade size on Cum.day )<-0.05and (buy trade size on Ex.day -sell trade size on Ex.day
)/(buy trade size on Ex.day +sell trade size on Ex.day )>0.05 then SB(H) equal one, otherwise zero. The
signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
BS(L) BS(M) BS(H)
Buy-Sell
Dividend Yield 0.863 0.863 0.897
(-1.01) (-1.01) (-0.70)
SB(L) SB(M) SB(H)
Sell-Buy
Dividend Yield 0.941 0.912 0.926
(-0.38) (-0.52) (-0.41)
All results in Table 3.4 are insignicant. The results of the estimations do not
supply enough evidence to suggest that a specic tax-arbitrage trading strategy
is being executed among FTSE SmallCap stocks.
3.6 Results
Spread and Volatility
The results for the spread and volatility models (presented in the methodology
sections in Chapter 2) are as follows. Table 3.5 reports results for models (2.8) and
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(2.14) using the data from FTSE SmallCap for both the ex-dividend week and
the control weeks, whereas Table 3.6 reports models (2.9) and (2.15) employing
data also from the FTSE SmallCap but only for days 2 and 3 in the control
week and ex-dividend week . Table 3.7 reports results of models (2.10) and (2.16)
using again the data from FTSE SmallCap but only for the cum-dividend and the
ex-dividend days.
Table 3.5  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.8) and Eq (2.14) for sample of 43 stocks
from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap
index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the
sample period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The regression is
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables Spread.Ex........................ Variables Volatility.Ex
Spread 0.262*** Volatility 0.356***
(3.45) (4.38)
Cum.day 0.000 Cum.day 0.000
(0.72) (0.67)
Ex.day -0.000 Ex.day -0.000
(-1.45) (-0.19)
Spread#C-Cum -0.096 Volatility#C-Cum -0.132**
(-1.17) (-1.97)
Spread#C-Ex -0.011 Volatility#C-Ex -0.085
(-0.11) (-1.28)
constant 0.001*** constant 0.001***
(5.30) (5.81)
Table 3.6  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.9) and Eq (2.15) for sample of 43 stocks
from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap
index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the
sample period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week.The regression is
robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables Spread. Ex........................ Variables Volatility. Ex
Spread 0.251*** Volatility 0.271***
(3.49) (4.28)
Cum.day 0.000 Cum.day 0.000
(1.57) (0.85)
Spread#C-Cum -0.085 Volatility#C-Cum -0.047
(-0.90) (-0.64)
constant 0.001*** constant 0.001***
(5.08) (11.45)
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Table 3.7  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.10) and Eq (2.16) for sample of 43
stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE
SmallCap index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday
during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The
regression is robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Spread. Cum. Day................. Volatility. Cum. Day
Spread.Ex.day 0.312*** Volatility.Ex.day 0.366***
(4.51) (5.64)
constant 0.001*** constant 0.001***
(9.60) (10.67)
First, the constant term is signicantly positive for all models. This indicates
that, in general, the spread and the volatility are higher in the ex-dividend week
than in the control week and are higher on the cum-dividend day than on the
ex-dividend day within the ex-dividend week. Second, the coecients on the
corresponding spread observations and the volatility observations in the two weeks
are positive in all tables, which indicate that there are intra-day patterns in both
the spread and the volatility variables. The general picture is therefore, that there
are spread and volatility eects in the ex-dividend week.
Two versions of model (2.11) are estimated. First, a model in dierences and
second a model in levels is estimated. The dierence in spread between the ex-
dividend week and the corresponding 5-minute time interval in the control week
is regressed, on a set of determining variables which are also dierences between
the two weeks. For the levels estimation, the level of the spread in the ex-dividend
week is regressed on the levels of a set of determining variables. The determining
variables are volatility, volume, return, buy-size, sell-size as well as indicators for
the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day and the results are reported in
Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8  Estimation of OLS regression over spread determinants
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.11) for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE
SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in
a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample
period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The second columns estimate
the determinants of the dierence in spread between control week and ex-dividend week for corresponding
5-minute intervals. The third columns estimate the determinants of the spread over ex-dividend week. The
regression is robust for heteroskedasticity and and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Control week + Ex-dividend week Ex-dividend week
Volatility
All Week 0.729*** 0.725***
(16.49) (16.50)
Cum-dividend day 0.010 0.015
(0.13) (0.21)
Ex-dividend day -0.004 -0.036
(-0.05) (-0.81)
Volume
All Week -0.000** -0.000
(-2.25) (-1.34)
Cum-dividend day 0.000 -0.000
(0.69) (-0.00)
Ex-dividend day 0.000 -0.000
(1.21) (-0.39)
Return
All Week 0.048 0.042
(0.76) (0.86)
Cum-dividend day 0.039 0.066
(0.38) (0.76)
Ex-dividend day -0.204 0.100
(-1.42) (1.10)
Buy Size
All Week 0.000 -0.000**
(0.42) (-2.23)
Cum-dividend day -0.000 -0.000
(-0.77) (-0.19)
Ex-dividend day -0.000* -0.000
(-1.72) (-0.48)
Sell Size
All Week -0.000 -0.000*
(-2.42) (-1.80)
Cum-dividend day 0.000 -0.000
(1.05) (-0.48)
Ex-dividend day -0.000 -0.000
(-0.94) (-0.18)
Dummies
Cum-dividend day 0.000 0.000
(0.21) (0.12)
Ex-dividend day 0.000* 0.000
(1.80) (0.48)
constant -0.000 -0.000**
(-1.11) (-2.50)
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In Table 3.8, column two shows the determinants of the dierence in spread and
column three shows the determinants of spread. We nd that the spread overall is
greater in the ex-dividend week than in the control week but low on ex-dividend
day. Furthermore, we nd that the dierence in spread is explained, in general, by
the dierence in volatility by a positive association but there are no specic cum-
dividend day and ex-dividend day eects. There is also a negative association with
the dierence in volume. For level regression, when either volatility is higher or
when trade sizes (buy or sell size) are lower, spread levels are higher. This eect is,
however, not linked to cum- or ex-dividend days, specically. The general picture
is, therefore, that there is little eect on spread in the ex-dividend week.
Table 3.9shows the results of model (2.12) and (2.17) , using the data for both
the ex-dividend week and the control weeks.
Table 3.9  Estimation of OLS regression
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.12) and Eq (2.17) for sample of 43
stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE
SmallCap index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday
during the sample period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The
regression is robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Dummies Spread Volatility
Cum.day 0.040 0.161
Ex.day -0.041 0.002
Cont.w 0.029 -0.083
C-Cum -0.056 -0.044
C-Ex -0.070 -0.173
constant 0.874*** 1.971***
The results of these regression conrm the previous results that volatility is
higher on ex-dividend week in compere to control week. Further, the constants
in two regressions are also positive conrming the potential intra-day patterns in
both the spread and the volatility variables.
Table 3.10shows the results of models (2.13) using the data for both the ex-
dividend week and the control weeks.
Chapter 3: Impact of Liquidity on Market Microstructure around Ex-Dividend Day 109
Table 3.10  Estimation of OLS regression over spread determinants
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.13) for sample of 47 stocks from FTSE 100
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE100 index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is
no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The regression is robust for heteroskedasticity
and and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Variables Ex.w Cum.day Ex.day Cont.w C-Cum C-Ex
Volatility 0.640*** 0.074 0.135 -0.117 -0.000 0.000
Volume -4.124 18.755** 2.401 -5.799 -96.894 -462.513
Return 0.052 0.117 -0.115 -0.118 0.000 -0.000***
Buy Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.376 -1.454***
Sell Size -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.073 1.157**
Dummies -0.195** 0.030 -0.187 0.152* 0.072 0.055
The signicant positive eect of volatility has been conrmed in this regression.
However, volume show a larg signicant positive eect on spread on cum-dividend
day which may suggest that the volume derive the spread on cum-dividend day.
Order Submission
The results of the order submission models are however more revealing of trading
strategies and patterns. All ve models described in the methodology section of
Chapter 2 are estimated for both the buy side and the sell side, separately. Only
the results of model M5 are discussed and presented here as the other models
are special cases of this model. Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 report the results of
regression M5 for the buy side and sell side respectively. 7
7The results of the remainder of models are reported in Appendix C
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Table 3.11  Relative risk ratiosM5buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M5-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable is aggressiveness which is
classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.774*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.125***
DW 1.052*** 1.050 1.007 1.069***
DC 0.825*** 1.284*** 0.805*** 1.092**
DE 0.968 1.010 1.301*** 0.604***
Baseline * DW 0.814 0.050 0.086 0.134
Baseline * DW * DC 0.672 0.065 0.069 0.146
Baseline * DW * DE 0.788 0.051 0.111 0.081
Spread variables
Spread 1.021*** 0.994 0.954*** 0.913***
Spread # DW 0.989** 0.973 1.048*** 1.042***
Spread # DC 1.001 1.062* 0.978 0.917***
Spread # DE 1.013 1.121*** 1.038** 0.888***
Spread * Spread # DW 1.010 0.967 1.000 0.951
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DC 1.011 1.027 0.978 0.872
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DE 1.023 1.084 1.038 0.845
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.972*** 0.979** 1.092*** 0.966***
Volatility # DW 1.012*** 1.014 0.976*** 1.035***
Volatility # DC 0.994 1.020 1.055*** 1.044***
Volatility # DE 0.986** 0.993 1.014 1.041***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.984 0.993 1.066 1.000
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC 0.978 1.013 1.124 1.044
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE 0.970 0.986 1.081 1.041
Return variables
Return 0.990*** 1.012** 1.056*** 1.033***
Return # DW 0.999 0.996 1.016** 0.990**
Return # DC 1.020*** 0.980 0.904*** 1.042***
Return # DE 1.006 1.000 0.989 0.988
Return * Return # DW 0.989 1.008 1.073 1.023
Return * Return # DW * Return # DC 1.009 0.988 0.970 1.066
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE 0.995 1.008 1.061 1.010
Duration variables
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000**
Duration # DC 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 1.000
Duration # DE 1.000** 1.000 1.000 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DC 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 3.12  Relative risk ratiosM5sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M5-sell side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable is aggressiveness which is
classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5)
buy order. Buy order set as reference category. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.842*** 0.073*** 0.142*** 0.145***
DW 0.979* 0.768*** 0.676*** 0.911***
DC 1.066*** 1.285*** 1.154* 1.428***
DE 1.007 1.083 1.626*** 1.319***
Baseline * DW 0.824 0.056 0.096 0.132
Baseline * DW * DC 0.879 0.072 0.111 0.189
Baseline * DW * DE 0.830 0.061 0.156 0.174
Spread variables
Spread 0.987*** 1.008 1.066*** 0.991
Spread # DW 1.029*** 0.967 0.916*** 0.974**
Spread # DC 0.993 1.055 1.046*** 1.039**
Spread # DE 0.973*** 1.071* 1.031* 1.037**
Spread * Spread # DW 1.016 0.975 0.976 0.965
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DC 1.009 1.028 1.021 1.003
Spread * Spread # DW * Spread # DE 0.988 1.044 1.007 1.001
Volatility variables
Volatility 1.013*** 0.979*** 1.054*** 0.976***
Volatility # DW 0.981*** 1.021 1.027*** 1.003
Volatility # DC 1.002 0.919*** 0.993 0.927***
Volatility # DE 0.992 0.940** 1.029** 0.996
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.994 1.000 1.082 0.979
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DC 0.996 0.919 1.075 0.907
Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE 0.986 0.940 1.114 0.975
Return variables
Return 1.001 1.004 1.020*** 0.929***
Return # DW 1.008*** 1.008 0.970*** 1.033***
Return # DC 0.995 0.947*** 0.955*** 1.031***
Return # DE 1.011** 0.978 1.004 0.938***
Return * Return # DW 1.009 1.012 0.989 0.960
Return * Return # DW * Return # DC 1.004 0.958 0.945 0.989
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE 1.020 0.990 0.993 0.900
Duration variables
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000 1.000*
Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000** 1.000
Duration # DC 1.000* 1.000 1.000* 1.000**
Duration # DE 1.000 1.000 1.000* 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DC 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW * Duration # DE 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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A number of results and patterns seem to emerge. First, the likelihood that
orders will be submitted is signicantly dierent for the cum dividend day, ex
dividend day and for the rest of the ex-dividend week when compared to the same
likelihoods for the control week. On the cum-dividend day there is an increase
in the likelihood of the submission of the least aggressive sell order and most
aggressive sell order and a decrease in the likelihood of the submission of any other
kind of sell order, compared to the control week. On the ex-dividend day there
is a reduction in the likelihood of the submission of the rst two least aggressive
sell orders and an increase in the likelihood of the submission of the last two
most aggressive sell orders, compared to the control week. On the cum-dividend
day there is an increase in the likelihood of the submission of the second least
aggressive buy order and most aggressive buy order, and a decrease likelihood of
the submission of any other kind of buy order, compared to the control week. On
the ex-dividend day there is a reduction in the likelihood of the submission of the
most aggressive buy order and an increase in the likelihood of the submission of
any other kind of buy order, compared to the control week.
At one level we observe what appears to be symmetry between the buy and
sell orders. For instance, the change in the likelihood runs in opposite directions
on the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day, compared to the control week,
but this applies equally to the buy and sell orders and to order of any level of
aggressiveness. The likelihood of the least aggressive buy orders and the second
and third most aggressive sell orders is reduced on the cum-dividend day compared
to the control week and the likelihood of the least aggressive buy order and the
two most aggressive sell orders is increased on the ex-dividend day, consistent with
more aggressive buying behaviour on the cum-dividend day and more aggressive
selling behaviour on the ex-dividend day.
This can be inferred from Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, by comparing the results
for the baseline relative risk ratio (RRR) with the interaction terms with the
baseline relative risk ratio. See the values reported for Baseline relative risk
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ratio (RRR) with the Baseline * DW * DC and Baseline * DW * DE relative
risk ratios. This comparison takes into account the eect on the baseline from
inclusion in the ex-dividend week (by the indicator variable DW) and the inclusion
on the cum-dividend day (by the indicator variable DC) and the ex-dividend day
(by the indicator variable DE), respectively. This can interpreted as evidence of
the presence of tax-arbitrage trading around the ex-dividend day for this sample
of FTSE SmallCap stocks.
We argue that this evidence of the increase in the likelihood of the least ag-
gressive sell orders on the cum-dividend day and the increase in the likelihood of
the least aggressive buy orders on the ex-dividend day is consistent with liquid-
ity suppliers seeking to benet from the activity of the relatively more aggressive
behaviour of the tax-arbitrageurs.
Second, turning to spread related results, we nd patterns in the way order
submission is associated with spread changes in the ex-dividend week relative to
the control week. For example, all types of sell orders, except the third least
aggressive sell order, respond more positively to spread increases on the cum-
dividend day than the control week. All types of sell orders, except the second
least aggressive sell order, respond more positively to spread increases on the
cum-dividend day than on the ex-dividend day. All types of buy orders, except
the most aggressive buy order respond more positively to spread increases on the
ex-dividend day than on the cum-dividend day and in the control week.
This can be inferred from Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, by comparing the Spread
RRRs with the interaction terms for spread. See the results for Spread * Spread
#DW * Spread #DC and Spread * Spread #DW * Spread #DE relative risk
ratios. Aggressive sell orders submitted following an increase in the spread are
more likely on the cum-dividend day and we are more likely to see more aggres-
sive buy orders, but not for the most aggressive buy order, submitted following an
increase in the spread on the ex-dividend day. This appears consistent with liq-
uidity provision by sellers on the cum-dividend day and buyers on the ex-dividend
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day. If there is buying pressure on the cum-dividend day and selling pressure on
the ex-dividend day from arbitrageurs, temporary increases in the spread that is
subsequently lled by more aggressive orders may be observed on the other side
on both the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day. This eect is observed
on the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend day.
Third, turning to volatility issues, there are patterns in the way that order
submission is associated with volatility changes in the ex-dividend week as com-
pared to the control week. All types of buy orders respond more positively to
volatility increases on the cum-dividend day than on the ex-dividend day and in
the control week. All types of sell orders, except the inside-the-quote (ITQ) sell
orders, respond more negatively to volatility increases on cum- and ex- dividend
days than in the control week. All types of sell orders, except the least aggressive
sell orders, respond more positively to volatility increases on the ex-dividend day
than on cum-dividend day. On the cum-dividend (ex-dividend) day, arbitrageurs
are expected to place more aggressive buy (sell) orders (which are more likely to
move prices). It is, therefore, expected that there will be a positive association
between the likelihood of the submission of buy orders and volatility on the cum-
dividend day. A positive association between the likelihood of the submission of
sell orders and volatility is expected on ex-dividend day. This assertion is found
to be supported by the data and can be inferred from Table 3.11 and Table 3.12,
by comparing the Volatility RRRs with the RRRs for Volatility * Volatility #
DW * Volatility # DC and Volatility * Volatility # DW * Volatility # DE.
Fourth, we report results associated with returns and nd there are patterns in
the way that order submission is associated with return changes in the ex-dividend
week relative to the control week. The least and the most aggressive buy orders
respond more positively to return increases on the cum-dividend day than on
the ex-dividend day and compared to the control week. The least aggressive sell
orders respond more positively to return increases on the ex-dividend day than the
control week. All sell orders, except the most aggressive sell orders respond more
Chapter 3: Impact of Liquidity on Market Microstructure around Ex-Dividend Day 115
positively to return increases on the ex-dividend day than the cum-dividend day.
Consistent with the literature, in the control week, there is a positive association
between on the one hand the likelihood of the submission the most aggressive buy
order and of the likelihood of the submission of the least aggressive sell order and
on the other hand return. This eect is expected to be amplied on the cum-
dividend day and the opposite eect is expected on the ex-dividend day. This
is because arbitrageurs are expected to place more aggressive buy orders on the
cum-dividend day and more aggressive sell orders on the ex-dividend day. We nd
that this assertion is supported in the data, since the positive association between
the submission of the most aggressive buy orders and of return is amplied on
the cum-dividend day and there is a positive association between the submission
of the three least aggressive sell orders and of return on the ex-dividend day.
Again these results can be inferred from Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, by comparing
the RRRs with the RRRs for Return * Return # DW * Return # DC and
Return * Return # DW * Return # DE. This is an evidence of the presence of
tax-arbitrage trading.
We are more likely to see least aggressive sell orders submitted following an
increase in returns on the cum-dividend day and more likely to see the three
aggressive buy orders being submitted following an increase in return on the ex-
dividend day. This is consistent with liquidity provision by sellers on the cum-
dividend day and by buyers on the ex-dividend day. If arbitrageurs submit more
buy orders on the cum-dividend day and more sell orders on the ex-dividend
day, they may temporarily increase the return that is subsequently lled by more
aggressive orders on the other side on both the cum- and the ex- dividend days.
Finally, we found no evidence of any relations between order arrival rates
and order submission decisions around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap
traders.
Overall, the results here point to traces of the foot-prints left by tax arbitrage
and liquidity supply trading around the ex-dividend event and there is evidence
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of eects that link order submission to spread, volatility and return. One expla-
nation is that one-sided trading by tax-arbitrageurs may drive prices away from
fundamentals and that process increase spread and returns, which attracts liq-
uidity suppliers, who may then trade aggressively either to take advantage of the
dierence between transaction prices and fundamental prices or to prot from the
larger spread. In addition, one-sided buying or selling pressure increases price
volatility and return which motivates tax-arbitrageurs to submit more aggressive
orders. We nd no evidence of a relation between order arrival rates and order
submission decisions around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap traders.
3.7 Robustness Test
This section provides additional tests to examine the robustness of the results
presented above. A full description of how we performed these robustness tests is
described in section 2.7. Table 3.13 shows the results of models (2.19), (2.20) and
(2.21). The rst row show the results of model (2.19), the second row show the
results of model (2.21) and the rest of the table show the results of model (2.20).
Table 3.13  Estimation of OLS regression over spread and volatility
This table shows the results of OLS estimates regression of Eq (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21) for sample of 77
stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE
SmallCap index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend during the sample
period. The regression is robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The signicant levels are dened
as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Spread Cum.day Ex.day After.Ex.day
Spread -0.279 -0.377 3.082***
Volatility -0.289 0.699 2.625***
Spread Determinants
Volatility -0.086 -0.034 0.041
Volume -0.062 -0.029 0.202
Return -0.015 0.016 0.013
Buy Size -0.438 0.726* -0.170
Sell Size 0.234 -0.583 -0.024
Dummies -0.019 -0.533 3.457***
The results show few signicant eects. Firstly, the constant term is signicant
positive in spread and volatility dummies regressions. This indicates that, in
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general, the spread and the volatility are signicant positive in the control period
which is the ten days after ex-dividend day. Furthermore, there is a positive
signicant, at the 10% signicance level, association between spread and buy size
on cum-dividend day.
Table 3.14 presents the predicted probabilities of submitting orders with vary-
ing levels of aggressiveness, on the cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day and 10
days after ex-dividend day, for both the buy-side as well as the sell side. Table
3.15 reports the coecient of ordered probit regression for the buy and sell sides
separately.
Table 3.14  The predicted probabilities of dierent level of aggressiveness of buy orders and sell orders
This table reports the predicted probabilities of each level of aggressiveness over buy and sell side separately.
The predicted probabilities are reported for sample of 77 ex-dividend events from FTSE SmallCap index.
These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between
June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend during the sample period.
Buy Side Sell Side
Aggressiveness After.Ex Cum.day Ex.day After.Ex Cum.day Ex.day
B-T-Q 0.6480 0.9453 0.9685 0.7290 0.6796 0.7563
A-T-Q 0.0023 0.0007 0.0004 0.0017 0.0018 0.0016
I-T-Q 0.0023 0.0007 0.0004 0.0026 0.0028 0.0024
M-A 0.3474 0.0533 0.0306 0.2667 0.3158 0.2397
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Table 3.15  Ordered probit regression
This table reports the ordered probit regression coecients over buy and sell side separately. The coecients
are reported for sample of 77 ex-dividend events from FTSE SmallCap index. These stocks achieve the
following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June 2007 and June 2008,
they paid a cash dividend during the sample period. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variables Buy Side Variables Sell Side
Spread-After-Ex.Day -0.058*** Spread-After-Ex.Day -0.186***
Spread-Cum.Day 0.314*** Spread-Cum.Day -0.116***
Spread-Ex.Day -0.197*** Spread-Ex.Day 0.118***
Return-After-Ex.Day 0.000 Return-After-Ex.Day 0.005***
Return-Cum.Day -0.022*** Return-Cum.Day -0.006***
Return-Ex.Day 0.012*** Return-Ex.Day 0.050***
Volatility-After-Ex.Day 0.622*** Volatility-After-Ex.Day 3.138***
Volatility-Cum.Day 14.959*** Volatility-Cum.Day 3.08***
Volatility-Ex.Day -14.185*** Volatility-Ex.Day 19.386***
Duration-After-Ex.Day 0.000* Duration-After-Ex.Day 0.000***
Duration-Cum.Day 0.001*** Duration-Cum.Day 0.000
Duration-Ex.Day 0.001*** Duration-Ex.Day 0.000
Cum-dividend day -1.221*** Cum-dividend day 0.143***
Ex-dividend day -1.479*** Ex-dividend day -0.085
Figures 3.1 and 3.3 present the variation in the predicted probabilities for
each level of aggressiveness against the spread variable, holding other variables
constant over the ex-dividend day, for sell and buy orders respectively. Similarly,
Figures 3.2 and 3.4 apply for cum-dividend day. Figures 3.5 and 3.7 present the
variation in the predicted probabilities for each level of aggressiveness against the
return variable, holding other variables constant over the ex-dividend day, for sell
and buy orders respectively. Similarly, Figures 3.6 and 3.8 apply for cum-dividend
day. Figures 3.9 and 3.11 present the variation in the predicted probabilities for
each level of aggressiveness against the volatility variable, holding other variables
constant over the ex-dividend day, for sell and buy orders respectively. Similarly,
Figures 3.10 and 3.12 apply for cum-dividend day. Figures 3.13 and 3.15 present
the variation in the predicted probabilities for each level of aggressiveness against
the duration variable, holding other variables constant over the ex-dividend day,
for sell and buy orders. Similarly, Figures 3.14 and 3.16 apply for cum-dividend
day.
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Figure 3.1  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Sell order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.2  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Sell order - Cum.Day
.
Figure 3.3  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Buy order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.4  Predicted Probabilities -
Spread - Buy order - Cum.Day
Figure 3.5  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Sell order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.6  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Sell order - Cum.Day
.
Figure 3.7  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Buy order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.8  Predicted Probabilities -
Return - Buy order - Cum.Day
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Figure 3.9  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Sell order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.10  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Sell order - Cum.Day
Figure 3.11  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Buy order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.12  Predicted Probabilities -
Volatility - Buy order - Cum.Day
Figure 3.13  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Sell order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.14  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Sell order - Cum.Day
Figure 3.15  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Buy order - Ex.Day
Figure 3.16  Predicted Probabilities -
Duration - Buy order - Cum.Day
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After we examine the new sample of data, analyse buy side and sell side
separately and calculate the actual spread, the results do not change in most
cases. Starting with predicted probabilities of dierent aggressive types of sell
and buy orders, the negative signs in Table 3.15 over buy side on both cum- and
ex- dividend days suggest that the aggressiveness level of buy order decreases on
both cum- and ex-dividend days. The predicted probabilities on cum-dividend
day for both buy and sell sides in Table 3.15 show that the aggressiveness level of
buy and sell orders is higher on cum-dividend day that on ex-dividend day. The
predicted probabilities of the least aggressive buy order (behind the quote) show
a high value on cum-dividend day (0.9453). The predicted probabilities of the
least aggressive sell order (behind the quote) show a high value on ex-dividend
day (0.7563). In general, most of buy (sell) order are submitted passively on cum-
dividend (ex-dividend) day. Second, the positive spread coecient over buy side
on cum-dividend day in Table 3.15 suggests that the aggressiveness level of buy
order respond positively to spread increases on cum-dividend day and the positive
spread coecient over sell side on ex-dividend day suggests that the aggressiveness
level of sell order respond positively to spread increases on ex-dividend day. These
results can be inferred from Table 3.15 and Figures 3.1 and 3.4.
In the general case, for FTSE SmallCap stocks, most of buy order and sell order
are submitted passively on cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day respectively. It
is, however, more likely that we see more aggressive buy orders submitted following
an increase in the spread on the cum-dividend day and more aggressive sell orders
submitted following an increase in the spread on the ex-dividend day. This can
be consistent with that, for illiquid stocks, tax-arbitrageurs place a premium on
certainty in the execution of their trades by submitting aggressive order as the
spread increases.
Third, turning to volatility issues, there are patterns in the way that order
submission is associated with volatility changes on cum- and ex- dividend days
relative to the control period. The positive volatility coecients for sell side
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on ex-dividend day and for buy side on cum-dividend day in Table 3.15 suggest
that the aggressiveness level of sell (buy) orders respond positively to volatility
increases on ex-dividend (cum-dividend) day. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show that the
positive response of the aggressiveness level of sell orders to the volatility increases
is higher on ex-dividend day than on cum-dividend day. This is evidence that
trading activity is associated with and perhaps even drives price volatility on the
cum- and ex-dividend days.
Fourth, we report results associated with returns and nd that there are pat-
terns in the way that order submission is associated with return changes on cum-
and ex- dividend days relative to the control period. Consistent with the prior
literature, in the control period and ex-dividend day, there is a positive association
between the aggressiveness level of buy order and return. The increase in returns
on the ex-dividend day positively aects the aggressiveness level of sell orders.
These results can be inferred from Table 3.15 and Figure 3.5.
Finally, consistent with the previous theories (Foucault et al., 2005; Rosu 2008,
2009), the positive coecient of the duration as reported in Table 3.15 suggests
an increase in order aggressiveness as duration increases.
Overall, the robustness results conrm traces of foot-prints associated with
tax arbitrage and liquidity supply around the ex-dividend event. There is high
passive buy behaviour on cum-dividend day and high passive sell behaviour on
ex-dividend day. Furthermore, increases in bid-ask spread and price volatility
motivate tax-arbitragers to buy on cum-dividend day and sell on the ex-dividend
aggressively to ensure the execution of their orders.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies market microstructure eects associated with the ex-dividend
day price drop FTSE SmallCap rms. FTSE SmallCap stocks are considered
illiquid stocks. Employing dierent liquidity measures we empirically conrm the
illiquidity of the FTSE SmallCap stocks. This study investigates tax-arbitrage
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driven trading around the ex-dividend day and searches for tell-tale footprints.
There are no strong eects in the aggregate trading data though we do nd that
that spread and volatility are higher in the ex-dividend week compared to the con-
trol week. Furthermore, spread in the ex-dividend week aects by price volatility,
size of the buy order and the size of the sell order. These eects are not directly
interpretable without also studying the limit order submission details.
We nd that the order submission results support the presence of tax-arbitrage
footprints, since there is an increased likelihood of relatively more aggressive
buying on the cum-dividend day and of relatively more aggressive selling on the
ex-dividend day. We also nd that there is an increase in the likelihood of rela-
tively less aggressive selling on the cum-dividend day and relatively less aggressive
buying on the ex-dividend day. These ndings are consistent with tax-arbitrage
and liquidity supply occurring simultaneously.
There are clear links between order submission and spread, volatility as well
as return. One pattern we nd is that one-sided trading of tax-arbitrageurs may
drive prices away from fundamentals and thereby increase spread and return,
which attracts liquidity suppliers, who trade aggressively either to take advantage
of the dierence between transaction prices and fundamental prices or to prot
from the resulting larger spread. In addition, one-sided buying or selling pressure
increases price volatility and return which motivates tax-arbitrageurs to submit
aggressive orders. There is no of an association between order arrival rate and the
order submission decision around the ex-dividend day for FTSE SmallCap stocks.
Finally, after we expand our sample period, analyse buy order and sell order
separately and calculate the actual tradable spread, the regression specication
conrms most of the results.
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3.9 Appendix C
Table 3.16  Relative risk ratiosM1
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M1-buy side and sell side on
a stock-by-stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period
between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period
and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy
regression is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3)
I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order (5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression.
The dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell
order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5) buy order. Buy order set as reference
category for sell regression. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Buy side
Baseline 0.781*** 0.050*** 0.086*** 0.126***
Spread 1.016*** 1.002 0.975*** 0.921***
Volatility 0.976*** 0.984** 1.088*** 0.991***
Return 0.992*** 1.008* 1.051*** 1.030***
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Sell side
Baseline 0.833*** 0.065*** 0.121*** 0.148***
Spread 0.999 1.000 1.037*** 0.988***
Volatility 1.004** 0.974*** 1.067*** 0.968***
Return 1.006*** 0.998 1.001 0.943***
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000**
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Table 3.17  Relative risk ratiosM2
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M2-buy side and sell side on
a stock-by-stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap
index. These stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period
between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period
and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable for buy
regression is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3)
I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order (5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category for buy regression.
The dependent variable for sell regression is aggressiveness which is classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell
order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5) buy order. Buy order set as reference
category for sell regression The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Buy side
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.778*** 0.052*** 0.088*** 0.121***
DW 1.008* 0.948*** 0.944*** 1.091***
Baseline * DW 0.784 0.049 0.083 0.132
Spread 1.016*** 1.001 0.975*** 0.921***
Volatility 0.976*** 0.984** 1.088*** 0.991***
Return 0.992*** 1.008* 1.051*** 1.030***
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Sell side
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.843*** 0.070*** 0.128*** 0.145***
DW 0.978*** 0.872*** 0.892*** 1.045***
Baseline * DW 0.824 0.061 0.114 0.152
Spread 0.999 1.000 1.036*** 0.988**
Volatility 1.004** 0.974*** 1.068*** 0.969***
Return 1.005*** 0.998 1.000 0.943***
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000**
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Table 3.18  Relative risk ratiosM3buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M3-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable is aggressiveness which is
classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.774*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.125***
DW 1.018 1.092* 1.001 1.017
Baseline * DW 0.788 0.052 0.085 0.127
Spread variables
Spread 1.021*** 0.994 0.954*** 0.913***
Spread # DW 0.989** 1.017 1.048*** 1.014
Spread * Spread # DW 1.010 1.011 1.000 0.926
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.972*** 0.979** 1.092*** 0.966***
Volatility # DW 1.010*** 1.015 0.993 1.049***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.982 0.994 1.084 1.013
Return variables
Return 0.990*** 1.012** 1.056*** 1.033***
Return # DW 1.003 0.990 0.987** 0.994
Return * Return # DW 0.993 1.002 1.042 1.027
Duration variables
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Duration # DW 1.000* 1.000 1.000 1.000***
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 3.19  Relative risk ratiosM3sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M3-sell side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable is aggressiveness which is
classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5)
buy order. Buy order set as reference category. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.842*** 0.073*** 0.142*** 0.145***
DW 0.981* 0.791*** 0.732*** 1.045**
Baseline * DW 0.826 0.058 0.104 0.152
Spread variables
Spread 0.987*** 1.008 1.066*** 0.991
Spread # DW 1.024*** 0.988 0.937*** 0.993
Spread * Spread # DW 1.011 0.996 0.999 0.984
Volatility variables
Volatility 1.013*** 0.979*** 1.054*** 0.976***
Volatility # DW 0.981*** 0.992 1.029*** 0.983***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.994 0.971 1.085 0.959
Return variables
Return 1.001 1.004 1.020*** 0.929***
Return # DW 1.009*** 0.985* 0.963*** 1.026***
Return * Return # DW 1.010 0.989 0.982 0.953
Duration variables
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000 1.000*
Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000* 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 3.20  Relative risk ratiosM4buy side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M4-buy side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable is aggressiveness which is
classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q buy order (2) A-T-Q buy order (3) I-T-Q buy order (4) M-A buy order
(5) sell order. Sell order set as reference category. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.774*** 0.048*** 0.085*** 0.125***
DW 1.070*** 1.032 0.933 1.077***
DC 0.809*** 1.360*** 1.158*** 0.857***
DE 0.907*** 0.990 1.253*** 0.816***
Baseline * DW 0.828 0.050 0.079 0.135
Baseline * DW * DC 0.670 0.067 0.092 0.115
Baseline * DW * DE 0.751 0.049 0.099 0.110
Spread variables
Spread 1.021*** 0.994 0.954*** 0.913***
Spread # DW 0.991** 1.013 1.047*** 1.014
Spread * Spread # DW 1.012 1.007 0.999 0.926
Volatility variables
Volatility 0.972*** 0.979** 1.092*** 0.966***
Volatility # DW 1.008** 1.016 0.995 1.047***
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.980 0.995 1.087 1.011
Return variables
Return 0.990*** 1.012** 1.056*** 1.033***
Return # DW 1.003 0.991 0.988** 0.994
Return * Return # DW 0.993 1.003 1.043 1.027
Duration variables
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Duration # DW 1.000* 1.000 1.000 1.000**
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table 3.21  Relative risk ratiosM4sell side
This table reports the relative risk ratios of estimates regression Eq.(2.18) for-M4-sell side on a stock-by-
stock basis. The relative risk ratios are reported for sample of 43 stocks from FTSE SmallCap index. These
stocks achieve the following criteria: They are listed on FTSE SmallCap index in a period between June
2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on Wednesday during the sample period and there is no
bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or control week. The dependent variable is aggressiveness which is
classied in to 5 levels: (1) B-T-Q sell order (2) A-T-Q sell order (3) I-T-Q sell order (4) M-A sell order (5)
buy order. Buy order set as reference category. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Variables BT-Q A-T-Q IT-Q M-A
Dummy variables
Baseline 0.842*** 0.073*** 0.142*** 0.145***
DW 0.952*** 0.661*** 0.642*** 0.985
DC 1.131*** 2.054*** 1.532*** 1.239***
DE 1.067*** 1.258*** 1.356*** 1.162***
Baseline * DW 0.802 0.048 0.091 0.143
Baseline * DW * DC 0.907 0.099 0.140 0.177
Baseline * DW * DE 0.855 0.061 0.124 0.166
Spread variables
Spread 0.987*** 1.008 1.066*** 0.991
Spread # DW 1.023*** 0.982 0.935*** 0.992
Spread * Spread # DW 1.010 0.990 0.997 0.983
Volatility variables
Volatility 1.013*** 0.979*** 1.054*** 0.976***
Volatility # DW 0.982*** 0.996 1.033*** 0.985**
Volatility * Volatility # DW 0.995 0.975 1.089 0.961
Return variables
Return 1.001 1.004 1.020*** 0.929***
Return # DW 1.009*** 0.988 0.964*** 1.026***
Return * Return # DW 1.010 0.992 0.983 0.953
Duration variables
Duration 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000 1.000*
Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000* 1.000
Duration * Duration # DW 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Chapter 4
Ex-dividend Day and Intraday
Trading Patterns
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the focus is on microstructure eects at the high frequency tick-
by-tick intraday level of trading. We investigate patterns in the bidask spread,
price volatility and trading volume around the ex-dividend day for a sample of
FTSE100 companies. It is well known that some of the trading activity around
the ex-dividend day is linked to tax-arbitrage, which has a predictable impact on
these intraday patterns. A standard view is that tax arbitrageurs are averse to
adverse selection costs and execution risk and should consequently prefer to trade
in the stocks of companies with the lowest costs and at a time of the trading day
when these costs are the lowest. Therefore, it is expected that tax-arbitrageurs
focus on low price volatility rms more than on high price volatility rms. This
chapter examines whether the eect of ex-dividend day on the intraday pattern
of spread, volatility and volume diers between low price volatility rms and high
price volatility rms.
Many studies nd evidence of general intraday patterns in volatility, spread
and trading volume in the equity and in other markets, specically U-shaped pat-
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terns in volatility, U-shaped patters in trading volume, and U-shaped patterns in
spreads, while some studies indicate that there is an L-shape or inverted J-shape
for the intraday pattern for spreads, volumes and volatility (Chan et al., 1995
and McInish and Van Ness, 2002).1'2'3'4Studies typically rationalise the U-shaped
patterns via information asymmetry eects at the beginning of the day and by
the eects of market closure, at the end of the day. Information asymmetry leads
to greater spreads and greater volatility because of adverse selection costs and in-
formation revelation, as well as to greater volumes because more informed trading
takes place. At market closure, the argument is that traders, otherwise risking
holding their position overnight when they have limited access to information and
to limited trading liquidity, choose instead to close out their positions. Therefore,
liquidity suppliers quote larger spreads to take advantage of those needing to close
their position and the resulting trading activity leads to greater price volatility
and volumes (Slezak, 1994). This chapter studies what impact trading around the
ex-dividend day has on these established patterns.
Many studies have investigated the behaviour of equity prices around the
ex-dividend day. For example, while Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) demon-
strate that the ex-dividend day is associated with an increase in trading volume,
Ainsworth et al. (2008) study spreads around the ex-dividend day and nd higher
spreads on ex-dividend days compared to cum-dividend days on the Australian
Stock Exchange, whereas Graham et al. (2003) nd no such eects on the NYSE.
Evidence of order imbalance around ex-dividend days is reported by Frank and
Jagannathan (1998) as well as Jakob and Ma (2004) while evidence of abnormal
1Chan et al. (1995) suggest that intraday trading patterns exhibit dierences between pure
order driven markets as compared with hybrid markets because of structural dierences between
such markets.
2Studies reporting results for volatility include Wood et al. (1985); Harris (1986); McInish
and Wood (1990); Foster and Viswanathan (1993); Lee et al. (1993); Chan et al. (1995) as well
as Ke et al. (2004).
3Studies reporting results for volume include Jain and Joh (1988); McInish and Wood (1990);
Foster and Viswanathan (1993); Lee et al. (1993); Chan et al. (1995) as well as Ke et al. (2004).
4Studies reporting results for spread include Brock and Kleidon (1992); Lau and McInish
(1995); Brockman and Chung (1999); Ahn and Cheung (1999); Chung at al. (1999); Chung and
Van Ness (2001); Ke et al. (2004) as well as Vo (2007).
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volume and price volatility around ex-dividend days is reported by Ainsworth et
al. (2008) and Jun et al. (2008).
Several studies report an increase in the trade size around ex-dividend days.5
Both cum- and ex- dividend days are expected to generate higher volumes. Cum-
dividend days and ex-dividend days need not necessarily display the same intraday
patterns. Immediacy concerns, for instance, are likely to be more pronounced on
cum-dividend days than on ex-dividend days. From a theoretical point of view,
waiting costs are shown to inuence order submission strategies since Foucault et
al. (2005) and Ro³u (2009) both argue, that higher waiting costs can lead to the
submission of more aggressive orders. More submission of more aggressive orders
can lead to narrower spreads and this eect should also be more pronounced on
cum-dividend days than ex-dividend days. The eects on ex-dividend days are
more likely to be associated with an unwinding of tax-arbitrage positions and
will therefore, be more aligned closer to the close of trading perspective posited
above. There are, however, other eects that could increase spreads around the
ex-dividend day. First, if immediacy concerns arise from traders who seek to trade
in the same direction, they are likely to lead to wider spreads because liquidity
suppliers may not necessarily be able to keep up with the one-sided demand.
Second, if there is increased demand for liquidity, suppliers of that liquidity may
increase the price for that liquidity, which also can lead to higher spreads.
This chapter empirically investigate these issues, employing data on order
submissions and executions in the ex-dividend week, and in a control week, and
for shares constituting the FTSE 100 going ex-dividend between June 2007 and
June 2008. This study is restricted to only those rms that go ex-dividend on a
Wednesday and where there is no bank holiday in the two weeks concerned.
The results of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, while intraday
patterns of spread display an L-shape, consistent with some previous literature,
volume exhibits an U-shape and, in general, is consistent with most prior litera-
5Evidence of this increase in trade size is reported by Michaely and Vila (1995); McDonald
(2001); Rantapuska (2008) as well as Ainsworth and Lee (2011).
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ture. Second, consistent with tax-arbitrage eects, spreads and volumes on both
ex-dividend days and cum-dividend days, for rms that are most attractive tar-
gets for tax-arbitrage6, are higher than normal for the last part of the trading day.
The fact that tax-arbitrage is more likely in the nal part of the trading day can
be explained by the relatively higher adverse selection costs of trading in the rst
part of the day. Since, both spreads and volatility are higher in the rst part of
the day, in general, it is rational to avoid that period. Third, there is evidence
that some of the eects on intraday patters around ex-dividend days can become
masked. When the sample is split, into classications, based on price volatility,
the results show that tax-arbitrageurs are likely to prefer trading in companies
with the lowest price volatility, because this minimises both adverse selection costs
and execution risks. Across all rms in the sample, there is no measurable impact
on spreads and volumes on the ex- and cum-dividend days but when the sample is
split into low-high volatility rms, the results show greater spreads and volumes
at the end of the ex- and cum-dividend days for low volatility rms and smaller
spreads and volumes at the end of the day for high volatility rms. The total
sample masks, therefore, the two opposing eects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the
extant literature and develops the relevant hypotheses while the data and sample
are outlined in Section 4.3 and section 4.4 describes the methodology and species
the variables employed. The results are presented and discussed in section 4.5.
while a nal section concludes.
6The sample of data in this chapter is classied, depending on the price volatility, into two
groups: 1- rms that are most attractive target for tax-arbitrageurs, which are the rms with
low price volatility and 2- rms that are least attractive target for tax-arbitrager, which are the
rms with high price volatility.
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4.2 Literature Review
Spread Patterns
The prior literature has found that the intraday variation of bid-ask spread tends
to be U-shaped, L-shaped or an inverted J-shaped (Chan et al., 1995 and McIn-
ish and Van Ness, 2002).7 There are three microstructure models that seek to
explain this intraday variation in spreads: inventory models, specialist market
power models and information asymmetry models.
The inventory based models (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980 and
Ho and Stoll, 1981) argue that the spread eect is explained by the premium that
market makers require for internalising the cost of carrying undesired inventory.
When market makers are forced away from their optimum inventory positions,
they adjust bid-ask spreads so as to attract orders to regain their preferred inven-
tory positions. Amihud and Mendelson (1982) and Madhavan and Smidt (1993)
argue that the quote revisions are positively linked to order imbalances. For ex-
ample, Madhavan and Smidt (1993) argue that since trading volume tends to be
higher at the start and at the end of the trading day, order imbalances and wider
spreads will more likely occur at these times. Associated with trading activity,
Lee et al. (1993) nd that for a sample of NYSE stocks, spread widens with higher
trading volume while Hasbrouck and Soanos (1993) report that trades involving
NYSE specialists have a larger and faster impact on spreads than trades not in-
volving specialists. Chan et al. (1995) show that spreads of NYSE stocks exhibit
an intra-day pattern that is U-shaped, though the spread of NASDAQ stocks
decreases throughout the day while increasing slightly in the last 30 minutes of
trading. They attribute the dierence in intraday variation of spreads between
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks to the structural dierences between the market spe-
cialists and the market dealers. More specically, market specialists might need
7Among others, studies reporting U-shaped include, Brock and Kleidon (1992); McInish and
Wood (1992); Lee et al. (1993); Chan et al. (1995); Abhyankar et al. (1997); Ahn and Cheung
(1999); Chung et al. (1999); Freihube et al. (2001) as well as Ahn et al. (2002).
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to hold larger inventory positions during periods of intense trading activity, hence,
bid-ask spreads might widen at the start and end of trading, reecting the eleva-
tion in trading activity. Spreads may narrow however, since the market dealers,
with no special knowledge of order ow and little market power, will engage in
inventory management and desire to `go home at'. This prediction is consistent
with the theoretical work of Ho and Macris (1985).
Specialist market power based models link the intraday patterns in spreads to
the potential monopoly power of the specialist. Brock and Kleidon (1992) claim
that specialists on the NYSE are monopolistic market makers and they illustrate
that the demand for transaction is both less elastic and greater, at the open and
close of trading than at other times, for two reasons. First, the accumulation of
overnight information is likely to alter investors' optimal portfolio (for the open
period). Second, due to the imminent non-trading hours, optimal portfolio could
be dierent from the ones during continuous trading hours (for the close period).
The market makers, therefore, can discriminate during these periods by charging
higher prices. Consistent with this model, McInish and Wood (1992) and Chan et
al. (1995) report a U-shaped pattern in intraday spreads on the NYSE, arguing
that the inelastic periods at the opening and closing of the trading day, lets
specialists use their market power to extract economic rents from traders.
Information based models, relate the intraday pattern of the spread to the ad-
verse selection risk experienced by market makers, who are at an informationally
disadvantaged position relative to informed traders.8 Market makers will, there-
fore, keep their spreads suciently wide to ensure the gains made from trading
with liquidity traders adequately compensates for losses made from trading with
informed traders. Since information asymmetry is more likely during the opening
and closing periods of the trading day, spreads are highest during these periods.
However, Foster and Viswanathan (1994) argue that it is the competition between
8Information models are developed and investigated by several prior studies including
Copeland and Galai (1983); Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Kyle (1985); Easley and O'Hara
(1987, 1992); Hasbrouck (1988); Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 1994); Madhavan (1992) as
well as Admati and Peiderer (1988).
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informed traders that leads to higher volume, higher return variances and higher
spreads, at the beginning of trading day. Madhavan (1992) claims that since
trade resolves information asymmetry during early trading hours, spreads should
decrease throughout the trading day.
Many dierent eects associated with the intraday variation in spreads are
expected on both the cum- and ex- dividend days. Foucault (1999) develops a
theoretical model and argues that bid-ask spread increases at the close of trading
are negatively related to the level of competition among limit order traders. On
one hand, if higher waiting costs, because of an approaching trading deadline,
result in more aggressive pricing on the cum-dividend day, spread is anticipated
to be narrower on the cum-dividend day. On other hand, Frank and Jagannathan
(1998) and Jakob and Ma (2004) nd evidence of order imbalance around the
ex-dividend day. If immediacy concerns arise on cum- and ex- dividend days
from traders who seek to trade in the same direction, they are likely to widen
spreads because liquidity suppliers may not necessarily be able to keep up with
such one-sided demand. Finally, if there is increased demand for liquidity on cum-
and ex-dividend days, suppliers of that liquidity may increase the price for that
liquidity, which also can lead to higher spreads. While the net eect of cum-
dividend day tax-arbitrage driven trading on spreads is not clear, the eect of ex-
dividend day tax-arbitrage driven trading is expected to increase the spreads.
Volume Patterns
The intraday variation of trading volume tends to be U-shaped for many markets.9
Gerety and Mulberin (1992) report a U-shaped pattern in trading volumes for the
NYSE. They illustrate that the optimal closing portfolios may be dierent, due to
the imminent non-trading period, from the portfolios that are considered optimal
9such as, the Sweden market (Niemeyer and Sandas, 1994); the Finland market (Hedvall,
1994); the Paris market (Biais et al., 1995); the Toronto market (McInish and Wood, 1990); the
London market (Werner and Kleidon, 1996); the Hong Kong market (Ho and Cheung, 1991);
NASDAQ (Chan et al., 1995); NYSE (Gerety and Mulberin, 1992) and the Taiwan market (Lee
et al., 2001)
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during continuous trading hours. Some traders cannot bear overnight risk but
trade with those who can, which leads to high trade volumes at close of trade.
Brock and Kleidon (1992) argue that at the start of a trading day, traders again
modify their portfolios. This periodic uctuation in the demand for trading results
in higher volumes at the start and close of trading. Furthermore, institutional fund
managers tend to trade near the close of trading to match the market index, which
increases volume further.10
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) nd that trading volume around the ex-
dividend day is higher than trading volume during normal trading days.11 They
suggest that no abnormal trading volume should be observed under the Elton
and Gruber (1970) framework, whereas positive and negative abnormal volumes
should be observed under the Kalay (1984) framework. They argue that investors
with high marginal tax rates would desire to sell before the ex-dividend day and
investors with low marginal tax rates would desire to buy before the ex-dividend
day. If all categories of traders exactly `match' each other, (i.e., if the amount
of accelerated purchases (and sales) is exactly equal to the amount of delayed
purchases (and sales)), then no abnormal volume will be observed.
We therefore expect that, trading volume should be higher on both the cum-
and ex-dividend days. Moreover, since tax-arbitrageurs may avoid trading during
the rst part of the trading day since this period faces relatively higher adverse
selection costs, trading volume should be higher in the nal part of both the cum-
and ex-dividend trading days.
Volatility Patterns
Previous studies suggest a U-shaped pattern for the intraday variation in volatility
while Harju and Hussain (2011) report a reversed J shaped for four European
10Similar results have been reported by Jain and Joh (1988) as well as Lockwood and Linn
(1990).
11Evidence of this increase in trade size is reported by Michaely and Vila (1995); McDonald
(2001); Milonas and Travlos (2001); Rantapuska (2008) as well as Ainsworth and Lee (2011).
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stock market indices (namely, FTSE 100, DAX30, SMI and CAC40).12 Harju
and Hussain (2011) argue that at the start of the trading day volatility is high
before declining fast until 14:30 CET and after 14:30 CET, volatility displays a
clear level shift and then three major jumps points at 14:35 CET, 15:35 CET, and
16:05 CET. Harju and Hussain (2011) associated this series of level shifts and rise
in volatility to the programmed macro news announcements in the US atO 14:30
CET and 16:00 CET, and to the opening of the NYSE at 15:30 CET. Harju and
Hussain (2011) verify empirically that after 09:15, the intraday volatility pattern
presents a U-shaped after controlling for the NYSE.
Foucault (1999) and Foucault et al. (2005) show that price uncertainty can
increase because of large dierences in investor valuation of a stock, for instance,
dierent tax status. In this study we, therefore, expect an increase in price volatil-
ity on the cum-dividend days. Order imbalances are also a source of price volatility
and Frank and Jagannathan (1998) as well as Jakob and Ma (2004) nd evidence
of order imbalance around the ex-dividend day while Ainsworth et al. (2008) and
Jun et al. (2008) nd evidence of abnormal volume and abnormal price volatil-
ity around the ex-dividend day. This study argue that volatility increase on both
cum- and ex-dividend days as a result of order imbalance generate by tax-arbitrage
activity.
Furthermore, the bid-ask spreads, trading volumes and price volatility are
related to each other. Volume and volatility are jointly endogenous and co-vary
in response to the rate of information ow into the market as shown in theoretical
models, 13while the notion that volatility and volume move simultaneously was
suggested by Copeland (1976) as well as Jennings et al. (1981). More recently,
Foucault (1999) suggests a direct positive relationship between bid-ask spreads
and price volatility.
12Studies suggest a U-shaped pattern include Abhyankar et al. (1997); Andersen and Boller-
slev (1997); Gerety and Mulherin (1994); Harris (1986, 1989); McInish and Wood (1990); Werner
and Kleidon (1996); Lockwood and Linn (1990); Rogalski (1984); Smirlock and Starks (1986)
as well as Wood et al. (1985).
13See, Clark (1973); Epps and Epps (1976) as well Tauchen and Pitts (1983).
Chapter 4: Ex-dividend Day and Intraday Trading Patterns 139
The empirical evidence is perhaps not as clear. For instance, while Chordia et
al. (2001) report a negative relationship between volatility and spreads for NYSE
stocks and Rahman et al. (2002) nd a positive and statistically signicant though
numerically very small eect for volume and for bid-ask spreads on conditional
volatility for NASDAQ stocks. Nevertheless, similar positive relationships between
trading volume and volatility are reported by others.14 However, Worthington
and Higgs (2003) conclude that the inuence of bid-ask spreads on volatility is
relatively large, though the eect of volume on volatility is relatively small on the
S&P/ASX 50 index on the Australian stock market. Meanwhile, thoughWang and
Yau (2000) suggest a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and volatility
and a negative relationship between lagged trading volume and volatility, Harris
(1987) demonstrates that trading frequency should not aect volatility. On the
other hand, based on the intuition that informed traders engage in stealth trading
by dividing large trades into many smaller trades, Kyle (1985) documented a
positive relationship between trading frequency and volatility results which are
conrmed by Jones et al. (1994) and Huang and Masulis (2003).
4.3 Data
The dataset and the sample that are used in this chapter are the same as for
chapter 2.15 We describe here the additional data preparations steps performed
for the tick-by-tick high frequency data employed in this chapter. The trading
hours between 08:00 a.m. -16:30 p.m. are partitioned into 17 successive 30-
minute intervals. The spread, volume, and volatility for each stock i during each
5-minute interval n are computed rst, and in this manner, the time-series of
values individually for all stocks, and from which time series, the mean of each
variable for each 30-minute interval are computed as in Chung and Van Ness
(2001). Table 4.1 shows the mean values of spread, volatility and volume for each
14Positive relationships between volume and volatility are reported by Darrat et al. (2003);
Karpo (1987); Schwert (1989); Gallant et al. (1992) and Easley et al. (1997).
15A full description of this dataset and sample can be found in Chapter 1 Section 1.4
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30-minutes time interval during the ex-dividend and control weeks, and Table 4.2
shows the mean values of spread, volatility and volume for each 30-minutes time
interval during cum- and ex-dividend days, as well as for days 2 and 3 in the
control week, corresponding to the cum- and ex-dividend days respectively.
Table 4.1  Summary statistics on spread, volatility and volume.
This table reports the mean value of the spread, volatility and volume variables for 47 stocks from FTSE
100 index. These stocks satisfy the following selection criteria: They are listed on FTSE 100 index in the
period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on the Wednesday during the sample
period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or in control week. These mean values are
calculated for the control week and ex-dividend week.
Time Spread Volatility Volume Spread Volatility Volume
Cont.w Ex.w
08:00-08:30 0.373 0.001 1,762,964.896 0.395 0.001 1,571,077.774
08:30-09:00 0.216 0.000 1,355,917.860 0.205 0.000 1,332,688.499
09:00-09:30 0.194 0.000 1,318,159.859 0.224 0.000 1,369,165.627
09:30-10:00 0.194 0.000 1,314,403.085 0.187 0.000 1,306,116.554
10:00-10:30 0.187 0.000 1,432,010.042 0.171 0.000 1,319,881.206
10:30-11:00 0.177 0.000 1,253,107.647 0.214 0.000 1,266,510.751
11:00-11:30 0.190 0.000 1,290,096.710 0.180 0.000 1,242,043.719
11:30-12:00 0.185 0.000 1,220,107.816 0.182 0.000 1,164,141.797
12:00-12:30 0.178 0.000 1,204,907.447 0.182 0.000 1,232,454.230
12:30-13:00 0.170 0.000 1,202,735.792 0.165 0.000 1,126,972.692
13:00-13:30 0.169 0.000 1,200,999.209 0.169 0.000 1,160,169.877
13:30-14:00 0.187 0.000 1,258,638.363 0.181 0.000 1,170,680.296
14:00-14:30 0.167 0.000 1,263,940.561 0.181 0.000 1,182,768.383
14:30-15:00 0.161 0.000 1,251,445.599 0.170 0.000 1,249,750.034
15:00-15:30 0.151 0.000 1,247,769.673 0.171 0.000 1,251,504.322
15:30-16:00 0.163 0.000 1,281,705.677 0.172 0.000 1,257,643.976
16:00-16:30 0.173 0.000 1,416,581.371 0.187 0.000 1,409,108.936
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Table 4.2  Summary statistics on spread, volatility and volume
This table reports the mean value of the spread, volatility and volume variables for 47 stocks from FTSE
100 index. These stocks satisfy the following selection criteria: They are listed on FTSE 100 index in the
period between June 2007 and June 2008, they paid a cash dividend on the Wednesday during the sample
period and there is no bank holiday in their ex-dividend week or in control week. These mean values are
calculated for the day corresponding to the cum-dividend day but in the control week (the Tuesday day 2),
the cum-dividend day, the day corresponding to the ex-dividend day but in the control week (the Wednesday
day3) and the ex-dividend day.
Time Spread Volatility Volume Spread Volatility Volume
C-Cum Cum.day
08:00-08:30 0.418 0.001 1,781,789.355 0.335 0.001 1,533,062.782
08:30-09:00 0.244 0.000 1,308,838.444 0.200 0.001 1,362,421.332
09:00-09:30 0.184 0.000 1,251,694.286 0.218 0.000 1,498,644.695
09:30-10:00 0.152 0.000 1,146,573.553 0.151 0.000 1,267,291.734
10:00-10:30 0.178 0.000 1,185,143.402 0.142 0.000 1,299,825.413
10:30-11:00 0.158 0.000 1,256,316.913 0.169 0.000 1,241,392.825
11:00-11:30 0.194 0.000 1,225,850.554 0.165 0.000 1,225,092.681
11:30-12:00 0.166 0.000 1,301,674.489 0.166 0.000 1,115,944.898
12:00-12:30 0.175 0.000 1,243,151.625 0.176 0.000 1,156,310.603
12:30-13:00 0.161 0.000 1,189,972.787 0.177 0.000 1,201,228.656
13:00-13:30 0.204 0.000 1,387,760.209 0.155 0.000 1,108,575.713
13:30-14:00 0.173 0.000 1,345,925.915 0.144 0.000 1,161,805.569
14:00-14:30 0.140 0.000 1,254,634.649 0.160 0.000 1,143,542.972
14:30-15:00 0.165 0.000 1,310,371.289 0.177 0.000 1,325,535.097
15:00-15:30 0.141 0.000 1,247,225.365 0.144 0.000 1,232,310.579
15:30-16:00 0.153 0.000 1,268,876.845 0.149 0.000 1,257,954.696
16:00-16:30 0.165 0.000 1,490,702.520 0.201 0.000 1,422,204.157
C-Ex Ex.day
08:00-08:30 0.322 0.001 1,806,534.652 0.443 0.001 1,710,872.663
08:30-09:00 0.163 0.000 1,301,419.858 0.233 0.000 1,384,228.131
09:00-09:30 0.190 0.000 1,366,939.689 0.205 0.000 1,305,846.693
09:30-10:00 0.196 0.000 1,469,548.359 0.162 0.000 1,316,142.634
10:00-10:30 0.196 0.000 1,309,369.209 0.141 0.000 1,176,889.024
10:30-11:00 0.175 0.000 1,257,462.229 0.166 0.000 1,293,056.664
11:00-11:30 0.140 0.000 1,281,192.329 0.227 0.000 1,162,090.246
11:30-12:00 0.185 0.000 1,239,119.021 0.235 0.000 1,186,429.188
12:00-12:30 0.155 0.000 1,209,911.667 0.215 0.000 1,320,166.676
12:30-13:00 0.143 0.000 1,097,655.401 0.144 0.000 1,111,244.714
13:00-13:30 0.131 0.000 1,109,153.091 0.177 0.000 1,253,364.476
13:30-14:00 0.209 0.000 1,274,202.192 0.179 0.000 1,122,015.058
14:00-14:30 0.205 0.000 1,264,017.052 0.163 0.000 1,158,581.247
14:30-15:00 0.150 0.000 1,326,082.909 0.169 0.000 1,260,725.768
15:00-15:30 0.147 0.000 1,237,037.938 0.158 0.000 1,303,333.168
15:30-16:00 0.167 0.000 1,338,618.416 0.175 0.000 1,315,365.218
16:00-16:30 0.169 0.000 1,368,607.455 0.172 0.000 1,407,461.334
The intraday variation in the spread, volatility and volume are easier to digest
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from Figures, the previous variables are plotted, during each 30-minutes interval,
in Figures 4.1 to 4.12 showing the intraday variation across intervals.
Figure 4.1  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals- mean spread -
Cont.w.
Figure 4.2  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals -mean spread-
Ex.w.
.
Figure 4.3  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals -mean volatility
- Cont.w.
Figure 4.4  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals - mean volatility
- Ex.w
.
Figure 4.5  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals - mean volume
-Cont.w.
Figure 4.6  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals -mean volume -
Ex.w.
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Figure 4.7  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals -mean spread -
C-Cum and C-Ex.
Figure 4.8  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals- mean spread -
Cum.day and Ex.day.
.
Figure 4.9  Intraday variation across 17
thirty- minute time intervals- mean volatility-
C-Cum and C-Ex.
Figure 4.10  Intraday variation across
17 thirty- minute time intervals- mean
volatility- Cum.day and Ex.day.
.
Figure 4.11  Intraday variation across
17 thirty- minute time intervals- mean volume
- C-Cum and C-Ex.
Figure 4.12  Intraday variation across
17 thirty- minute time intervals- mean volume
-Cum.day and Ex.day.
In general, the intra-day pattern for spread and volatility show an L-shaped
pattern whereas volume presents a U-shaped pattern. Spread and volume in the
rst half an hour of cum-dividend day is lower than the spread and the volume in
the rst half an hour on ex-dividend day as well as, days 2 and 3 in the control
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week. The rst half hour of day 3 in the control week has also lower spread. There
is a need for a detailed analysis to test whether the ex-dividend day signicantly
aects the intraday patterns of spread, volatility and volume.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Variables
For each stock i at trade j and during a ve-minute time interval n, bid-ask spread,
price volatility and trade volume are specied as:1617
Spread(i,n) =

√
−cov(∆p(i,j)∆p(i,j−1)) when cov(∆pi,j∆pi,j−1) < 0
0 when cov(∆pi,j∆pi,j−1) ≥ 0
(4.1)
Volatility(i,n) =
√√√√ N∑
j=1
(R(i,j) −R(i,n))2
N − 1
(4.2)
Volume(i,n) =
∑N
j=1Q(i,j) ∗ P(i,j)
N
(4.3)
where:
p(i,j): is the price for stock i at trade j.
Q(i,j): is the number of share for stock i at trade j.
R(i,j): is the return for stock i at trade j.
R(i,n): is the mean return for stock i during the nth interval.
N : is the number of trades during the nth interval.
16We scale the volatility variable by multiply it by 1000
17We scale the volume variable by divide it by 1000
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4.4.2 Models
To reliably test whether the intraday variations in bid-ask spread, price volatility
and trade volume around the ex-dividend day diers from those for other days,
the Hansen (1982) Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure, together
with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity have
been employed. The GMM procedure is used since no particular structure can
be imposed on the error term.18The GMM procedure yields consistent parame-
ter estimates without a specic distribution assumption on the error term and
allows for arbitrary cross-correlation, serial correlation and heteroskedastic errors
(Andrews, 1991). For each stock i and ve-minute time interval n, the following
specication is estimated, using GMM:
Vi,n = αi,0 +
12∑
k=1
αi,kDi,k + εi,n (4.4)
where:
Vi,n: is the relevant variable for stock i during ve-minute time interval n. The
variables are spread, volatility and volume.
D1 ∼ D12: are time indicator variables. Each indicator represents one thirty-
minute time interval.
Indicator variables D1 ∼ D6 represent, in order, the rst six thirty-minute
time intervals of the trading day while variables D6 ∼ D12 represent, in order, the
last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The coecients for the
indicator variables, a1 ∼ a12 measure the dierences between the average value
during each respective thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle
of the trading day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m.
The GMM estimation involves determining a set of moment restrictions to
estimate the unknown coecients. The normal equation, of the regression corre-
sponding to equation (4.4), is used as the orthogonality conditions:
18The GMM technique has been applied in prior studies that have examined intraday patterns.
See Foster and Viswanathan (1993); Chan et al. (1995); Chan et al. (1995); Abhyankar et al.
(1997); Cai et al. (2004); and Frino et al. (2008).
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E[εi] =0 (4.5)
E[Dkεi] =0 k = 1, 2, ..., 12 (4.6)
For each company, there are 13 orthogonality conditions (one for the xed
eect and 12 for each thirty-minute time interval indicator) and 13 parameters to
be estimated. For 47 rms, there are 611 parameters to be estimated with 611
equations, so the system is just identied.19
Following Hansen (1982), if it is assumed that the error term is stationary and
ergodic, for a large sample size, the sample moments can be assumed to, therefore,
be close to the population moments. If gT (α̂) is a 611-vector parameter of sample
moments (where T is the number of observations) then for each company, gT (α̂)
includes:
19In doing so we are follow Bessembinder (1994) and take the explanatory variables as instru-
ments for the GMM estimation.
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O
gT (α̂) =
1
T
T∑
i=1

εi
D1εi
D2εi
D3εi
D4εi
D5εi
D6εi
D7εi
D8εi
D9εi
D10εi
D11εi
D12εi

(4.7)
where gT (α̂)→ 0 as T →∞.
To estimate α, the coecients on the indicator variables, for each company,
values that set the sample moment conditions as close to zero as possible are cho-
sen. The quadratic form g′Wg (that incorporates the Parzen kernel correction
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity) is minimized, where, W , a symmetric
weighting matrix, is a consistent estimator of the inverse of the asymptotic co-
variance matrix of
√
TgT (α̂) after adjusting for serial correlation.20 In this study,
the system is justidentied, so there is a need only to solve gT (α̂)=0 and GMM
produces the same coecient as in OLS, but with the standard errors now robust
to heteroskedasticity and to autocorrelation.
If DT denotes a consistent estimator of ∂gT (α̂)/∂α̂ and if we dene α̂ to be an
20Although several microstructure studies while employing the GMM procedure, apply the
Newey and West (1987) adjustment for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, we control for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Parzen kernel technique reported in Gallant
(1987) since Andrews (1991), reports that the Bartlett kernel applied by Newey and West
(1987) displays a higher bias and is 100% less ecient, asymptotically, than the Parzen kernel.
Following Andrews (1991), k1/5 is applied to calculate the lag truncation period.
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estimate of α , then
√
T (α̂− α) ∼ N(0, [D′TWDT ]−1) (4.8)
The signicance of the coecient estimates is tested using the covariance ma-
trix in the square brackets. For example, a signicant positive (negative) spread
coecient α1 would mean that the spreads are higher (lower) for the interval
(08:00 a.m. - 08:30 a.m.) than the middle of the day (11:00 a.m. -13:30 p.m.).
Estimations in this chapter are produced in three dierent stages, for the
ex-dividend and control weeks, cum- and ex-dividend days, as well as for days
2 and 3 in the control week. Variables that are discussed in this chapter may
correlate across rms, therefore, in the rst stage, for each variable, equation
(4.4) is estimated simultaneously using GMM for all rms as one pool, as this
should give more ecient estimates by exploiting the cross-correlations in the
error term.21
In the second stage, having determined that there are signicant variations in
the sample, for each variable, equation (4.4) is estimated for each rm separately
to pinpoint the source of the variation. The use of a test of an initial multivariate
hypothesis, followed by a test of a univariate hypothesis is an accepted procedure
to avoid nding spurious signicance (see, for example, Savin, 1980, 1984 and
Schee, 1977).22 Then, for each variable, the GMM coecients are stacked across
all rms and the mean values are calculated for each thirty-minute time interval in
the ex-dividend and control weeks, cum- and ex-dividend days, as well as for days
2 and 3 in the control week. Lastly, a t-test is conducted to determine whether
the regression coecients are signicantly dierent from zero.
21For example, when a rm has a large trading volume on one day, other rms could have
large trading volumes on that day as well.
22If the univariate test is used directly, the rejection region of the tests should partition to
account for a number of hypotheses that are examined.
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Many previous literatures attempt to measure and decompose trading costs
into dierent components such as an adverse selection, order processing cost,
and inventory cost (e.g., Glosten, 1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Stoll, 1989;
Hasbrouck, 1991a; Amihud, 2002). The theoretical models of Glosten (1989), Kyle
(1985), and Easley and O'Hara (1987) and the empirical analysis of Glosten and
Harris (1988) suggest that the liquidity eects of asymmetric information are most
likely to be captured in the price impact of a trade. Following previous literature,
(e.g., Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Stoll, 1989; Hasbrouck,
1991a; Lin et al., 1995), we construct a price impact measure based on Amihud
(2002). Amihud (2002) proposes the ratio of absolute return to dollar trading
volume as a measure of illiquidity. Our price impact measure is a modied version
of the Amihud (2002) measure, where our impact measure is a weighted average
absolute return instead of straight averge return. Previous studies document
a strong positive relation between the Amihud (2002) measure and the high-
frequency price impact benchmark e.g. Hasbrouck (2009), Goyenko, Holden, and
Trzcinka (2009).
In the last stage, we classify the rms in to two approaches according to their
price impact. Firstly, rms are divided into three types: rms that are most
attractive targets for tax-arbitrage (low price impact) (Arbitrage) (AT-F), rms
that are least attractive targets for tax-arbitrage (high price impact) (Informa-
tion asymmetry) (IA-F), and rms that are neither (No classication) (NC-F).
Secondly, rms are divided into two types: rms that are most attractive targets
for tax-arbitrage (low price impact) (Arbitrage) (AT-F) and rms that are least
attractive targets for tax-arbitrage (high price impact) (Information asymmetry)
(IA-F).
Firms are classied by applying the following procedure. Firstly, the price
impact of each trade is calculated for each stock (i) during a ve-minute time
interval (n):23
23This benchmark is dened separately for order submission data and for order execution
data.
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Price Impact =
∑J
j=1
|Pi,j−Pi,j−1|∗Qi,j∑J
j=1 Qi,j∑J
j=1 Pi,j
J
(4.9)
where:
Qi,j: is number of share for stock i at trade j.
Pi,j: is price of stock i at trade j.
J : is the number of observations during the nth interval.
We calculated the mean value of price impact in the control week for each
rm separately. We, then, divided the cross section of mean price impact into
three groups to classify our sample of rms into low, medium and high price
impact. Each category is denoted as follows, low price impact rms Classication
1-Arbitrage, medium price impact rms Classication 1- No classication and
high price impact rms Classication 1- Information asymmetry. For the second
approach of classication, we divided the cross section of mean price impact into
two groups to classify our sample of rms into low and high price impact. Each
category is denoted as follows, low price impact rms Classication 2- Arbitrage
(AT-F) and high price impact rms as Classication 2- Information asymmetry
(IA-F).
Furthermore, we seek to measure the eect that tax arbitrageurs might have on
trading activity on the cum- and ex- dividend days. Eects are evaluated in two
ways. Firstly, we evaluated the ratio of total monetary amount of all buy orders to
the total monetary amount of sell orders. Secondly, we evaluated the ratio of total
number of shares in the buy orders to the total number of share in the sell orders.
In both cases, we computed the natural logarithm of the ratios. We further argue
that such arbitrageurs will avoid implementing their trading strategies on those
rms that are likely to have high price impact and focus instead on the low impact
rms. Furthermore, we anticipate a timing preference among the arbitrageurs in
that they are more likely to avoid the extremes of the trading day (i.e. opening
and closing trading periods), focusing instead around the middle of the trading
day. Hence, our approach is designed to isolate those rms and those periods in
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which such tax-arbitrageurs are most likely to be found. We proceed as follows:
for each stock (i) and ve-minute time interval (n), the GMM estimation is run
for the following equation using two dierent dependent variables:
Vi,n = αi,0 +
12∑
k=1
αi,kDi,k (4.10)
+ bi,0Firmi +
12∑
k=1
bi,kDi,k ∗ Firmi
+ ci,0DCi +
12∑
k=1
ci,kDi,k ∗DCi +
12∑
k=1
ei,kDi,k ∗DCi ∗ Firmi
+ di,0DEi +
12∑
k=1
di,kDi,k ∗DEi +
12∑
k=1
hi,kDi,k ∗DEi ∗ Firmi
+ εi,n
where:
D1 ∼ D12: are time indicator variables. Each indicator represents one thirty-
minute time interval.
Firmi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 if rm classify as high price
impact rms and 0 if rm classify as low price impact rms.
DCi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on cum-dividend day and 0
otherwise.
DEi: is an indicator variable takes value of 1 on ex-dividend day and 0 other-
wise.
The two dependent variables are dened for each stock (i) during a ve-minute
time interval (n) as follows:
Monetary Ratio = ln
(∑N
n=1 Pi,j,B ∗Qi,j,B∑N
n=1 Pi,jS ∗Qi,j,S
)
(4.11)
Number Ratio = ln
(∑N
n=1Qi,j,B∑N
n=1Qi,j,S
)
(4.12)
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where:
Qi,j,B: is number of share for stock (i) at trade (j) if the trade is buy order.
Qi,j,S: is number of share for stock (i) at trade (j) if the trade is sell order.
Pi,j,B: is price of stock (i) at trade (j) if the trade is buy order.
Pi,j,S: is price of stock (i) at trade (j) if the trade is sell order.
Indicator variables D1 ∼ D6 represent, in order, the rst six thirty-minute
time intervals of the trading day while variables D6 ∼ D12 represent, in order, the
last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The coecients for the
indicator variables,
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a1 ∼ a12 measure the dierences between the average value during each respective
thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle of the trading
day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m., for low price impact rms.
b1 ∼ b12 measure the dierences between the average value during each respective
thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle of the trading
day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m., for high price impact rms.
c1 ∼ c12 measure the dierences between the average value during each respective
thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle of the trading
day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m., for low price impact rms, on
cum-dividend day.
d1 ∼ d12 measure the dierences between the average value during each respective
thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle of the trading
day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m., for low price impact rms, on
ex-dividend day.
e1 ∼ e12 measure the dierences between the average value during each respective
thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle of the trading
day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m., for high price impact rms, on
cum-dividend day.
h1 ∼ h12 measure the dierences between the average value during each respective
thirty-minute interval and the average value for the middle of the trading
day, between 11:00 a.m. - 13:30 p.m., for high price impact rms, on
ex-dividend day.
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Table 4.3 reports results of GMM estimation of model (4.10).24,25,26
Table 4.3  GMM estimation of intraday variation in the ratio of total monetary amount of all buy
orders to the total monetary amount of sell orders
The table presents the coecient from estimating model (4.10) for all rms as one pool for the ratio of total
monetary amount of all buy orders to the total monetary amount of sell orders. The model is estimated
using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time AT-F IA-F AT-F/
Cum.day
AT-F/
Ex.day
IA-F/
Cum.day
IA-F/
Ex.day
08:00-08:30 -0.023 -0.018 0.004 0.115** -0.033 0.004
08:30-09:00 -0.026 -0.011 0.059 0.059 -0.105* 0.112*
09:00-09:30 -0.01 -0.019 0.011 0.118** 0.015 -0.07
09:30-10:00 -0.013 -0.007 -0.055 0.247*** 0.014 0.06
10:00-10:30 -0.007 0.005 0.109 0.039 0.046 -0.018
10:30-11:00 0.033 -0.057* -0.155* 0.121** -0.055 0.012
13:30-14:00 0.004 0.042 -0.056 0.137*** -0.145** -0.032
14:00-14:30 0.014 0.023 -0.013 0.077 -0.024 -0.015
14:30-15:00 -0.031** 0.009 0.013 0.073* 0.000 0.136***
15:00-15:30 -0.007 -0.009 0.070* -0.006 -0.003 0.073
15:30-16:00 0.035** -0.079*** 0.116** 0.024 0.003 0.027
16:00-16:30 0.016 -0.024 0.039* -0.019 -0.024 0.058
Indicators 0.025*** -0.022* -0.023 -0.070*** 0.011 0.052
For low price impact rms on cum-dividend days, the log ratio of buy vol-
ume to sell volume (monetary ratio) has signicantly positive coecients in the
nal one and a half hours. For low price impact rms on ex-dividend day, the
monetary ratio has signicantly positive coecients in most of the thirty minute
time interval during the rst half of the trading day. The implication here is a
signicant impact of tax-arbitrageurs trading activities towards the end of cum-
dividend days and beginning of ex-dividend days. As the cum-dividend trading
deadline approaches, the trading activities of the tax-arbitrageurs increase. The
results also indicate that the liquidity suppliers try to unwind their position they
had on cum-dividend days during the rst half of those trading days.27
24Since the GMM estimation does not show much variation between Monetary and Number
ratios, only the results for Monetary ration are further reported.
25AT-F: low price impact rms
26IA-F: high price impact rms
27We arrive at similar conclusions when we employ dierence-in-dierence estimation instead
of GMM.
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4.5 Results
The results of the models presented in the methodology section are as follows.
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 reports results of model (4.4) using the data for all rms
as one pool whereas Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 reports results for the mean value of
the rm-by-rm GMM estimation of model (4.4).
Table 4.4  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume
The table presents the coecient from estimating model (4.4) for all rms as one pool for spread, volatility
and volume separately over the ex-dividend week and the control week. The independent variables are
indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is
estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.230*** 4.940*** 13.725*** 0.203*** 5.218*** 20.032***
08:30-09:00 0.039*** 1.466*** 7.919*** 0.034*** 1.508*** 8.570***
09:00-09:30 0.029*** 0.903*** 6.928*** 0.028*** 0.691*** 6.775***
09:30-10:00 0.027** 0.426* 5.612*** 0.013 0.326*** 4.407***
10:00-10:30 0.005 -0.053 5.637*** -0.004 -0.156 8.309***
10:30-11:00 0.013 0.184 3.072** 0.007 0.329** 4.083***
13:30-14:00 -0.002 -0.087 2.720** -0.016** -0.099 2.166*
14:00-14:30 -0.012* -0.094 0.921 -0.029*** -0.344*** 2.248*
14:30-15:00 -0.019** -0.651*** 6.682*** -0.025*** -0.417*** 3.352***
15:00-15:30 -0.015** -0.362* 8.410*** -0.022*** -0.175* 7.456***
15:30-16:00 -0.022*** -0.462** 7.189*** -0.020*** -0.180 7.562***
16:00-16:30 -0.013** -0.224 17.445*** -0.011* -0.068 16.117***
Constant 0.118*** 4.901*** 52.247*** 0.121*** 3.531*** 59.407***
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Table 4.5  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume
The table presents the coecient from estimating model (4.4) for all rms as one pool for spread, volatility
and volume separately over the cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week.
The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of
the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure
together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The
signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.217*** 5.564*** 8.440*** 0.170*** 4.988*** 12.202***
08:30-09:00 0.003 1.226*** 6.837*** 0.050*** 2.024*** 0.233
09:00-09:30 0.048 1.050*** 9.681*** 0.035* 0.745** 1.832
09:30-10:00 0.007 -0.005 6.813*** -0.002 0.560** -2.188
10:00-10:30 0.021 0.342 6.476** -0.017 0.063 -2.714
10:30-11:00 -0.005 -0.005 4.582* 0.021 0.933*** 5.914**
13:30-14:00 -0.023 -0.139 2.539 -0.035*** 0.088 0.841
14:00-14:30 -0.026* -0.333 0.184 -0.038*** -0.201 3.528
14:30-15:00 -0.034*** -0.150 11.151*** -0.031*** -0.289 4.380**
15:00-15:30 -0.034** 0.069 8.285*** -0.012 -0.234 6.149***
15:30-16:00 -0.027** -0.134 8.564*** -0.031*** -0.502** 6.208***
16:00-16:30 -0.022 -0.253 18.029*** -0.011 -0.043 19.750***
Constant 0.096*** 3.323*** 57.970*** 0.154*** 4.030*** 53.498***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.241*** 4.976*** 19.568*** 0.228*** 5.429*** 24.769***
08:30-09:00 0.044*** 1.094*** 5.392 0.010 1.347*** 9.969***
09:00-09:30 0.022 0.540*** 5.565 0.027* 1.161*** 7.988***
09:30-10:00 0.028 0.227** 2.146 -0.010 0.096 8.250***
10:00-10:30 -0.023* 0.051 -1.305 -0.016 -0.180 8.370***
10:30-11:00 0.008 0.053 4.250 -0.013 0.261 7.140***
13:30-14:00 0.003 0.072 -1.769 0.014 0.274 3.145
14:00-14:30 -0.001 -0.254** -0.997 -0.022* -0.347* 2.246
14:30-15:00 -0.025** -0.292*** 6.476 -0.026** -0.549*** 6.169**
15:00-15:30 -0.025* -0.218** 8.216* -0.021* -0.189 6.954***
15:30-16:00 -0.011 -0.378*** 6.848 -0.005 -0.461** 10.823***
16:00-16:30 -0.003 -0.195* 15.378*** -0.002 0.144 16.633***
Constant 0.161*** 3.864*** 92.779*** 0.087*** 3.059*** 62.670***
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Table 4.6  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) for rm by rm for spread, volatility
and volume separately over the ex-dividend week and the control week. The independent variables are
indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is
estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.234*** 4.886*** 13.160*** 0.206*** 5.063*** 18.815***
08:30-09:00 0.037*** 0.899** 7.655*** 0.033*** 1.710*** 8.111***
09:00-09:30 0.029** 0.454** 6.596*** 0.029** 0.610*** 6.600***
09:30-10:00 0.028 0.147 5.204** 0.015 0.200 4.483*
10:00-10:30 0.003 -0.107 5.526*** -0.003 -0.256 8.332***
10:30-11:00 0.013 -0.024 3.103** 0.006 0.603 3.877***
13:30-14:00 -0.002 0.035 2.489 -0.016* -0.128 1.933
14:00-14:30 -0.013 -0.358 0.625 -0.029*** -0.422** 2.191*
14:30-15:00 -0.020** -0.425 6.319*** -0.025*** -0.473*** 3.065*
15:00-15:30 -0.014* -0.275* 8.185*** -0.022*** -0.165 7.334***
15:30-16:00 -0.022** -0.456** 6.929*** -0.021*** -0.116 7.432***
16:00-16:30 -0.014 -0.278 17.137*** -0.012* -0.021 15.961***
Constant 0.179*** 5.094*** 89.309*** 0.169*** 4.977*** 90.114***
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Table 4.7  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) for rm by rm for spread, volatility
and volume separately over the cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week.
The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of
the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure
together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The
signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.233*** 5.747*** 7.862* 0.172*** 5.216*** 12.137**
08:30-09:00 0.004 1.237*** 6.874* 0.050** 2.172*** 0.026
09:00-09:30 0.060 0.890** 9.401** 0.045** 1.101*** 2.105
09:30-10:00 0.012 0.093 6.574* 0.001 0.773*** -2.465
10:00-10:30 0.023 0.409** 6.552** -0.014 0.214 -2.603
10:30-11:00 -0.007 -0.033 5.387 0.025 0.859** 5.721
13:30-14:00 -0.024 -0.075 2.341 -0.034* 0.051 0.695
14:00-14:30 -0.026 -0.288 -0.135 -0.035*** -0.073 3.460
14:30-15:00 -0.034** 0.003 10.758*** -0.027** -0.075 4.292
15:00-15:30 -0.041** -0.225 8.133** -0.007 0.057 6.078*
15:30-16:00 -0.031* -0.314 8.298*** -0.025*** -0.255 6.039*
16:00-16:30 -0.021 -0.243 17.763*** -0.007 0.095 19.767***
Constant 0.186*** 4.842*** 88.544*** 0.167*** 4.594*** 92.068***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.253*** 5.251*** 20.037*** 0.227*** 5.273*** 24.981***
08:30-09:00 0.049** 1.670*** 4.956 0.011 1.325*** 10.138**
09:00-09:30 0.025 1.036*** 5.209 0.025** 0.993*** 7.623*
09:30-10:00 0.034 0.664* 1.652 -0.011 0.118 7.864
10:00-10:30 -0.020 0.214 -1.276 -0.018 -0.339 8.161**
10:30-11:00 0.012 0.454 5.251 -0.017 -0.222 7.277**
13:30-14:00 0.002 0.051 -1.563 0.011 0.237 2.967
14:00-14:30 -0.001 0.112 -0.998 -0.023 -0.467* 2.058
14:30-15:00 -0.022 -0.344 7.295* -0.028* -0.650*** 5.992
15:00-15:30 -0.024 -0.198 8.427** -0.025*** -0.376** 6.883*
15:30-16:00 -0.009 -0.215 7.972** -0.004 -0.377** 10.515***
16:00-16:30 -0.002 -0.033 16.206*** -0.010 -0.343 16.389***
Constant 0.177*** 4.681*** 91.655*** 0.162*** 4.670*** 91.880***
The results are also presented graphically. Figures4.13 and 4.14 present results
for the spread model when the sample is all rms and when estimated rm-by-rm
respectively.
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Figure 4.13  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads- across the rst six and the last six
thirty- minute time intervals -All rms as one pool
Figure 4.14  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads - across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -rm by rm
For the spread model reported in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, Table 4.6, and Table 4.7,
the rst six thirty-minute time intervals are generally positive and the last six
thirty-minute time intervals are negative. Consistent with Chan et al. (1995);
McInish and Van Ness (2002) and Madhavan (1992) who nd that spread is the
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highest during the opening hours, and then declines until the market closes, we
nd that, the results suggest spread, for a sample of FTSE 100 rms, shows an
L-shaped pattern.
On the cum-dividend day the spread from 13:30 p.m. till the end of the trading
day records the lowest value compared with the ex-dividend and control weeks,
ex-dividend day, as well as for days 2 and 3 in the control week. This low spread on
the second half of the cum-dividend day could be explained by the cum-dividend
day trading deadline. As this deadline approaches, competition between traders
increases, leading to lower spread. Furthermore, out of twelve thirty-minute time
intervals, six reports the highest spread value on the ex-dividend day compared
with the ex-dividend and control weeks, cum- dividend day, as well as for days 2
and 3 in the control week. In the absence of a trading deadline on the ex-dividend
day, traders can submit less aggressive orders leading to wider spreads.
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 illustrate the results for the volume models for the sample
of all rms and for rm-by-rm cases, respectively.
Figure 4.15  GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume  across the rst six and the last six
thirty- minute time intervals -All rms as one pool
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Figure 4.16  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -rm by rm
For the volume model reported in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, Table 4.6, and Table 4.7,
most of the thirty-minute time intervals are positive. Consistent with studies in
other markets,28 we nd that the intraday volume for a sample of FTSE 100 stocks
shows a U-shaped pattern.
The volume in the rst half hour of trading on the cum-dividend day is lower
than the volume in the rst half an hour for the ex-dividend and control weeks,
the ex-dividend day, as well as for days 2 and 3 in the control week. However,
the volume during the rest of the cum-dividend day has relatively higher value in
comparison with the ex-dividend and control weeks, with the ex-dividend day, as
well as for days 2 and 3 in the control week. The traders on the cum-dividend
day may skip the rst half an hour and trade during the rest of the cum-dividend
day to avoid trading with the informed traders. Moreover, we nd that as the
cum-dividend trading deadline approaches, trading volume becomes much higher.
Furthermore, the volume on the ex-dividend day is low between 08:30 a.m. - 11:00
a.m. and between 13:30 p.m. - 14:30 p.m. The constant term for the ex-dividend
28See Sweden (Niemeyer and Sandas, 1993); Finland (Hedvall, 1994); Paris (Biais et al., 1995);
Toronto (McInish and Wood, 1990); London (Werner and Kleidon, 1996); Hong Kong (Ho and
Cheung, 1991); NASDAQ (Chan et al., 1995); NYSE (Gerety and Mulberin, 1992) and Taiwan
(Lee et al., 2001).
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day volume model has signicantly the highest value (92.779) in comparison with
the ex-dividend and control weeks, cum-dividend day, as well as for days 2 and 3
in the control week. Similarly to the cum-dividend day, traders on the ex-dividend
day might also avoid trading during the early hours of the trading day.
Figures 4.17 and 4.18 illustrate the results for the volatility models for the
sample of all rms and for rm-by-rm cases, respectively.
Figure 4.17  GMM estimation of intraday variation in volatility  across the rst six and the last six
thirty- minute time intervals -All rms as one pool
Figure 4.18  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volatility- across the rst six
and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -rm by rm
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For the volatility model reported in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, Table 4.6, and Ta-
ble 4.7, most of the rst six thirty-minute time intervals are generally positive
and most of the last six thirty-minute time intervals are negative. We nd that,
the results suggest volatility, for a sample of FTSE 100 rms, shows an L-shaped
pattern.
There is an eect of the ex-dividend day on the intraday patterns of spread
and volume. The high waiting cost of no-trade on the cum-dividend day increases
the competition between traders, resulting in higher volumes and lower spreads.
The absence of trading deadlines on the ex-dividend day helps traders execute
their orders with better prices leading to a wider spread. Furthermore, traders
on the cum- and ex- dividend days may avoid the information eects associated
with market opening trading. They may instead trade during the middle of the
trading day.
Table 4.8, Table 4.9, Table 4.10, Table 4.11, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 report,
from employing the rst classication, the mean values of the results from a GMM
estimation for the rm-by-rm case of model (4.4) by Arbitrage, Information
asymmetry and the No classication types.
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Table 4.8  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the rst type
(Arbitrage) from classication 1 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the ex-dividend week and
the control week. The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute
time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.152*** 3.110*** 19.618*** 0.134*** 3.480*** 27.698***
08:30-09:00 0.024* 0.739*** 11.638*** 0.011** 0.665*** 11.453***
09:00-09:30 0.024** 0.591*** 6.491** 0.000 0.392*** 7.347*
09:30-10:00 0.011 0.190* 8.913** -0.002 0.227*** 5.499
10:00-10:30 0.001 0.083 8.003*** -0.009 -0.084 12.137**
10:30-11:00 0.004 0.030 4.874*** 0.000 -0.026 5.100**
13:30-14:00 0.003 0.168* 1.985 -0.003 0.005 1.168
14:00-14:30 0.006 -0.003 2.867 -0.019** -0.246*** 1.698
14:30-15:00 0.002 0.078 10.768*** -0.015* -0.166*** 3.223
15:00-15:30 0.001 0.063 11.212*** -0.021*** -0.157* 7.027**
15:30-16:00 0.001 -0.039 9.523*** -0.005 -0.198** 7.599*
16:00-16:30 0.013** -0.037 23.657*** 0.000 -0.128 20.183***
Constant 0.133*** 3.135*** 113.377*** 0.145*** 3.311*** 117.269***
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Table 4.9  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the rst
type (Arbitrage) from classication 1 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the cum-dividend
day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week . The independent variables are indicator
variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated
using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.082*** 2.701*** 16.649** 0.124*** 3.225*** 20.985**
08:30-09:00 0.009 0.811*** 11.367 -0.002 1.018*** 2.443
09:00-09:30 0.013 0.568*** 2.919 -0.001 0.329 -0.677
09:30-10:00 -0.008 -0.051 11.083* -0.005 0.392* -3.294
10:00-10:30 -0.013 0.102 6.265 -0.026* -0.130 -3.408
10:30-11:00 -0.012 -0.072 6.986 -0.012 -0.105 13.508*
13:30-14:00 -0.016 0.059 4.667 -0.002 0.066 -1.608
14:00-14:30 0.010 0.236** 4.832 -0.031** -0.224 2.072
14:30-15:00 0.000 0.143 18.989*** -0.015 -0.117 5.615
15:00-15:30 -0.004 0.054 11.698** -0.028** -0.095 6.960
15:30-16:00 -0.005 -0.041 11.489* -0.009 -0.276* 6.165
16:00-16:30 0.028 0.070 24.804*** -0.004 -0.056 22.175***
Constant 0.126*** 3.024*** 111.323*** 0.147*** 3.26*** 118.29***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.160*** 3.439*** 26.584** 0.096*** 2.874*** 29.747***
08:30-09:00 0.020 0.572* 7.878 -0.001 0.483** 4.815
09:00-09:30 0.047 0.854** 8.209 0.003 0.291 10.704
09:30-10:00 -0.004 0.146 7.532 -0.009 0.054 5.277
10:00-10:30 -0.031 -0.122 -1.813 0.001 -0.338*** 6.230
10:30-11:00 -0.017 0.011 7.208 0.022 -0.066 0.732
13:30-14:00 0.003 -0.011 -4.166 0.010 -0.143 -1.081
14:00-14:30 -0.008 -0.201 5.957 -0.001 -0.48*** 1.000
14:30-15:00 0.014 0.004 16.116** -0.014 -0.324*** -0.830
15:00-15:30 0.001 0.085 12.388** -0.023** -0.422*** 0.008
15:30-16:00 0.019 -0.059 12.202* 0.008 -0.321* 6.559
16:00-16:30 0.007 -0.078 23.467*** 0.012 -0.258 17.832*
Constant 0.140*** 3.202*** 115.733*** 0.138*** 3.407*** 119.084***
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Table 4.10  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the second
type (Information Asymmetry) from classication 1 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the
ex-dividend week and the control week. The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and
last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.607* 10.460*** 5.224 0.386*** 8.476*** 8.430
08:30-09:00 0.103** 2.074*** 4.775 0.089** 2.470** 4.176
09:00-09:30 0.106 1.165* 8.382* 0.094 0.826 8.768**
09:30-10:00 0.127 1.101 3.881 0.061 1.032* 4.169
10:00-10:30 0.043 0.136 1.535 0.006 0.086 5.075
10:30-11:00 0.068 0.588 1.054 0.034 1.003 2.939
13:30-14:00 -0.046 0.125 3.101 -0.059 -0.180 0.744
14:00-14:30 -0.078 -0.213 -1.209 -0.060 -0.469 3.020
14:30-15:00 -0.038 -0.404 5.292* -0.043** -0.589 4.561
15:00-15:30 -0.068* -0.809 6.416 -0.012 -0.010 8.942***
15:30-16:00 -0.083* -0.908 4.388 -0.048* -0.561 7.481**
16:00-16:30 -0.086* -0.452 9.294** -0.028 0.002 8.882***
Constant 0.319** 8.749*** 51.302*** 0.260** 7.684*** 52.550***
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Table 4.11  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the second
type (Information Asymmetry) from classication 1 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the
cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week . The independent variables are
indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is
estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.491** 13.287*** 9.881 0.046 4.246*** 6.201
08:30-09:00 -0.001 2.163 10.395 0.114 1.701 -4.525
09:00-09:30 0.249 1.298 12.861* 0.144* 1.547 8.857
09:30-10:00 0.129 0.645 11.888* 0.053 1.908** -5.114
10:00-10:30 0.113 0.774 7.749* -0.042 0.236 -3.300
10:30-11:00 -0.052 0.129 7.632 0.122 2.543* -0.232
13:30-14:00 -0.095 -0.827 -0.777 -0.133 -0.252 -8.049
14:00-14:30 -0.146* -2.120* -8.612** -0.085 -0.820 -0.460
14:30-15:00 -0.103** -1.184** 4.768 -0.074 -0.570 2.663
15:00-15:30 -0.162* -1.274 1.444 0.058 -0.541 3.462
15:30-16:00 -0.107 -1.737** 2.690 -0.075** -1.112** -2.029
16:00-16:30 -0.201* -2.621** 2.816 -0.013 -0.041 5.741
Constant 0.365** 10.111*** 51.177*** 0.284** 8.373*** 57.000***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.712 8.294** 3.829 0.582** 12.164*** 2.945
08:30-09:00 0.160* 3.400* -2.274 0.036 2.878** 15.810
09:00-09:30 0.031 1.920* 7.394 0.108** 2.288*** 11.379
09:30-10:00 0.145** 2.870* 1.324 -0.057 -0.152 19.494
10:00-10:30 0.026 0.951 2.853 -0.070 -0.910 11.649
10:30-11:00 0.103 1.568 -3.683 -0.109 0.151 14.924**
13:30-14:00 -0.062 1.108 7.099 -0.027 0.907 4.992
14:00-14:30 0.020 2.364 -5.338 -0.078 -0.305 6.078*
14:30-15:00 -0.086 0.072 -1.004 -0.077 -1.238 11.007**
15:00-15:30 -0.108 -0.814** 3.636 -0.034** -0.705 8.137***
15:30-16:00 -0.062** 0.165 3.103 -0.030 -0.218 6.907*
16:00-16:30 -0.051 0.509 6.614 -0.077 -0.401 9.705*
Constant 0.288** 7.778*** 51.652*** 0.253*** 7.399*** 50.263***
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Table 4.12  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the
third type (No-classication) from classication 1 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the
ex-dividend week and the control week. The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and
last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.166*** 4.562*** 8.539** 0.215*** 5.505*** 12.206*
08:30-09:00 0.022 0.552 3.856** 0.036** 2.706*** 5.639*
09:00-09:30 0.000 -0.058 5.890 0.036*** 0.791 4.613
09:30-10:00 0.003 -0.358 1.026 0.014 -0.227 3.317*
10:00-10:30 -0.014 -0.467 4.200 0.000 -0.638 4.941*
10:30-11:00 -0.001 -0.382 1.774 0.001 1.229 2.734
13:30-14:00 0.013 -0.180 2.852 -0.013* -0.276 3.484
14:00-14:30 -0.006 -0.885 -1.413 -0.027** -0.628 2.440
14:30-15:00 -0.040** -1.087 1.044 -0.028** -0.816** 2.156
15:00-15:30 -0.009 -0.462 5.099** -0.027** -0.250 6.976***
15:30-16:00 -0.024** -0.783* 4.769** -0.028** 0.199 7.193***
16:00-16:30 -0.015 -0.508 12.389*** -0.019* 0.106 13.830***
Constant 0.172*** 5.910*** 76.048*** 0.157*** 5.859*** 72.649***
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Table 4.13  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the
third type (No-classication) from classication 1 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the
cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week . The independent variables are
indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is
estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.319* 6.165*** -4.460 0.300** 8.44*** 2.938
08:30-09:00 -0.001 1.359** -1.065 0.089* 3.995*** -1.021
09:00-09:30 0.027 1.128** 16.161* 0.058** 1.939*** 2.554
09:30-10:00 -0.021 0.014 -1.762 -0.017 0.730** -0.001
10:00-10:30 0.026* 0.649** 6.361 0.015 0.677 -1.147
10:30-11:00 0.023 -0.062 2.262 0.027 1.344 -2.010
13:30-14:00 0.002 0.118 0.798 -0.028 0.182 8.234
14:00-14:30 -0.014 -0.093 -2.573 -0.016 0.510 7.329
14:30-15:00 -0.046 0.404 2.926 -0.020 0.230 3.287
15:00-15:30 -0.030* -0.083 6.669 -0.011 0.564 6.172
15:30-16:00 -0.029 0.023 6.808* -0.023 0.202 9.899**
16:00-16:30 0.004 0.515 15.686** -0.008 0.371 23.470***
Constant 0.177*** 4.706*** 76.651*** 0.136*** 4.538*** 73.547***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.144** 6.220*** 19.192*** 0.230** 5.126*** 29.446**
08:30-09:00 0.034 2.316** 4.577 0.014 1.705*** 14.622**
09:00-09:30 -0.011 0.844 0.300 0.014 1.312** 1.509
09:30-10:00 0.030 0.272 -5.804 0.008 0.340 5.607
10:00-10:30 -0.029 0.307 -2.524 -0.018 -0.055 9.073
10:30-11:00 0.008 0.505 6.924 -0.026 -0.623* 12.452
13:30-14:00 0.036 -0.393 -2.272 0.031 0.424 7.522
14:00-14:30 -0.001 -0.584 -7.955* -0.027 -0.529 1.504
14:30-15:00 -0.041 -1.032** -0.214 -0.021* -0.803** 12.865
15:00-15:30 -0.016 -0.279 5.555 -0.022 -0.150 15.709***
15:30-16:00 -0.022 -0.619 4.789 -0.008 -0.533 17.758***
16:00-16:30 0.009 -0.243 11.323 -0.006 -0.431 17.747***
Constant 0.172*** 5.166*** 79.321*** 0.150*** 5.042*** 75.285***
Figures 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21 present the results for the spread model for the Ar-
bitrage type, Information asymmetry type and No classication type respectively.
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Figure 4.19  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Classication 1- Arbitrage
Figure 4.20  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Classication 1- Information asymmetry
Chapter 4: Ex-dividend Day and Intraday Trading Patterns 171
Figure 4.21  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Classication 1- No classication
Table 4.14, Table 4.15, Table 4.16 and Table 4.17 report the mean values of rm-
by-rm GMM estimation of model (4.4) for Arbitrage and Information asymmetry
types respectively from the second classication.
Table 4.14  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the rst
type (Arbitrage) from classication 2 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the ex-dividend week
and the control week. The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-
minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with
k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.159*** 3.110*** 17.230*** 0.145*** 3.480*** 26.561***
08:30-09:00 0.023** 0.739*** 9.151*** 0.012** 0.665*** 10.789***
09:00-09:30 0.019** 0.591*** 7.337** 0.012* 0.392*** 7.337**
09:30-10:00 0.008 0.190* 7.485*** 0.002 0.227*** 4.825
10:00-10:30 0.003 0.083 7.561*** -0.006 -0.084 10.678***
10:30-11:00 0.000 0.030 3.999*** 0.004 -0.026 5.650***
13:30-14:00 0.005 0.168* 3.081 -0.006 0.005 2.840
14:00-14:30 0.011* -0.003 1.860 -0.021*** -0.246*** 2.548
14:30-15:00 -0.004 0.078 7.811*** -0.017*** -0.166*** 2.856
15:00-15:30 -0.004 0.063 9.233*** -0.020*** -0.157* 7.070***
15:30-16:00 -0.004 -0.039 8.358*** -0.011** -0.198** 8.213***
16:00-16:30 0.010 -0.037 21.457*** -0.005 -0.128 19.594***
Constant 0.140*** 3.135*** 105.929*** 0.145*** 3.311*** 106.938***
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Table 4.15  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the rst
type (Arbitrage) from classication 2 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the cum-dividend
day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week . The independent variables are indicator
variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated
using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.101*** 2.701*** 12.658** 0.153*** 3.225*** 17.723***
08:30-09:00 0.013 0.811*** 10.395** 0.002 1.018*** 2.910
09:00-09:30 0.016 0.568*** 10.265* 0.010 0.329 1.654
09:30-10:00 -0.007 -0.051 9.533** -0.007 0.392* -2.084
10:00-10:30 -0.002 0.102 6.703* -0.019 -0.130 -1.771
10:30-11:00 -0.004 -0.072 5.360 0.001 -0.105 8.818
13:30-14:00 -0.011 0.059 3.303 -0.011 0.066 3.708
14:00-14:30 0.015 0.236** 1.466 -0.028** -0.224 5.043
14:30-15:00 -0.002 0.143 14.325*** -0.021 -0.117 3.248
15:00-15:30 -0.007 0.054 10.105** -0.025*** -0.095 6.862
15:30-16:00 -0.005 -0.041 11.412*** -0.016 -0.276* 8.719*
16:00-16:30 0.029** 0.070 24.785*** -0.011 -0.056 25.654***
Constant 0.128*** 3.024*** 104.289*** 0.147*** 3.260*** 106.419***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.147*** 3.439*** 24.750*** 0.109*** 2.874*** 33.524***
08:30-09:00 0.012 0.572* 5.968 0.002 0.483** 9.495
09:00-09:30 0.032 0.854** 5.813 0.009 0.291 8.966*
09:30-10:00 -0.012 0.146 4.247 -0.004 0.054 6.808
10:00-10:30 -0.026 -0.122 -1.840 0.005 -0.338*** 7.015*
10:30-11:00 -0.025** 0.011 7.553* 0.018 -0.066 6.635
13:30-14:00 0.007 -0.011 -2.955 0.011 -0.143 2.128
14:00-14:30 -0.004 -0.201 3.453 -0.008 -0.48*** 3.246
14:30-15:00 -0.004 0.004 12.110** -0.020* -0.324*** 6.946
15:00-15:30 -0.009 0.085 10.591** -0.018* -0.422*** 6.994
15:30-16:00 0.007 -0.059 11.772** -0.001 -0.321* 12.541***
16:00-16:30 0.002 -0.078 22.203*** 0.005 -0.258 19.102***
Constant 0.147*** 3.202*** 108.214*** 0.140*** 3.407*** 107.453***
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Table 4.16  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the second
type (Information Asymmetry) from classication 2 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the
ex-dividend week and the control week. The independent variables are indicator variables for the rst and
last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel correction for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Ex-dividend week Control week
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
08:00-08:30 0.418** 10.460*** 4.779 0.363*** 8.476*** 2.639
08:30-09:00 0.072* 2.074*** 5.205* 0.083*** 2.470** 3.001
09:00-09:30 0.053 1.165* 6.166* 0.072* 0.826 5.405**
09:30-10:00 0.076 1.101 0.322 0.044 1.032* 4.606**
10:00-10:30 0.003 0.136 1.632 0.003 0.086 3.750
10:30-11:00 0.047 0.588 2.012 0.012 1.003 0.499
13:30-14:00 -0.017 0.125 1.010 -0.042 -0.180 -0.304
14:00-14:30 -0.067** -0.213 -1.225 -0.050* -0.469 1.093
14:30-15:00 -0.058** -0.404 3.065 -0.045** -0.589 4.281
15:00-15:30 -0.039 -0.809 6.304** -0.028 -0.010 8.785***
15:30-16:00 -0.064** -0.908 3.677 -0.048** -0.561 6.642***
16:00-16:30 -0.069** -0.452 8.512*** -0.030* 0.002 7.611***
Constant 0.276*** 8.749*** 53.137*** 0.238*** 7.684*** 53.483***
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Table 4.17  GMM estimation of intraday variation in spread, volatility and volume.
The table presents the mean coecient from estimating model (4.4) rm by rm for all rms in the second
type (Information Asymmetry) from classication 2 for spread, volatility and volume separately over the
cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, day 2 and day 3 in the control week. The independent variables are
indicator variables for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is
estimated using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure together with the Parzen kernel
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with k1/5 lags. The signicant levels are dened as
follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Time Spread volatility volume Spread volatility volume
Cum-dividend day Day2
08:00-08:30 0.587** 13.287*** 0.731 0.222* 4.246*** -2.008
08:30-09:00 -0.022 2.163 1.573 0.165** 1.701 -6.475
09:00-09:30 0.180 1.298 9.893* 0.133** 1.547 5.074
09:30-10:00 0.063 0.645 -0.027 0.022 1.908** -2.534
10:00-10:30 0.090 0.774 7.396 -0.009 0.236 -3.770
10:30-11:00 -0.016 0.129 8.521 0.081* 2.543* -0.426
13:30-14:00 -0.064 -0.827 -0.681 -0.092 -0.252 -6.608
14:00-14:30 -0.137** -2.120* -2.489 -0.054 -0.820 -0.296
14:30-15:00 -0.124*** -1.184** 4.195 -0.045 -0.570 7.719*
15:00-15:30 -0.135** -1.274 4.702 0.038 -0.541 5.843
15:30-16:00 -0.104* -1.737** 2.055 -0.051** -1.112** 0.248
16:00-16:30 -0.158** -2.621** 2.573 0.002 -0.041 7.327
Constant 0.351*** 10.111*** 52.623*** 0.224*** 8.373*** 58.441***
Ex-dividend day Day3
08:00-08:30 0.527 8.294** 9.420* 0.530*** 12.164*** 6.806
08:30-09:00 0.141** 3.400* 1.978 0.028 2.878** 11.743*
09:00-09:30 0.013 1.920* 4.503 0.065* 2.288*** 4.898
09:30-10:00 0.148** 2.870* -3.642 -0.032 -0.152 11.517
10:00-10:30 -0.001 0.951 0.378 -0.077* -0.910 11.452
10:30-11:00 0.105** 1.568 0.027 -0.106** 0.151 8.564
13:30-14:00 -0.004 1.108 0.999 0.015 0.907 4.115
14:00-14:30 0.011 2.364 -10.059* -0.061* -0.305 -3.738
14:30-15:00 -0.063* 0.072 -2.854 -0.048 -1.238 4.058
15:00-15:30 -0.056 -0.814** 3.615 -0.044*** -0.705 6.144*
15:30-16:00 -0.044** 0.165 -0.786 -0.013 -0.218 5.470
16:00-16:30 -0.012 0.509 4.172 -0.046 -0.401 6.737*
Constant 0.255*** 7.778*** 55.773*** 0.227*** 7.399*** 56.846***
Figures 4.22 and 4.23 present results for the spread model for the Arbitrage
and Information asymmetry types respectively from the second classication.
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Figure 4.22  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Classication 2- Arbitrage
Figure 4.23  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in spreads- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Classication 2- Information asymmetry
For the Arbitrage type, in Figure 4.19, spread on the cum-dividend day has
the lowest value during the rst half an hour and the highest value during the last
half an hour of trading. The second classication conrms this result. Similar
patterns cannot be seen in the Information asymmetry or in the No classication
types in the rst classication and in the information asymmetry type in the
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second classication. The implication is that the arbitrager may seek to avoid
the relatively higher adverse selection costs of trading in the rst part of the day.
Figures 4.20 and 4.23 show that the low value of spread during the second half
of the day is related more to Information asymmetry. Figure 4.19 illustrates that
on the ex-dividend day, spread, from 08:00 a.m. till 9:30 a.m. and from 14:30
p.m. till 16:00 p.m., records the highest value in comparison with ex-dividend
and control weeks, cum- dividend day, as well as for days 2 and 3 in the control
week, conrming that the absence of the cum-dividend deadline motivates the
arbitrageur to trade less aggressively; consequently, the spread is wider.
Figures 4.24, 4.25 and 4.26 present the results for the volume model for Arbi-
trage type, Information asymmetry and No classication types respectively from
the rst classication.
Figure 4.24  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 1  Arbitrage
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Figure 4.25  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 1  Information asymmetry
Figure 4.26  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 1  No classication
Figures 4.27 and 4.28 present the result for the volume model for the Arbitrage
and Information asymmetry types respectively from the second classication.
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Figure 4.27  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 2  Arbitrage
Figure 4.28  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 2  Information asymmetry
Figures 4.24 and 4.27 show a high value for volume on the cum-dividend day
from 09:30 a.m. till the end of trading suggesting that high trading volumes
around the cum-dividend day is more related to rms that are the most attractive
to arbitrageurs. Moreover, in Figure 4.22 the ex-dividend day shows high trading
volumes. The suggestion here is that a high volume of rms that are the most
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attractive to arbitrageurs on cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day could be
related to tax-arbitrage trading strategy. A similar pattern is not seen for the
Information asymmetry and No classication types.
Figures 4.29, 4.30 and 4.31 present the results for the volatility model for
Arbitrage type, Information asymmetry and No classication types respectively
from the rst classication.
Figure 4.29  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 1  Arbitrage
Figure 4.30  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 1  Information asymmetry
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Figure 4.31  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 1  No classication
Figures 4.32 and 4.33 present the result for the volatility model for the Arbi-
trage and Information asymmetry types respectively from the second classica-
tion.
Figure 4.32  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 2  Arbitrage
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Figure 4.33  The mean of GMM estimation of intraday variation in volume- across the rst six and
the last six thirty- minute time intervals -classication 2  Information asymmetry
We can not see a signicant eect of the ex-dividend event on intraday pattern
of price volatility.
Finally, after distinguishing between rms that are the most attractive targets
for tax-arbitrage (Arbitrage) and those that are the least attractive targets for
tax-arbitrage (Information asymmetry), the conclusion is: There is high volume
and spreads on both the cum-dividend day and the ex-dividend days conrming
the eects of taxarbitrage strategies on the spreads and trade volumes around the
ex-dividend day. We report the dierences in the spreads on cum- and ex-dividend
days, but we cannot tell whether these dierences are statistically signicant just
from looking at them. We do not, at the present time, know whether we can test
for statistical signicance in this context .
4.6 Robustness Test
This section provides additional tests to examine the robustness of the evidence
presented above which documents, for rms that are most attractive target for
tax-arbitrageurs (Arbitrage rms), a narrow (wider) spread at rst (last) half an
hour of cum-dividend day, a wide spread at the beginning and the end of ex-
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dividend day and high trading volume from 9:30 am till the end of cum-dividend
day. For the robustness test, we rst expand our sample to all rms that are listed
on FTSE100 and have paid a cash dividend on any trading day between June 2007-
June 2008. We also recalculate the spread variables using equation (??). Then,
we apply dierences in dierences estimation using 167 ex-dividend events. The
robustness test divides the sample periods, which consists of cum-dividend day,
ex-dividend day and 10 days after ex-dividend days, into subsamples in order to
determine if the change in bid-ask spreads and volume presented in above tables
permanent through time and larger sample. The sample periods are divided into
two subsamples according to their price volatility: high price volatility rms (IA-
F) which is least attractive target for tax-arbitrageurs (84 rms) and low price
volatility rms (AT-F) which is most attractive target rms for tax-arbitrageurs
(83 rms). A full description how this classication has been done can be found
in section 4.4.2.
Table (4.18) reports the dierence in dierence estimation of model (4.4),
where the dependent variable is bid-ask spread in ve-minutes interval, for both
Arbitrage (AT-F) and Information asymmetry (IA-F) types over cum- and ex-
dividend days and 10- days after ex-dividend day.
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Table 4.18  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in spread
The table presents the coecient from estimating model (4.4) for all rms with low price volatility (Arbitrage
(AT-F) and high price volatility (Information asymmetry (IA-F) for spread variable over cum-dividend day
, ex-dividend day and 10 days after the ex-dividend day. The independent variables are indicator variables
for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the
dierences in dierence procedure. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Spread Middle
interval
(Mid)
AT-F
Treated
interval
(Tre)
AT-F
Middle
interval
(Mid)
IA-F
Treated
interval
(Tre)
IA-F
Di-
Mid&Tre
(AT-F)
Di-
Mid&Tre
(IA-F)
Di-
AT-F&
IA-F
(Tre)
Di-
AT-F&
IA-F
(Mid)
Di-in-
Di
Cum-dividend day
08:00-08:30 0.128 0.244 0.156 0.469 0.116*** 0.314*** 0.225*** 0.028*** 0.197***
08:30-09:00 0.128 0.155 0.156 0.226 0.027*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.028*** 0.043***
09:00-09:30 0.128 0.143 0.156 0.192 0.015 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.028*** 0.021
09:30-10:00 0.128 0.137 0.156 0.175 0.009 0.019** 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.010
10:00-10:30 0.128 0.137 0.156 0.177 0.009 0.022** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.013
10:30-11:00 0.128 0.133 0.156 0.173 0.005 0.017* 0.04*** 0.028*** 0.013
13:30-14:00 0.124 0.144 0.157 0.152 0.021** -0.004 0.008 0.033*** -0.025*
14:00-14:30 0.129 0.125 0.157 0.152 -0.004 -0.004 0.027*** 0.028*** -0.001
14:30-15:00 0.129 0.123 0.155 0.160 -0.006 0.005 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.011
15:00-15:30 0.130 0.122 0.154 0.162 -0.007 0.007 0.04*** 0.025*** 0.015
15:30-16:00 0.129 0.125 0.157 0.153 -0.003 -0.003 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.000
16:00-16:30 0.128 0.135 0.156 0.184 0.007 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.028*** 0.021
Ex-dividend day
08:00-08:30 0.134 0.240 0.163 0.320 0.106*** 0.158*** 0.081*** 0.029*** 0.052**
08:30-09:00 0.134 0.151 0.163 0.227 0.017* 0.064*** 0.076*** 0.029*** 0.047***
09:00-09:30 0.134 0.149 0.163 0.179 0.015 0.017* 0.03** 0.029*** 0.001
09:30-10:00 0.134 0.151 0.163 0.188 0.017 0.025** 0.036* 0.029*** 0.008
10:00-10:30 0.134 0.134 0.163 0.164 -0.001 0.001 0.031** 0.029*** 0.002
10:30-11:00 0.134 0.151 0.163 0.169 0.017* 0.006 0.018 0.029*** -0.011
13:30-14:00 0.133 0.138 0.161 0.171 0.005 0.010 0.032** 0.028*** 0.005
14:00-14:30 0.134 0.135 0.162 0.168 0.001 0.006 0.033** 0.028*** 0.006
14:30-15:00 0.135 0.130 0.164 0.156 -0.005 -0.008 0.026** 0.029*** -0.003
15:00-15:30 0.135 0.131 0.163 0.164 -0.004 0.001 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.005
15:30-16:00 0.134 0.136 0.164 0.156 0.003 -0.009 0.02* 0.031*** -0.011
16:00-16:30 0.134 0.155 0.163 0.167 0.021** 0.004 0.012 0.029*** -0.017
After Ex-dividend day
08:00-08:30 0.141 0.269 0.169 0.441 0.128*** 0.272*** 0.172*** 0.028*** 0.144***
08:30-09:00 0.141 0.166 0.169 0.239 0.025*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.028*** 0.045***
09:00-09:30 0.141 0.154 0.169 0.214 0.013*** 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.028*** 0.033***
09:30-10:00 0.141 0.162 0.169 0.204 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.028*** 0.014***
10:00-10:30 0.141 0.149 0.169 0.189 0.008** 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.013***
10:30-11:00 0.141 0.146 0.169 0.176 0.005 0.007** 0.03*** 0.028*** 0.002
13:30-14:00 0.140 0.145 0.165 0.181 0.005 0.016*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.011**
14:00-14:30 0.140 0.143 0.166 0.177 0.002 0.011*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.009*
14:30-15:00 0.141 0.140 0.169 0.168 -0.001 -0.001 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.000
15:00-15:30 0.142 0.136 0.171 0.159 -0.006* -0.012*** 0.023*** 0.029*** -0.006
15:30-16:00 0.141 0.140 0.171 0.158 -0.001 -0.014*** 0.018*** 0.03*** -0.013***
16:00-16:30 0.141 0.157 0.169 0.175 0.016*** 0.006* 0.018*** 0.028*** -0.01**
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Figures 4.34, 4.35 and 4.36 present the results graphically for the spread model
over Arbitrage rm, Information asymmetry rms and dierence in dierence
between both types respectively.
Figure 4.34  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in spread across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Arbitrage
Figure 4.35  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in spread across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Information asymmetry
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Figure 4.36  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in spread across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals
In Figure 4.36, the general picture is that the spread is wide at the start
of the day then it decreases throughout the trading day. However, the spread
on the cum-dividend day show an increase behaviour at the last half an hour.
The implication is that the liquidity suppliers take advantage of tax-arbitrager by
widening the spread on cum-dividend day, especially at the end of cum-dividend
day, conrming the GMM estimation results. Interestingly, Figures 4.36 presents
that the spread is low in the rst half an our on ex-dividend day. The suggestion
is that the liquidity suppliers are heavy currying their position from cum-dividend
day, so they try to unwind their position early in the morning accepting cheaper
prices. 29
Table 4.19 reports the dierence in dierence estimation of model (4.4 ), where
the dependent variable is trade volume in ve-minutes interval, for both Arbitrage
and Information asymmetry types over cum- and ex-dividend days and 10- days
after ex-dividend day.
29We arrive at similar conclusions when we examine the live actual spread.
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Table 4.19  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volume
The table presents the coecient from estimating model (4.4) for all rms with low price volatility (Arbitrage
(AT-F) and high price volatility (Information asymmetry (IA-F) for volume variable over cum-dividend day
, ex-dividend day and 10 days after the ex-dividend day. The independent variables are indicator variables
for the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the
dierences in dierence procedure. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Volume Middle
interval
(Mid)
AT-F
Treated
interval
(Tre)
AT-F
Middle
interval
(Mid)
IA-F
Treated
interval
(Tre)
IA-F
Di-
Mid&Tre
(AT-F)
Di-
Mid&Tre
(IA-F)
Di-AT-F&
IA-F (Tre)
Di-AT-
F& IA-F
(Mid)
Di-in-Di
Cum-dividend day
08:00-08:30 178.825 193.477 87.823 93.541 14.651*** 5.718 -99.935*** -91.002*** -8.933
08:30-09:00 178.825 193.926 87.823 85.136 15.1*** -2.687 -108.79*** -91.002*** -17.788***
09:00-09:30 178.825 186.783 87.823 83.697 7.958* -4.126 -103.086*** -91.002*** -12.083*
09:30-10:00 178.825 181.202 87.823 80.335 2.376 -7.488* -100.867*** -91.002*** -9.865
10:00-10:30 178.825 175.643 87.823 80.720 -3.183 -7.103 -94.923*** -91.002*** -3.921
10:30-11:00 178.825 168.935 87.823 81.662 -9.89** -6.161 -87.273*** -91.002*** 3.729
13:30-14:00 182.599 163.733 88.759 84.056 -18.866*** -4.703 -79.676*** -93.839*** 14.163**
14:00-14:30 179.461 176.262 89.234 82.059 -3.199 -7.175 -94.203*** -90.227*** -3.976
14:30-15:00 176.192 189.331 87.234 90.164 13.139*** 2.931 -99.167*** -88.959*** -10.208
15:00-15:30 177.896 182.533 87.160 90.457 4.637 3.297 -92.076*** -90.736*** -1.340
15:30-16:00 177.976 182.216 86.717 92.195 4.241 5.478 -90.022*** -91.259*** 1.237
16:00-16:30 178.825 215.110 87.823 99.945 36.284*** 12.122** -115.164*** -91.002*** -24.162***
Ex-dividend day
08:00-08:30 181.506 209.733 87.816 93.760 28.227*** 5.945 -115.973*** -93.69*** -22.283***
08:30-09:00 181.506 187.290 87.816 87.044 5.784 -0.771 -100.246*** -93.69*** -6.556
09:00-09:30 181.506 180.752 87.816 91.864 -0.754 4.048 -88.888*** -93.69*** 4.802
09:30-10:00 181.506 183.366 87.816 84.066 1.860 -3.750 -99.3*** -93.69*** -5.610
10:00-10:30 181.506 170.658 87.816 82.837 -10.847** -4.979 -87.822*** -93.69*** 5.868
10:30-11:00 181.506 180.948 87.816 78.787 -0.557 -9.029** -102.162*** -93.69*** -8.472
13:30-14:00 183.683 172.732 88.735 84.069 -10.951** -4.666 -88.663*** -94.949*** 6.285
14:00-14:30 184.026 171.427 88.976 83.144 -12.599*** -5.832 -88.283*** -95.05*** 6.767
14:30-15:00 181.272 182.438 87.617 88.593 1.166 0.976 -93.845*** -93.654*** -0.190
15:00-15:30 179.080 191.203 86.944 91.307 12.123*** 4.364 -99.896*** -92.136*** -7.760
15:30-16:00 179.462 189.655 86.799 91.854 10.193** 5.055 -97.801*** -92.663*** -5.138
16:00-16:30 181.506 207.886 87.816 99.308 26.38*** 11.492** -108.578*** -93.69*** -14.888***
After Ex-dividend day
08:00-08:30 174.868 185.632 85.999 87.781 10.764*** 1.781 -97.851*** -88.869*** -8.982***
08:30-09:00 174.868 177.103 85.999 87.364 2.235* 1.365 -89.739*** -88.869*** -0.870
09:00-09:30 174.868 173.594 85.999 85.032 -1.274 -0.968 -88.563*** -88.869*** 0.306
09:30-10:00 174.868 168.177 85.999 81.997 -6.691*** -4.002*** -86.179*** -88.869*** 2.689
10:00-10:30 174.868 179.879 85.999 85.300 5.011*** -0.700 -94.58*** -88.869*** -5.711**
10:30-11:00 174.868 168.281 85.999 83.279 -6.587*** -2.721** -85.003*** -88.869*** 3.866**
13:30-14:00 176.132 169.781 86.624 83.468 -6.351*** -3.156** -86.313*** -89.509*** 3.196*
14:00-14:30 176.039 170.174 86.343 84.603 -5.866*** -1.740 -85.571*** -89.697*** 4.126**
14:30-15:00 173.901 178.724 85.955 86.176 4.822*** 0.222 -92.547*** -87.947*** -4.6**
15:00-15:30 174.244 177.358 85.753 86.973 3.114** 1.220 -90.385*** -88.491*** -1.894
15:30-16:00 174.020 178.252 85.317 88.700 4.231*** 3.383*** -89.552*** -88.703*** -0.849
16:00-16:30 174.868 201.013 85.999 97.203 26.144*** 11.204*** -103.81*** -88.869*** -14.941***
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Figures 4.37, 4.38 and 4.39 present the results graphically for the volume model
over the Arbitrage rm, Information asymmetry rms and dierence in dierence
between both types respectively. Figure 4.40 is exactly same as Figure 4.39 but
we multiply all coecients by (-1 ) to have a better view.
Figure 4.37  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volume across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Arbitrage
Figure 4.38  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volume across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Information asymmetry
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Figure 4.39  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volume across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Information asymmetry
Figure 4.40  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volume across the rst
six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals
Figures 4.40 shows a high value for volume on most of the interval on cum-
dividend day. Further, the last half an hour on cum-dividend day and rst half an
hour on ex-dividend day present a high value. The suggestion here is that a high
value of volume in rms that are the most attractive target for arbitrageurs on
cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day could be related to tax-arbitrage trading
strategy.
Table 4.20 reports the dierence in dierence estimation of model (4.4 ), where
the dependent variable is trade price volatility in ve-minutes interval, for both
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Arbitrage and Information asymmetry types over cum- and ex-dividend days and
10- days after ex-dividend day.
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Table 4.20  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volatility
The table presents the coecient from estimating model (4.4) for all rms with low price volatility (Arbitrage
(AT-F) and high price volatility (Information asymmetry (IA-F) for volatility over cum-dividend day , ex-
dividend day and 10 days after the ex-dividend day. The independent variables are indicator variables for
the rst and last six thirty-minute time intervals of the trading day. The model is estimated using the
dierences in dierence procedure. The signicant levels are dened as follows: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
volatility Middle
interval
(Mid)
AT-F
Treated
interval
(Tre)
AT-F
Middle
interval
(Mid)
IA-F
Treated
interval
(Tre)
IA-F
Di-
Mid&Tre
(AT-F)
Di-
Mid&Tre
(IA-F)
Di-AT-
F& IA-F
(Tre)
Di-AT-
F& IA-F
(Mid)
Di-in-
Di
Cum-dividend day
08:00-08:30 2.962 5.094 4.770 11.797 2.133*** 7.028*** 6.703 1.808 4.895***
08:30-09:00 2.962 3.689 4.770 6.885 0.728*** 2.115*** 3.196 1.808 1.388***
09:00-09:30 2.962 3.318 4.770 6.108 0.356*** 1.339*** 2.790 1.808 0.982***
09:30-10:00 2.962 3.296 4.770 5.456 0.335*** 0.686*** 2.160 1.808 0.351**
10:00-10:30 2.962 3.064 4.770 5.270 0.102 0.5*** 2.206 1.808 0.398**
10:30-11:00 2.962 3.037 4.770 5.311 0.075 0.542*** 2.275 1.808 0.467***
13:30-14:00 2.920 3.128 4.777 4.739 0.208* -0.038 1.611 1.857 -0.246
14:00-14:30 2.950 3.007 4.791 4.681 0.057 -0.110 1.674 1.841 -0.167
14:30-15:00 2.962 2.958 4.717 4.978 -0.004 0.261** 2.020 1.755 0.265*
15:00-15:30 2.972 2.921 4.763 4.798 -0.050 0.035 1.876 1.791 0.085
15:30-16:00 3.004 2.795 4.800 4.650 -0.209* -0.151 1.855 1.797 0.058
16:00-16:30 2.962 2.948 4.770 5.297 -0.013 0.527*** 2.348 1.808 0.54***
Ex-dividend day
08:00-08:30 2.966 4.859 4.828 9.844 1.893*** 5.016*** 4.985*** 1.862*** 3.123***
08:30-09:00 2.966 3.582 4.828 6.858 0.616*** 2.03*** 3.276*** 1.862*** 1.414***
09:00-09:30 2.966 3.289 4.828 5.693 0.323*** 0.865*** 2.404*** 1.862*** 0.542***
09:30-10:00 2.966 3.255 4.828 5.731 0.289** 0.903*** 2.476*** 1.862*** 0.614***
10:00-10:30 2.966 3.051 4.828 5.385 0.086 0.557*** 2.334*** 1.862*** 0.472***
10:30-11:00 2.966 3.156 4.828 5.048 0.19* 0.22* 1.892*** 1.862*** 0.030
13:30-14:00 2.958 2.995 4.764 5.091 0.037 0.328*** 2.096*** 1.805*** 0.291*
14:00-14:30 2.974 2.931 4.858 4.706 -0.043 -0.152 1.775*** 1.884*** -0.109
14:30-15:00 2.960 2.988 4.836 4.797 0.027 -0.038 1.81*** 1.875*** -0.066
15:00-15:30 2.963 2.977 4.832 4.809 0.015 -0.024 1.832*** 1.87*** -0.038
15:30-16:00 2.973 2.937 4.850 4.741 -0.036 -0.108 1.804*** 1.877*** -0.073
16:00-16:30 2.966 3.057 4.828 5.040 0.091 0.212* 1.983*** 1.862*** 0.121
After Ex-dividend day
08:00-08:30 3.085 5.616 4.977 11.514 2.531*** 6.537*** 5.898*** 1.892*** 4.006***
08:30-09:00 3.085 3.807 4.977 6.897 0.722*** 1.92*** 3.09*** 1.892*** 1.199***
09:00-09:30 3.085 3.508 4.977 6.166 0.423*** 1.189*** 2.658*** 1.892*** 0.766***
09:30-10:00 3.085 3.359 4.977 5.799 0.274*** 0.822*** 2.44*** 1.892*** 0.548***
10:00-10:30 3.085 3.217 4.977 5.489 0.132*** 0.512*** 2.272*** 1.892*** 0.381***
10:30-11:00 3.085 3.134 4.977 5.139 0.048 0.162*** 2.006*** 1.892*** 0.114**
13:30-14:00 3.057 3.199 4.904 5.277 0.142*** 0.374*** 2.078*** 1.847*** 0.231***
14:00-14:30 3.081 3.102 4.973 4.994 0.021 0.021 1.892*** 1.892*** 0.000
14:30-15:00 3.073 3.134 4.951 5.079 0.061 0.128*** 1.945*** 1.878*** 0.067
15:00-15:30 3.098 3.033 5.014 4.830 -0.065* -0.184*** 1.797*** 1.916*** -0.119**
15:30-16:00 3.117 2.958 5.044 4.715 -0.159*** -0.329*** 1.757*** 1.927*** -0.17***
16:00-16:30 3.085 3.198 4.977 5.182 0.113*** 0.205*** 1.984*** 1.892*** 0.092
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Figures 4.41, 4.42 and 4.43 present the results graphically for the volatility
model over the Arbitrage rm, Information asymmetry rms and dierence in
dierence between both types respectively.
Figure 4.41  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volatility across the
rst six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Arbitrage
Figure 4.42  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volatility across the
rst six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals -Information asymmetry
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Figure 4.43  The dierences in dierences estimation of intraday variation in volatility across the
rst six and the last six thirty- minute time intervals
We can not see a signicant eect of the ex-dividend event on intraday pattern
of price volatility conrming the GMM estimation results.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter studies the changes in the intraday pattern of bid-ask spread, price
volatility and trading volume around the ex-dividend day. The results, across
ex-dividend week, control week, cum-dividend day, ex-dividend day, days 2 and
3 in the control week, conrm several ndings of previous studies. Consistent
with Chan et al. (1995); McInish and Van Ness (2002) and Madhavan (1992)
the intraday distribution of the spread for a sample of FTSE 100 rms shows an
L-shaped pattern. The intraday volume pattern for a sample of FTSE 100 stocks
shows a U-shaped. This result is consistent with studies in other markets such as,
the Swedish market (Niemeyer and Sandas, 1994); the Finnish market (Hedvall,
1994); the Paris market (Biais et al., 1995); the Toronto market (McInish and
Wood, 1990); the London market (Werner and Kleidon, 1996); the Hong Kong
market (Ho and Cheung, 1991); NASDAQ (Chan et al., 1995); NYSE (Gerety
and Mulberin, 1992) and the Taiwan market (Lee et al., 2001).
There is no eect of the ex-dividend day on price volatility but there are eects
on spread and volume. In both the aggregate sample and for rm by rm results,
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the ndings are interesting. The high waiting cost of not being able to trade on
the cum-dividend day increases competition between traders and results in higher
volumes and lower spreads on the cum-dividend day. The absence of a trading
deadline on the ex-dividend day helps traders to execute their orders at their
desired price and leads to wider spreads. Further, traders on the cum and ex
-dividend days may avoid the early period around the opening of the market and
trade during the middle of the day to minimise information asymmetry eects
known to be associated with opening periods.
Consistent with tax-arbitrage eects, spreads and volumes on both the cum-
and ex- dividend days for rms that are the most attractive targets for tax-
arbitrage (arbitrage) are higher than normal for the last part of the trading day.
That tax-arbitrage based trading is more likely in the nal part of the day can be
explained by the relatively higher adverse selection costs of trading in the early
part of the day. Since both spreads and volatility are higher in the rst part of
the day, anyway in general, it makes sense that tax-arbitrageurs avoid executing
trades during that period. Moreover, there is evidence that the eects on intraday
patters around ex-dividend day that we observe could be masked.
We split our sample of rms into several classications based on price volatility.
The tax-arbitrageurs are likely to prefer trading in companies with the lowest
price volatility since this minimises both adverse selection costs and execution
risks. Across all rms in our sample there is no measurable impact on spreads
and volumes of the ex and cum-dividend days but when the sample is split into
low and high volatility rms, the results show greater spreads and volumes at the
end of the day for low volatility rms and smaller spreads and volumes at the end
of the day for high volatility rms. The total sample masks, therefore, these two
opposing eects.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
Since the early 1990s electronic trading systems have become popular among -
nancial markets worldwide and an understanding of their structure and operations
is now thought almost a pre-requisite to being associated with such markets either
as regulators or as investors trading in them. It is necessary since the optimal trade
executions reduce the related transaction costs and increase the expected returns.
Portfolio trading strategies implemented in markets today cannot but factor in the
precise microstructure associated with the markets they trade in, whether they
are arbitrage based trades, style based portfolios or standard buy-and-hold port-
folios. This issue matters especially in situations where high frequency trading
strategies are concerned.
For example, when considering the trading activity associated with the cum-
dividend day and the day following it, the ex-dividend day, several tax-based and
transaction costs based theories as well as associated empirical evidence have been
known for several decades. In this light we nd for example, that waiting costs
may be greater on the cum-dividend day relative to other trading days, in light
of the approaching cum-dividend guillotine type deadline to place (submit) order
to trade and the after-tax return that is potentially forgone if they trade is not
executed. That is, the opportunity cost of not executing is likely to be relatively
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high on the cum-dividend day compared to other trading days. Moreover, there
is a little published evidence concerning the market microstructure around the
ex-dividend day. Thus, this thesis reports on an empirical study of this event and
associated trading patterns for the London Stock Exchange, and further investi-
gates issues related to ex-dividend day eects on market microstructure in liquid
and illiquid stocks and on intraday patterns. The thesis investigates two separate
questions. First, whether there are eects on market microstructure from the trad-
ing activity observed, in the order submission, around ex-dividend days. Since,
liquidity is an important concern in these situations this issue is investigated both
for stocks with high liquidity (Chapter 2) and those with lower liquidity (Chapter
3). A second question is whether there are dividend-related eects observable
at the tick-by-tick high frequency level in the trading patterns observable in the
intra-day periods around ex-dividend days and this is also investigated in the or-
der submissions and for both buy and sell orders on the limit order book (Chapter
4).
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature from the perspective of the eects of ex-
dividend days on the market microstructure associated with liquid stocks. More
specically, it discusses the eect of ex-dividend days on spread, volatility and the
order submission decisions for a sample of FTSE 100 stocks in a period between
2007-2008. Chapter 2 employs the ex-dividend week and as a control week, the
week prior. This chapter adopts a pooled panel, logit, multinomial logit and
ordered probit models. The results suggest that spread and volatility are higher
in ex-dividend weeks compared to control weeks. Spread in the ex-dividend week
is aected by price volatility and trading volume. The ndings of the Chapter
2 are consistent with tax-arbitrage and liquidity supply occurring simultaneously
around the ex-dividend day. Moreover, order submission decisions in highly liquid
stocks is aected by spread, volatility, return and duration. The one-sided pressure
expected on ex-dividend days appears to move prices may be increasing returns
and spreads, motivating liquidity suppliers to trade aggressively. Furthermore,
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these trading pressures also increase price volatility, motivating tax-arbitrageurs
to trade aggressively. These eects are stronger on cum-dividend days because of
a cum-dividend day deadline for placing tax-arbitrage transactions.
Chapter 3 extends recent studies on the eect of liquidity on order submission
decisions by studying the eects of a lack of liquidity on tax-arbitrage activities
around the ex-dividend day. Chapter 3 used the ex-dividend week and a prior
control week for a sample of FTSE SmallCap stocks in the period 2007-2008.
Several liquidity measures commonly employed in the literature are computed to
conrm empirically that there is illiquidity on FTSE SmallCap Index. Chapter
3 also adopted pooled panel, logit, multinomial logit and ordered probit models.
The results show that there are tax-arbitrage activities around the ex-dividend day
in illiquid stock as well as in the liquid stocks. The link, as in Chapter 2, between
order submission decisions on the one hand and on the other spread, volatility
and return is conrmed for FTSE SmallCap stocks, but the link between order
submission and execution probability is not found.
High frequency eects are investigated in Chapter 4, which examines intra-
day patterns of bid-ask spread, price volatility and trading volume around the
ex-dividend day. Again several models are described and estimated using the
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and dierence in dierence procedures.
Previous literature suggests an L-shape1 for the intra-day bidask spread and a
U-shaped for intraday trading volume.2 Chapter 4, nds that the intraday pattern
of spread (volume) is L-shaped (a U-shaped) for FTSE 100 stocks. Moreover, the
high waiting cost on the cum-dividend day increases competition between traders,
leading to higher volumes and lower spreads. Traders on the cum-dividend day
and the ex-dividend day are quite likely to avoid high information asymmetry
periods in the intra-day period, which are often at the start of trading day and in-
stead may trade more during the middle of the day. Consistent with tax-arbitrage
1See Chan et al. 1995; McInish and Van Ness 2002 and Madhavan 1992.
2See Niemeyer and Sandas 1993; Hedvall 1994; Biais et al. 1995; McInish and Wood 1990;
Werner and Kleidon 1996; Ho and Cheung 1991; Chan et al. 1995; Gerety and Mulberin 1992;
Lee et al. 2001.
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eects, for the rms that are most attractive target for tax-arbitrage traders, the
spreads and the volume on both cum-dividend day and ex-dividend day are greater
than normal for the latter part of the trading day. As there are relatively higher
adverse selection costs during the rst part of the trading day, tax-arbitrageurs,
therefore, are more likely to be present in the nal part of a trading day. Since
both spreads and volatility are higher in the rst part of the day, in general, it
makes sense to avoid that trading period.
5.2 Future Research
This thesis focuses on the eects of ex-dividend day on market microstructure.
It would be interesting to analyse the eect on market microstructure of those
corporate events that have high information asymmetry, such as, for example, time
horizons prior to earning announcements. In this manner, I intent to investigate
the eects on market microstructure of dierent events that have varying levels
of information asymmetry.
Ex-dividend day eects on market microstructure are likely to present not
only on the London Stock Exchange but also on other markets. It would be
interesting to study ex-dividend day eects on other markets such as derivative
and bond markets and on the markets of other types of countries, such as emerging
markets.
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